concurring in result.
I concur with the Majority's treatment of the discovery rule, but I cannot concur completely with the Majority's application of the Appellate Rules of Procedure. It seems to me that there has been a misapplication of the rules as well as a misconception of the procedural posture of this appeal. First, the assumption indulged by the Majority under the guise of Appellate Rule 4(E) is misplaced. It is misplaced in the appellate sequence and misplaced as to the Rule's intended purpose as well. Appellate Rule 4(E) applies only to the dismissal of appeals which are already before the court under the rules as interlocutory appeals or as final judgments. The Rule 4(E) has nothing to do with qualifying or legitimizing the entry of a cause of action from a trial court into the appellate pipeline for review. Furthermore, the assumption indulged by the Majority is not necessary to review what is in substance a final judgment.
Pekofski as the agent of Farm Bureau has an identical claim interest. If the statute of limitations has run against Farm Bureau, it has certainly run against Pekof-ski. There is only one claim-Groen's suit for abuse of legal process. In a like manner, there is only one claim to defend against. In substance, there are no multiple claims. In substance, Pekofski and Farm Bureau are one party as to interest and as to liability exposure. The fact that as a matter of form in the pleadings they are treated as separate parties belies true procedural status of the parties. The identity of liability exposure, the identity of interest as well as the obvious principal-agent relationship completely destroy any contention that the judgment was anything other than what the trial court obviously intended-a rendering of an appealable final judgment. An interlocutory appeal was never considered by the trial court.