dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority has given an overly broad interpretation to Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant (1988), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 983. The Supreme Court did not limit Frampton in Morgan Drive Away. Rather, the holding of the Supreme Court in that case was consistent with prior decisions of the Court of Appeals, which held that parties could not bring an action for retaliatory discharge unless the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for exercising a statutory right or for fulfilling a statutory duty. See Hamblen v. Dan-ner's, Inc. (1985), Ind. App., 478 N.E.2d 926; Rice v. Grant County Board of Commis-stoners (1984), Ind., 472 NE2d 218; Campbell v. Eli Iilly & Co. (1980), Ind. App., 418 N.E.2d 1054; Martin v. Platt (1979), 179 Ind.App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026.
In Morgan Drive Away, Brant (the employee) had been hired pursuant to several contracts. Thus, it was doubtful that Brant was an employee at all, much less at will. Furthermore, the court only stated that it was declining to extend Frampton to the "facts of the instant case." Morgan Drive Away, 489 N.E.2d at 988. Brant was not discharged from his "employment" for exercising a statutory right or fulfilling a statutory duty. Brant was allegedly discharged after he filed a complaint against Morgan Drive Away in small claims court for his uncompensated services. Therefore, the holding in Morgan Drive Away is consistent with the prior decisions interpreting Frampton 1 and does not support Haven Hubbard's argument *862that the Supreme Court rejected an expansive reading of Frampton.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the Supreme Court created a new cause of action in McClanahan, restricting its holding to its facts. The McClanahan court merely adopted and applied the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Frampton. See Hamblen, 478 N.E.2d at 929; Rice, 472 N.E.2d at 215; Campbell, 413 N.E.2d at 1061; Martin, 179 Ind.App. at 691-692, 386 N.E.2d at 1028.
Our appellate courts, in the decisions cit, ed above, did not gradually develop the tort of retaliatory discharge; rather, the courts, including the MeClanahkan court, interpreted Frampton itself. The majority's reading of Frampton, Morgan Drive Away and MeClaonahan unduly restricts employees' ability to protect themselves from invasion of legally protected interests, which is the primary function of the retaliatory discharge remedy. See Scott v. Union Tank Car Co. (1980), Ind.App., 402 N.E.2d 992.
An employee's statutory right to seek unemployment benefits is a legally protected interest. The legislature created the right of employees to seek benefits, I.C. § 22-4-1-1, et seq., as well as the right to be free from threats, intimidation, etc., to discourage them from seeking benefits. I.C. § 22-4-84-8 (making such acts to discourage an employee from filing a class C misdemeanor).
The majority assumes that one applying for unemployment compensation benefits would not be placed in fear of losing his employment, since one must already be unemployed to receive benefits. As a general proposition, the majority's observation is correct that an unemployed person can not be fired. Nonetheless, that is exactly what happened in this case; Lawson was still an employee of Haven Hubbard, but was eligible for unemployment benefits as a result of her employer's unwillingness to, at that time, allow her to return to work.
While the damages would be difficult to measure, such a task would not beyond the ability of the trier of fact to measure Lawson's loss in being deprived of the opportunity to return to work for Haven Hubbard. The jury could evaluate the following factors:
(1) the likelihood of Lawson's return to work;
(2) the loss of wages from the time of her expected return until the time of trial; and
(3) reasonable future wages mitigated by the ability of Lawson to secure similar employment.
Violation of state statutes should not be tolerated, in either eriminal or civil forums. A violation of state public policy by employers, as expressed by the statutes enacted by the legislature, should carry with it attendant civil liability.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for trial.
. Morgan Drive Away is consistent with the pri- or Court of Appeals cases in that all of them rejected liability predicated upon a generalized violation of public policy absent a statute declaring the public policy. Hamblen v. Danner's, Inc. (1985), Ind.App., 478 N.E.2d 926, 928. Our courts have consistently held that broad statements of what the public policy is, or which of competing policies should be given precedence, should be left to the legislature. Rice v. Grant County Board of Commissioners (1984), Ind. App., 472 N.E.2d 213, 215.