The opinion of the court was delivered by
Burling, J.The Township of Woodbridge enacted an ordinance “to encourage the observance of Sundays to preserve the public peace and order and to promote the public health by repose and quiet on the day assigned for rest,” but only the sale of the following items has been prohibited under pain of fine or imprisonment:
general household electrical appliances
home furnishings and bedding
furniture
floor coverings
hardware
paint and wallpaper
men’s and women’s wear
shoes
automotive services and parts (except as sold by gasoline stations licensed by Woodbridge).
Plaintiffs own mercantile establishments in the township and deal in certain of the items prohibited from Sunday *191sale. Included in the questions involved and propounded by the appellant’s and argued in this case was:
“3. Was not Woodbridge’s Sunday-closing ordinance one authorized by statute and constitutionally valid?”
The ordinance was brought under attack by a suit in lieu of prerogative writ in the Superior Court, Law Division. After Woodbridge filed its answer plaintiffs moved for summary judgment upon supporting affidavits. Wood-bridge offered nothing in opposition thereto which would raise a factual issue, and the trial court quite properly viewed as true the statements of uncontradicted facts appearing in the plaintiffs’ affidavits. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N. J. 67, 75 (1954).
The most significant recital in the moving papers is a recital of the business establishments which are engaging in Sunday trade. Among these are listed:
1 hardware and lumber supply
1 dry goods store
1 camera shop
1 lumber company
1 children’s clothing store
1 garden supply store
1 bicycle shop
1 sporting goods store
1 store selling linens, blankets and drapes
1 gift shop
4 candy stores
3 general stores
The trial court concluded that the ordinance effected “an unconstitutional invasion of personal and property rights of the plaintiffs” and deemed the true purpose of the enactment to be an attempt “to subvert competition in favor of the members of the Perth Amboy Merchants Association” and “not for the purpose set forth in the title of the ordinance.” 41 N. J. Super. 303, 313-314 (Law Div. 1956). Woodbridge pursued *192an appeal to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, and we certified the cause prior to a review below.
The determination of this case reduces itself to the principal and dispositive question: May a municipality exercise its delegated police powers to enact a Sunday closing ordinance which conflicts with a state statute?
The object of Sunday legislation is to insure a day of quiet, rest and relaxation in the community at large. As stated by Chief Justice Weintraub (then a Judge of the Superior Court) in Hertz Washmobile System v. Village of South Orange, 41 N. J. Super. 110, 114 (Law Div. 1956) :
“The thesis usually advanced today is that the object is to protect all persons from the physical and moral debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor. * * * That this objective may be sought under the police power of the State is beyond question, and so also it may not be disputed that the State may choose the Christian Sabbath for the day of rest, as our Legislature has done.”
And see State v. Fair Lawn Service Center, 20 N. J. 468, at pages 482, 483 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
The legislative policy of this State to set aside the first day of the week as one of rest and relaxation is a declaration of long standing. See State v. Maier, 13 N. J. 235, 261 (1953). Our legislative pronouncements have been in keeping with the object to be achieved by prohibiting all “worldly employment or business” and are an extension upon the design of the English statute of 29 Car. II, c. 7 (1676), which merely prohibited one from engaging in the labor of his “ordinary calling.” Reeves v. Butcher, 31 N. J. L. 224, 225 (Sup. Ct. 1865). The legislative purpose today is comparable to that of 146 years ago when Justice Pennington commented: “It is to prevent the public exposure of goods, merchandise, etc., for sale on Sunday, and selling them in consequence thereof,” Crocket v. Vanderveer, 3 N. J. L. 856, 857 [Reprint 422, 424] (Sup. Ct. 1811), and thereby provide an escape from the market place for merchant and customer alike. Sunday is to be a day of rest, and this has been “the general and immemorial policy of the state.” *193Sherman v. City of Paterson, 82 N. J. L. 345, 346 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
Prior to the revision of Title 2 of the Revised Statutes in 1951 the Sunday statute was equipped with a penalty of one dollar for any violation thereof, R. S. 2:207-l. It may have been a compromise between Sunday law advocates and antagonists. When Title 2A was enacted the penalty did not accompany the Sunday law, now appearing as N. J. S. 2A :171-1 et seq. State v. Fair Lawn Service Center, supra. Judge Clapp, speaking as chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Revision of Statutes, noted (in the foreword to Title 2A) that the object in revising the Sunday law was to eliminate obsolete provisions rather than effect substantive changes. Eurther
“It was intended to leave municipalities with the power they theretofore had, to control and regulate Sunday activity.”
N. J. S. 2A .T71-1 is not the source of the power. This is to be found in the omnibus provision of the Home Rule Act, R. S. 40:48-2, enabling municipalities to enact ordinances for the preservation of the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens. The Sunday law, however, does cast the die into which local control and regulation must necessarily take shape if the essential purpose of the enactment is to be achieved.
