(dissenting).
I dissent.
In the present case the minor plaintiff pleads a right to recover on the theory he has been deprived, and would continue to be deprived in the future, of the family relationship, loss of companionship and association, the care, attention, kindness, maternal guidance, comfort and solace of his mother’s society as a result of nonfatal injuries sustained by her as a proximate result of defendants’ negligence.
As a result of the court’s ruling on defendants’ motion to strike, this appeal presents the question whether one whose negligence proximately causes physical injuries not resulting in death of a parent of a minor child is liable to such child for damages for his deprivation of the “aid, comfort, companionship, loss of services and earnings” of the parent attributable to the injury. Stated otherwise, does an independent right of action exist in the child to recover against the tortfeasor for such loss ?
The majority denies the minor the right to bring an action for such injuries suffered by him in this respect. They do so in light of what appears to be the universally accepted rule at the present time that no right of action exists in a child to recover for the loss of love, companionship, guidance and support of a parent caused by the negligence of a third party. See Hayrynen v. White Pine Copper Co., 9 Mich.App. 452, 157 N.W.2d 502, 503, cited by the majority.
As stated by the majority, the cause of action asserted by the minor plaintiff has no direct statutory .sanction and there is no decision of any appellate court which has recognized that an independent right of action exists under the common law in a child to recover against the tortfeasor for such loss.
The majority says, “No one questions the fact a child has an interest in the maintenance of a viable family relationship and in all the benefits derived from the family circle.”
For me it is not easy to understand and appreciate this reluctance to compensate the child who has been deprived of the care, companionship and education of a parent who has been injured through the *587defendant’s negligence in a nonfatal accident. See Prosser on Torts, Fourth Ed., page 896.
No better reason has been given than the lack of any right to services, the absence of precedent and the conclusion that any change must be for the legislature.
The elements of a cause of action for negligence are set forth in Restatement, Second, Torts, section 281, in this fashion:
“Statement of the Elements of a Cause of Action for Negligence. The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if:
“(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and
“(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class of persons within which he is included, and
“(c) the actor’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
“(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing an action for such invasion.”
The essential question is whether a minor’s interest in the support, care, training, guidance, comfort and solace of a mother is such an interest as to be legally protecti-ble against defendants’ negligent conduct. It will be recalled that the minor’s alleged cause of action is based on the theory he has sustained a separate loss or damage as a consequence of the nonfatal injury to his mother. It is premised upon an invasion of a right. He contends that as a result of defendants’ negligence causing physical injury to his mother not resulting in death he has been deprived of the “aid, comfort, companionship, loss of services and earnings” previously available to him.
It is apparent that one who suffers physical injury resulting in a disability less than death may, as a result, be unable to give her minor child parental attention, training, affection and support in the same degree as she might have done but for the injury.
Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543, quoted from by the majority was an action by a minor child to recover damages alleged to have been sustained as a result of defendant’s enticing her mother from their family home. The opinion contains this language which I deem relevant to a determination of whether a child has a legally protected interest in the attention, training, affection, and support of a parent free from physical disability brought about by negligence of a third party:
* * There can be no doubt that benefits of the greatest value flow to the child from its mother’s love, society, care, and services, which may be a major factor in the welfare of the child during its entire life, and that, because the child’s character, disposition, and abilities have a corresponding impact upon society, it is of the highest importance to the child and society that its right to receive the benefits derived from its mother be protected. Such a right has pecuniary value capable of measurement.” Id., 228 Minn. at 403, 37 N.W.2d at 545.
Before making the statement just quoted the court made several similar statements bearing on the importance of keeping the family relationship intact which support my contention a child has a legally protected interest in the care, companionship and education of its parent even though such statements were made by the court in the cited case in pointing out the distinction between intentional torts and unintentional or negligent torts.
“ * * * [T]he common law is not static, * * * it consists of fundamental principles and reasons and a system of legal logic rather than a fixed and inflexible set of rules, and ‘by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions, and the court at all times in the application of any *588rule should give heed to present-day standards of wisdom and justice.’ ” Halberg v. Young, 41 Haw. 634, 642, 59 A.L.R.2d 445, 451.
