(dissenting, with whom Nolan and Lynch, JJ., join). I agree that, on adequate proof, a defendant may be held liable to a patient in tort for negligent performance of a sterilization procedure, or for negligently advising a patient concerning the probable effectiveness of a particular procedure compared to others. I agree, too, that a defendant may be held liable to a patient on a contract theory if the defendant’s guarantee of a result does not hold true. I do not agree, however, that damages may be assessed on either a tort or contract theory as compensation to anyone for raising and being responsible for a child born after the procedure has taken place or the advice or guarantee has been given. I do not agree that damages may reflect the impact of the birth of a child on parents’ or a family’s economic situation or mode of life. The view that I take has been embraced by a substantial majority of courts that have dealt with the issue.
This is not a run-of-the-mill medical malpractice case. Involving, as it does, the creation of new human life, it is unique, see Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243 (1982), *774and that reality must be recognized in the formulation of a proper rule of damages. Tort law finds its source in social values and ought to promote appropriate public policy. See Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987); Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244, 246-251 (1982); W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Torts § 3, at 15-17 (5th ed. 1984).
The court concludes that parents who have elected sterilization for economic reasons1 are entitled, if they establish liability, to the cost of rearing “a normal child to adulthood, offset, however, by the benefits that the parents receive in having a normal, healthy child.” Ante at 771. I agree, as do most of the relatively few courts that allow recovery of child-rearing costs, that an award of such costs without setting off the value of the child to the parents would be unfair to defendants, and therefore intolerable. However, in my view, it would be equally intolerable for a judge or jury to engage in an inquiry concerning the probable value of a child to his or her parents. The result, in my view, is that child-rearing costs should not be recoverable.
The inquiry would be intolerable because it would require a determination of whether the child represents a loss to his or her parents. Would they be better off if the child had never been born? Is the child worth less than it would cost to raise him or her and, if so, how much less? Even if such an inquiry could lead to a reasoned, and not merely speculative, conclusion, a doubtful proposition, the balancing of costs and benefits treats the child as though he or she were personal property. The very inquiry is inconsistent with the dignity that the Commonwealth, including its courts, must accord to every human life, and it should not be permitted.
The court suggests that such an inquiry would be no different in principle from other inquiries in which we now engage, such as inquiry into parental loss of consortium due to *775a child’s serious impairment from injury, or inquiry into parental loss due to a child’s death. I disagree. The policy assumption underlying the assessment of damages for loss of a child’s consortium or for a child’s death is that a child’s life has value and its impairment or termination results in loss to the parents. That assumption is consistent with the respect for human life that ought to be embodied in the public policy of this Commonwealth. The assumption underlying the availability of damages due to a child’s birth, however, is that the child’s net value to his or her parents, in light of associated costs, is less than nothing. How much less determines the amount of the plaintiffs damages. Surely, sound public policy requires a recognition that injury or death of a child, but not a child’s life, represents loss to others.
No further policy reason is needed to reject the rule embraced by the court. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to consider further, if only briefly, the potentially adverse effect of the newly adopted rule on children and families in this Commonwealth. “It is . . . the policy of this commonwealth to direct its efforts ... to the strengthening and encouragement of family life for the protection and care of children.” G. L. c. Ill, § 1 (1988 ed.). That policy is surely not served, indeed it is disserved, by a rule of damages that would require parents, if their litigation is to succeed, to persuade a judge or jury that their child is not worth to them the cost of rearing that child. The Supreme Court of Illinois put it this way: “It can be seen that permitting recovery then requires that the parents demonstrate not only that they did not want the child but that the child has been of minimal value or benefit to them. They will have to show that the child remains an uncherished, unwanted burden so as to minimize the offset to which the defendant is entitled. The court in Public Health Trust v. Brown, [388 So. 2d 1084, 1086 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)] convincingly noted: ‘The adoption of that rule [allowing recovery] would thus engender the unseemly spectacle of parents disparaging the “value” of their children or the degree of their affection for them in open court. It is obvious, whether the conclusion is phrased in *776terms of “public policy” [citation] or otherwise, that such a result cannot be countenanced.’ ” Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 202 (1983).
The court states that it is “unimpressed with the reasoning [of several courts] that child-rearing expenses should not be allowed because some day the child could be adversely affected by learning that he or she was unwanted and that someone else had paid for the expense of rearing the child.” Ante at 770. The court concludes that “it is for the parents, not the courts, to decide whether a lawsuit would adversely affect the child and should not be maintained.” Ante at 770. I disagree. The State’s interest in strengthening and encouraging family life for the protection and care of children is legitimate and strong. P.B.C. v. D.H., 396 Mass. 68, 73 (1985). Indeed, it is for the State to determine whether to adopt a rule of damages that would encourage litigation harmful to families — litigation designed to produce the result, ultimately to be discovered by the child, that he or she was supported not by the parents, because they did not want him or her, but by an unwilling stranger.
The court appears to consider only parents who have elected sterilization for economic, eugenic, or therapeutic reasons. Clearly, there may be numerous other motivations for submitting to sterilization procedures. It is unclear whether cases brought by such parents come within the rule of damages announced in this decision.