dissenting.
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent as I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999), does not apply retroactively.
¶ 2 As the Majority indicates, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that:
[Wjhere an appellate decision overrules prior law and announces a new principle, unless the decision specifically declares the rule to be prospective only, the new rule is to be applied retroactively to cases where the issue in question is properly preserved at all stages of adjudication up to and including any direct appeal.
Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 233, 469 A.2d 146, 148 (1983). The purpose behind the aforementioned holding is that “[ejvenhanded decision making requires that similarly situated individuals on direct appeal be treated the same.” Id. at 232, 469 A.2d at 148.
¶ 3 In the case sub judice, as in Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999), the question on appeal is whether the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46, is the exclusive remedy where a defendant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to perfect a direct appeal. In Lantzy, the Supreme Court held that the PCRA is the exclusive remedy, and, therefore, the Supreme Court rejected this Court’s conclusion that an appeal nunc pro tunc was the proper remedy.
¶ 4 Since there is no meaningful distinction which can be drawn between the facts in the case sub judice and the facts in Lantzy, the same law should be applied. Moreover, considering the similarity between this case and Lantzy, I find that this case may well have been the case which set aside prior law if Lantzy had not been decided while this particular case was pending. As such, I find that the law enunciated in Lantzy should be applied to the within case.