(dissenting).
As this court recognizes, the district court applied the wrong standard for determining whether probable cause existed for issuance of an administrative inspection warrant. The correct standard, as the court notes, is set out in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1824-25, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, 316 (1978) (“A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer’s Fourth Amendment rights.”). This court refuses, however, to recognize the authority of the district court to issue an administrative warrant to permit the commissioner of labor to carry out his statutory inspection duties. I believe the district court has implied authority to issue such warrants.
The General Assembly has declared in Code chapter 88 “the policy of this state to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the state safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve human resources.... ” Iowa Code *727§ 88.1 (1983). One of the prescribed means for achieving this objective is “[providing an effective [occupational safety and health standards] enforcement program which shall include a prohibition against giving advance notice of any inspection and sanctions for an individual violating this prohibition.” § 88.1(10). The commissioner is authorized to enter premises for the purpose of investigation and enforcement:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the commissioner or his representative, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized:
a. To enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer.
b. To inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and within a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent or employee.
§ 88.6(1). Any person who gives advance notice of an inspection without authority to do so is guilty of a serious misdemeanor. § 88.14(6).
In the present situation the commissioner sought to inspect the premises of Shuler Manufacturing & Equipment Co., Inc. in Griswold, pursuant to a health inspection plan under which the Shuler plant was targeted for inspection based on high health hazard potential. When the health officer presented his credentials and explained his purpose to the person in charge at the Shuler worksite, he was denied access to the premises. In accordance with regulations of the department of labor, the officer reported the refusal to the commissioner. See 530 Iowa Admin.Code 3.2(1).
As authorized by the regulation, the commissioner sought an administrative warrant in order to carry out the inspection. The regulation provides in part: “The labor commissioner shall promptly take appropriate action, including compulsory process, if necessary.” Compulsory process is defined in the regulations to mean “the institution of any appropriate action, including ex parte application for an inspection warrant or its equivalent.” Id. at 3.2(3). The regulation also provides: “Ex parte inspection warrants shall be the preferred form of compulsory process in all circumstances where compulsory process is relied upon to seek entry to a workplace under this rule.”
Thus no question exists of the commissioner’s authority to inspect or to seek compulsory process to enforce the inspection right. For present purposes the regulations have the force of statute. See Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Iowa 1982). Furthermore, no question should exist of the legislature’s intention that inspections be made whether the person in control of the premises consents or not. Otherwise the purposes of the statute would be frustrated.
The only issue in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. was whether forced inspections could be made under the federal counterpart of our statute without an administrative warrant. The Supreme Court held that an administrative warrant, or its functional equivalent, is required by the fourth amendment. See 436 U.S. at 325, 98 S.Ct. at 1826-27, 56 L.Ed.2d at 319. No such constitutional problem exists in the present case, because the regulations mandate the obtaining of an administrative warrant before a forced inspection can be made.
The Secretary of Labor sought in Barlow’s to avoid having to use authority to seek compulsory process provided in a regulation like that in this case. See id. at 325 n. 23, 98 S.Ct. at 1827, 56 L.Ed.2d at 319 (“[T]he Secretary has limited his submission in this case to the constitutionality of a warrantless search of the Barlow establishment authorized by § 8(a). He has expressly declined to rely on 29 CFR § 1903.4 (1977) and upon the order obtained in this case.”). In the present case the Iowa com*728missioner sought to do exactly what the Supreme Court requires and the Iowa regulations authorize.
The only question here is whether the district court has authority to issue the required warrant. This question was addressed in Marshall v. Huffhines Steel. Co., 478 F.Supp. 986 (N.D.Tex.1979), under the analogous federal OSHA statute. In holding that the authority to inspect carried with it implied judicial authority to issue warrants for forced inspections, the court reasoned: “To interpret the statute to mean that warrants are constitutionally required but that the courts lack the jurisdiction to issue them would be to render the statute meaningless and to undermine Congress’ stated objectives. This court is unwilling to so hold.” Id. at 988. The same conclusion was reached by the court in Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F.Supp. 873, 881 (D.Mont.1977). Because our statute is based on the federal model, the federal court interpretations constitute persuasive authority for giving a similar interpretation to our statute. See Hubbard v. State, 163 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Iowa 1969). We recently recognized our duty in construing statutes to assume the legislature intended them to have an intelligent and meaningful purpose. See In re Girdler, 357 N.W,2d 595, 597 (Iowa 1984).
This is not a problem of legislative failure to correct a constitutional infirmity. Rather it is a case in which the legislature has granted authority by implication instead of by express grant. Exactly the same situation is presented in Code section 83.13(1) in which forced inspection of coal mines is provided for upon warrants obtained by the attorney general. No express grant of judicial authority to issue the warrants is made. The authority to do so plainly arises by implication. Moreover, it is not accurate to say that federal decisions are distinguishable because they rely on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(h) for warrant authority. Rule 41(h) merely provides in relevant part that rule 41 does not override any special statutory provisions allowing searches in other situations. The provision for inspections in the federal OSHA statute is such a special provision. See Marshall, 478 F.Supp. at 989. Section 88.6(1) in our statute is also such a provision. The federal rule would be relevant here only if a contention were made that the absence of similar language in Code section 808.2 makes section 808.2 exclusive authority for search warrants in Iowa. No such contention has been made. Nor would such a contention be tenable in view of specific subsequent legislation providing for an administrative warrant for forced inspections under the controlled substances statute. See § 204.501.
The federal courts have not doubted their authority to issue inspection warrants. A division of opinion existed previously concerning whether they could issue them ex parte in the absence of a statute or regulation providing for ex parte warrants. The question was settled in Barlow’s in favor of authority to issue ex parte warrants. See In the Matter of Establishment Inspection of Keokuk Steel Castings, 493 F.Supp. 842, 845-46 (S.D.Iowa 1980). The question is answered in Iowa by the regulation authorizing ex parte warrants. See 530 Iowa Admin.Code 3.2(3).
I would hold that the Iowa district court has authority to issue search warrants for inspections by the commissioner of labor pursuant to section 88.6(1). Such warrants may issue only in accordance with the standard in Barlow’s and Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). No state policy decisions are implicated. The General Assembly has defined the relevant policy in chapter 88. That policy includes forced inspections of worksites. The courts are asked only to determine whether a proposed forced inspection meets the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. If an inspection passes muster under Barlow’s and Camara, it is reasonable. Warrant procedure under state law is not an issue. See Owens v. City of North Las Vegas, 85 Nev. 105, 107, 450 P.2d 784, 786 (1969).
*729Statutory limitations independently require that the entry be made “at reasonable times” and that the inspection or investigation be made “during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and within a reasonable manner.” § 88.6(1). Because no inspection is lawful unless it meets both the constitutional and statutory standards, the function of a warrant is merely to allow the commissioner to carry out his carefully circumscribed responsibilities over the objection of the person in control of the premises.
This court confronted analogous issues in Forst v. Sioux City, 209 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Iowa 1973), and Auxier v. Woodward State Hospital School, 266 N.W.2d 139, 142-43 (Iowa 1978). In each case the court recognized its duty to spell out procedures that were essential to the constitutional operation. of statutes. In doing so the court did no more and no less than give effect to its own constitutional role, in Forst as expositor of the Constitution of Iowa and in Auxier as expositor of the United States Constitution.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and HARRIS and LARSON, JJ., join this dissent.