Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois

JUSTICE REID,

specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:

While I concur in part with the majority opinion, I feel compelled to write separately on a troubling aspect raised in this case. There can be no question that an employer such as Ameritech has a qualified right to protect its property interests against an employee who would commit fraud such as Schmidt did. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1033. To that end, the qualified right arguably would allow the employer to make appropriate internal checks concerning the job conduct of its employees. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1033. My problem with this case is the idea that Ameritech’s authority to investigate potentially dishonest employees extends without limit. It does not and should not. When it comes to a dishonest employee, one who is attempting to take advantage of his position for personal gain, such as abusing the vacation time system, that employee cannot reasonably object to said employer’s attempts to catch him in the lies told. It is even reasonable to extend the investigation from the employee himself to his spouse, who by the nature of her relationship to the employee is likely to be caught up in the investigation. Since the spouse shares directory line records (DLR) and message unit detail (MUD) with her husband, she has no independent basis for objecting to the use of such information as detailed in the majority opinion. I believe that is where Ameritech’s authority should have ended. However, in its zealous pursuit of the truth, Ameritech accessed the phone records of Jeri Lynn Richie, merely because she is Cynthia Schmidt’s employer. I believe this is outrageous. While its interest in accessing the Schmidts’ phone records is arguably legitimate, Ameritech does not have the same interest in accessing Richie’s records. Independent of the relationship between Cynthia Schmidt and Jeri Lynn Richie, Ameritech would likely need an order of a court of competent jurisdiction in order to independently access Richie’s telephone records. It shocks the conscience to think that the door to the invasion of privacy can be opened by any such a tenuous connection.

Additionally, the majority identified that Richie’s claimed damages were substantiated by the evidence. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1038. Since I would hold that Richie set out the elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, and the majority found her damages to.be substantiated, I believe the matter should be affirmed as to her.