concurring in result.
I fully concur with the majority decision to reverse the contempt finding in this case. I am also in full agreement that cooperation between trial courts, community mental health centers and other institutions and individuals is essential to provide necessary treatment for individuals subject to emergency detention orders.
Where I part with my colleagues is in regard to their conclusion that "A trial court presiding over a case under Indiana Code chapter 1226-5 has authority to ensure that a 'facility' is following the law in response to an emergency detention order and that a decision by a 'facility' to decline to admit an emergency detainee is in fact predicated on inadequate or inappropriate space or staff." Opinion, p. 61. I believe such a conclusion is too broad and undermines the legislative determination that the superintendent of a community mental health center is the one best suited to make admissibility decisions.
In making the determination regarding the admission of a patient subject to an emergency detention order, the superintendent of a community mental health center must balance a myriad of concerns. These range from issues of patient and staff safety to economic and liability concerns to compliance with the requirements and standards of regulatory bodies and accrediting organizations. Moreover, this balancing must occur almost instantaneously under the pressure of the moment presented by the emergency detention order. In making such calls, superintendents should not face being second guessed in contempt proceedings before trial courts themselves under the pressure of a difficult emergency placement. Allowing trial courts to hold superintendents in contempt for exercising their discretion to decline admission to an emergency detention detainee allows the courts to do indirectly what they cannot do directly-make the ultimate determination regarding admission.
In the event that a community mental health center is failing to meet its obligations to the community it serves, there are adequate regulatory and contractual remedies for such failures. Indeed, the trial court here alluded to such remedies in its comments at the contempt hearing. See Opimion, p. 54.