N. J. S. 2A :171-1 provides in terms that are unmistakably clear:
“No worldly employment or business, except works of necessity and charity, shall be performed or practiced by any person within this state * *
N. J. S. 2A :171~2 expands the list of exceptions from the general prohibition: *194By petition and referendum the legal voters of a municipality may adopt N. J. S. 2A :171-6 which would permit any person, on Sunday, to “(a) print, publish and sell newspapers, (b) sell and deliver milk, (c) walk, ride or drive for recreation, (d) hire conveyances for riding and driving, or (e) engage or take part in any form of recreation, sport or amusement that is not unlawful on other days of the week, if in so doing such person does not disturb others in their observance of Sunday.”
*193“Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the preparation and sale of drugs, meals, prepared food and nonalcoholic beverages on Sunday, nor to apply to sales of alcoholic beverages which are otherwise subject to regulation under Title 33 of the Revised Statutes.”
*194The statute stands as a declaration of state policy. Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert, 23 N. J. 71, 83 (1956). Within this framework municipalities may control and regulate Sunday activity. There is nothing in the state act which indicates that a prohibition against the sale of electrical appliances and furniture is essential to achieve a day of rest and relaxation while a prohibition against the sale of children’s clothing or the sale of lumber is of no consequence in attaining the objective. The pattern is wholly to the contrary. Prior to the revision of Title 2 a local enactment in conflict with the state mandate was ultra vires. Singer v. First Criminal Court of City of Newark, 79 N. J. L. 386 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Geisler v. Davis, 9 N. J. Misc. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1931); cf. Fennan v. Atlantic City, 88 N. J. L. 435 (Sup. Ct. 1916), affirmed 90 N. J. L. 675 (E. & A. 1917). The Revision did not alter the situation. The local power was not enhanced to enable piecemeal prohibition and consequent subversion of basic purpose. Hence, although the local power is competent to deal with the measure of penalty, as well as defining works of “necessity and charity” within the statutory contemplation, it is inconsistent with the statutory policy (“no worldly employment or business”) to single out particular business enterprises for sanction. The state legislative power has declared the incidence of the prohibition and the local power may not transgress, but must conform to the superior authority. Borough of Jamesburg v. Hubbs, 6 N. J. 578, 584 (1951); Hasbrouck Heights Hosp. Ass’n. v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 15 N. J. 447, 455 (1954). And Art. IV, Sec. VII, par. 11 of the *1951947 Constitution enjoining a liberal construction of municipal power has no relevancy here. The mandate did not operate to vest municipalities with a source of power not delegated by statute, Fred v. Mayor and Council, Old Tappan Borough, 10 N. J. 515, 518 (1952), and “unless constitutionally secured, the municipality has no inherent right of self-government beyond the control of the state.” Jersey City v. Martin, 126 N. J. L. 353, 361 (E. & A. 1941). A municipal corporation is a government of enumerated powers; it has no inherent jurisdiction to make laws or adopt regulations of government and must stay within its delegated authority. Grogan v. DeSapio, 11 N. J. 308, 321 (1953); Scatuorchio v. Jersey City Incinerator Authority, 14 N. J. 72, 85 (1953).
But it is contended that our courts have recognized the validity of local laws which singled out particular undertakings for special penalty where they have violated the state and local policy. The cases relied on all occurred at a time when the state statute contained a penalty provision, and the rationale of decision was that municipalities could legislate in aid of the state enactment, in that the municipal power was capable of imposing more severe deterrents upon persons who chose to violate the statute with impunity for the price of a dollar. Sherman v. City of Paterson, supra; Schachter v. Hauenstein, 92 N. J. L. 104 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Mazzarelli v. City of Elizabeth, 11 N. J. Misc. 150 (Sup. Ct. 1933). And the enhanced penalty for particular violations was not considered to create invidious distinctions because those not affected were presumed to be adherents to the state policy until shown otherwise.
Today the state statute contains no penalty, and the undisputed facts in the record before us demonstrate that the statutory declaration alone has no deterrent influence upon merchants who seek Sunday trade. Acknowledgment of the fact necessarily requires that local enactments, to conform with state policy, must reflect an enforcement as broad as the purpose of the Sunday law. It is no answer to suggest that in the absence of statutory enactment the *196local legislative power delegated under Home Rule might deal with the evil in degrees and attack it where the most pressing need is felt. Municipalities are bound to act in good faith in the pursuance of the common good and welfare of their citizens. The powers delegated under Home Rule legislation are amply adequate to fulfill legitimate ends. But they must not be abused.
Here the substance of the ordinance makes a sham of the declared title and purpose to be served. The doors of the paint and wallpaper stores are closed but lumber supplies flow freely, all supposedly, in the interest of peace and quiet, rest and relaxation to all merchants and the purchasing public alike. The mere statement of the proposition demonstrates that the Woodbridge ordinance was not designed to serve the stated objective.
In summarizing, it may be said: The state policy is a day of rest and relaxation. Sunday closing ordinances may not be validly enacted to conflict with a statute which declares state policy, namely, no worldly employment or business may be performed, excepting works of necessity and charity within the statutory contemplation and those activities mentioned in the statute and placed with the will of the electorate by local referendum vote. There is no middle ground. The Woodbridge ordinance conflicts with state policy and it is therefore void and of no effect.
The judgment is affirmed for the reasons stated in this opinion.