The common law should continue to be reappraised and reinterpreted to meet changing circumstances.
In regard to the rules of the common law and the novelty of actions of this kind the Minnesota court said:
“Novelty of an asserted right and lack of common-law precedent therefor are no reasons for denying its existence. The common law does not consist of absolute, fixed, and inflexible rules, but rather of broad and comprehensive principles based on justice, reason, and common sense. It is of judicial origin and promulgation. Its principles have been determined by the social needs of the community and have changed with changes in such needs. These principles are susceptible of adaptation to new conditions, interests, relations, and usages as the progress of society may require. * * * [citing authorities] It is but lip service to these principles to say that the common law has such capacity for growth and expansion and then to refuse to allow it effect in a particular case where that should be done. * * * [citing authorities].
“ ‘To concede this capacity for growth and change in the common law by drawing “its inspiration from every fountain of justice,” and at the same time to say that the courts of this country are forever bound to perpetuate such of its rules as, by every reasonable test, are found to be neither wise nor just, because we have once adopted them as suited to our situation and institutions at a particular time, is to deny to the common law in the place of its adoption a “flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation” which was “the peculiar boast and excellence” of the system in the place of its origin.’ ” Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. at 406, 37 N.W.2d at 547.
Unless the foregoing pronouncement, as well as the statement quoted earlier from Halberg v. Young, is to be completely ignored this court should recognize that a minor has a legally protectible interest in the nurture and training — physical, intellectual and moral — rendered by a parent free from physical disability brought about by negligence of a third party and thus hold a cause of action exists in a minor to recover against such third party for an unintentional invasion of this interest which results in the minor’s loss.
Although factually distinguishable in that the court was dealing with a wife’s action for loss of consortium allegedly due to defendant’s negligent injury of her husband, the following principle stated in Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 280, 78 N.W.2d 480, 485, is pertinent to my position in the case before us:
“While we recognize the almost total lack of precedent for allowing appellant’s cause of action, we deem precedent to be worthy of support only when it can stand the scrutiny of logic and sound reasoning in the light of present-day standards and ideals.”
In connection with the Acuff case it is interesting to note that the decision there was contrary to the rule announced in Restatement, Torts, section 695. The Council to the Members of The American Law Institute in tentative draft No. 14, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, proposes to adopt section 695 without change observing that “this is highly controversial.” The question is now before the Institute for decision. In the same tentative draft the Council proposes the following as section 707A:
“Action by child for harm caused by tort against parent. One who by reason of his tortious conduct is liable to a parent is not liable to a minor child for resulting loss of parental support and care.”
*589In reference to section 707A the Council noted for the Institute that, “This is stated with some reluctance on the part of several of the drafting group, and under compulsion of the case law.” Adoption of this section is also before the Institute for deci-sjon_
Everyone seems to agree that “a child has an interest in the maintenance of a viable family relationship and in all the benefits derived from the family circle” but no one does anything about it.
The present case is not the factual situation before the court in Egan v. Naylor, 208 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973). The Egan case came before this court on an interlocutory appeal from an order dismissing division II of plaintiff’s petition. That division was based on the claim of the decedent’s children for loss of support occasioned by the alleged negligent injury of their father which resulted in his death. Since Iowa does not recognize a common-law action for death, the action was instituted under our survival statute, section 611.20, The Code. In Egan this court held that section 613.15, The Code, did not create a right of action in children to sue for loss of support for the wrongful death of a parent. As repeatedly pointed out, death did not ensue in the case under consideration.
I adhere to the principles announced in Egan because it was an action arising by reason of the wrongful death of the parent.
I disagree with the majority who find themselves “inhibited from declaring that minor plaintiff has a maintainable cause of action by the provisions of section 613.15, The Code, 1971,” and with the conclusion that this statute permits recovery for all elements of damages asserted by the minor plaintiff in the matter before us.
I would hold the minor alleged a cause of action in his petition as amended and the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ motion to strike notwithstanding the considerations weighing against the recognition of such an action as summarized in the note in 54 Mich.L.Rev. 1023. See An-not. 59 A.L.R.2d 454, n. 1.
REYNOLDSON and McCORMICK, JJ., join this dissent.