dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that Katzioris' equivocal testimony amounts to a concession that he knew or should have known of the Appellants' conduct as early as 1994, thereby causing the statute of limitations to have run well before he filed this action in 2006. I would hold that the evidence favorable to Kat-zioris, the nonmoving party in this summary judgment appeal, is sufficient to cereate a genuine question of material fact regarding what he actually knew or should have known and when that knowledge should be attributed to him. As such, I would affirm the trial court's denial of the Appellants' summary judgment motion.
Our standard of review in appeals from the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is well established:
A party is entitled to summary judgment if no material facts are in dispute.... Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"). When reviewing the propriety of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard as the trial court. Review is limited to those materials designated to the trial court. The Court accepts as true those facts alleged by the nonmoving party, construes the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and resolves all doubts against the moving party.
Estate of Mintz v. Comm. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 905 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind.2009) (some citations omitted). And, in cases such as this one, "[a] party seeking appellate reversal of the denial of summary judgment must demonstrate that the designated evi-dentiary matter negates the existence of any genuine issue of material fact...." Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, 880 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (Ind.2008).
Here, the facts favorable to Katzioris demonstrate the following. In 1994, Martin Oil hired ESG to determine the extent of Martin Oil's environmental damage. Later that year, Katzioris, his wife, and his son, Louis, observed capped pipes protruding from their property, which was adjacent to Martin Oil's property. Louis believed that the pipes were installed by the water department and "never even thought" that they could be something else. Appellants' App. at 116. Because of that mistaken belief, he did not investigate further. And Louis heard Katzioris reach *1190the same conclusion about the eapped pipes: "He [Katzioris] said[ ] those are something from the water department." Id. at 117. Around October of 2000, IDEM informed Louis that Katzioris' property had been contaminated by Martin Oil. See id.
In reversing the trial court's denial of the Appellants' motion for summary judgment, the majority emphasizes three facts. First, the majority notes that ESG claims to have received oral permission from Kat-zioris in 1994 to enter his property to test for and possibly remediate contamination. Second, the majority notes that Katzioris, whose "memory has faded and ... is unable to recall much," slip op. at 8, did not expressly refute ES@'s claim. And third, the majority recognizes that Katzioris was aware of the capped pipes on his property in the early 1990s. In light of those facts, the majority holds that, in 1994, "Katzioris possessed sufficient information to cause a reasonable person to inquire further in order to determine whether he had suffered a legal wrong." Id. at 11.
The majority's emphasis of those three facts ignores our standard of review in an appeal from the denial of a summary judgment motion. As for the majority's first and second emphasized facts, Indiana law does not require a nonmovant in a summary judgment proceeding to provide a line-by-line refutation of the moving party's evidence. Katzioris presented evidence-namely, Louis' testimony-that demonstrated that, before October of 2000, Katzioris and his family believed the capped pipes were installed by the water department. The inference from that evidence is that he and his family were unaware that an entity other than the water department-ESG-had installed the pipes. Insofar as the Appellants have presented conflicting evidence, a genuine question of material fact exists as to which evidence the factfinder should give eredit.1
The majority's third emphasized fact likewise does not overcome the moving party's burden on summary judgment. Without question, the evidence demonstrates that Katzioris and his family were aware of the capped pipes on their property as early as 1994. The question, then, is whether the mere presence of those capped pipes put Katzioris on inquiry notice that he might have a legal cause of action against another party. But "[wJhether knowledge of an adverse interest will be imputed in any given case is a question of fact to be determined objectively from the totality of the circumstances." Keybank N.A. v. NBD Bank, 699 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). Here, again, Katzioris presented evidence that he and his family believed that the capped pipes were placed on the property by the water department, not by ESG. If the factfinder credits Katzioris' evidence and discredits the Appellants', then the factfinder might also conclude that the totality of the cireumstances from the credited evidence does not require imputing notice of ESG's activity to Katzioris. Similarly, the factfinder might reach the opposite conclusion and determine that notice should be imputed to Katzioris based on the Appellants' evidence. In any event, those conclusions are for the factfinder, and not for a court at the summary judgment phase of this proceeding.
In sum, the majority's reversal of the trial court's ruling improperly reaches factual conclusions relying exclusively on the testimony of an elderly man of failing *1191health and memory. At the same time, the majority disregards the testimony of other competent witnesses. I would hold that the trial court did not err in denying the Appellants' motion for summary judgment and that the Appellants are unable on appeal to negate the existence of genuine questions of material fact regarding what Katzioris knew and when he knew it. See Chi Yun Ho, 880 N.E.2d at 1197. The evidence tendered to the trial court by Katzioris, that he and his family believed the capped pipes were placed on the property by the water department, was sufficient to survive summary judgment. Thus, I would affirm the trial court's denial of the Appellants' motion for summary judgment. I express no opinion on any issue raised by the parties but not addressed in the majority opinion.
. I note that, depending on the facts found by the factfinder, the statute of limitations might well apply to Katzioris' cause of action. But the summary judgment stage is simply too early to make that call.