dissenting.
The majority today decides that evidence pertaining to an incident, in which Preston Barnes was killed allegedly as the result of the violation, by police officer Stephen Pagotto (“the respondent”), of three police departmental guidelines; was legally insufficient to sustain the jury verdict convicting the respondent of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of reckless endangerment. To reach its decision, the majority purports not to have weighed the evidence, but to have neutrally concluded that the respondent’s conduct, judged from the perspective of a reasonable police officer, similarly situated, was neither grossly negligent nor reckless. See 361 Md. 528, 555-56, 762 A.2d 97, 112 (2000).
The respondent’s conduct as a police officer is directly in question here.1 On the night of February 7, 1996 the respondent conducted a vehicle stop of a car being driven by Preston Barnes. The respondent testified that he thought the car may have been stolen because of the placement of the license plate *557tag. The respondent also testified that, at about five steps from the vehicle, he saw activity that caused him to fear for his safety and therefore draw his weapon. Thus, he approached Preston Barnes, with his service weapon drawn, and instructed Mr. Barnes to stop the now drifting vehicle. This method of approach was referred to as “closing on the suspect.”
Subsequently, when Preston Barnes ignored the respondent’s instructions to stop the vehicle, the respondent then reached into the vehicle and attempted to extricate Mr. Barnes with his free hand. This method of extrication was referred to as a “control tactic.”
At some point during the control tactic, the respondent’s weapon discharged and Mr. Barnes was fatally wounded. An autopsy revealed that Mr. Barnes was wounded while either placing his hands up defensively to protect his face from an onslaught, or placing them on the steering wheel in plain view of the respondent.
The respondent was charged with violation of three police departmental guidelines: closing on a suspect with a drawn weapon; attempting to control a suspect with one hand, with his weapon drawn; and improper placement of his finger on the weapon’s trigger, rather than its trigger guard. In Maryland, a violation of police guidelines may be the basis for a criminal prosecution, which may, in turn, result in a criminal conviction. See State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 502-03, 649 A.2d 336, 349 (1994) (holding that police officer could be held criminally liable for conduct not in compliance with standard police guidelines, procedures or practices). Thus, to be sure, while a violation of police guidelines is not negligence per se, it is a factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of police conduct. See Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 139-40, 753 A.2d 41, 61-62 (2000); Albrecht, 336 Md. at 502-03, 649 A.2d at 349-50; Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 591, 594 A.2d 121, 137 (1991); Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 472 (8th Cir.1995); Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir.1990); Kladis v. Brezek, *558823 F.2d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir.1987); Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1456 (9th Cir.1984).2
As to the first violation, it was alleged that closing on a suspect could result, as it did in this case, in a discharge of the weapon, thereby killing the suspect. The second alleged violation was charged because officers were taught to control suspects with two hands and moreover, in a vehicle situation, attempting a control tactic with a drawn weapon unnecessarily endangered all passengers in the vehicle. Finally, Baltimore City Police Department guidelines specifically mandate that a police officer’s trigger finger be placed under the trigger guard, in order to prevent an “accidental” discharge and, consequently, the possibility of an unnecessary killing.
The majority quickly dismisses each of alleged violations of police guidelines. Regarding closing with a drawn weapon, the majority adopts the view of the Court of Special Appeals that the respondent approached an inherently dangerous situation and if, “in a stress-laden situation and for his own self-protection Sergeant Pagotto violated a departmental guideline, he did not thereby commit an act of gross negligence.” Pa-gotto v. State, 127 Md.App. 271, 318, 732 A.2d 920, 945 (1999). As to the one-armed vehicular extrication attempt, the majority again embraces the intermediate appellate court’s position:
*559“The testimony of both Major Melcavage and Sergeant Vittetoe dealt with the subject of vehicular extrication as an abstract academic or training exercise. Self-evidently, one can wrestle with an opponent more effectively with two hands than one. That’s the school situation. They analyzed the problem as if Sergeant Pagotto had moved forward ab initio with a pre-formed and deliberate plan to perform a one-armed vehicular extrication. Their opinions had no pertinence to an instinctive, split-second reaction, actual or hypothetical, where the right hand is already holding a weapon and where a car door suddenly opens, a foot or two away, in front of one’s face. The instantaneous reaction either to ‘move into the ambush’ or to attempt to retreat to cover of the police cruiser is something that is not concerned with the schoolroom paradigm of a model vehicular extrication.”
Pagotto, 127 Md.App. at 320-22, 732 A.2d at 946-47. On the last issue, the respondent’s placement of his trigger finger on the slide of his service weapon — and ultimately the trigger, the majority concludes that because some police departments permit that finger placement, then the conduct cannot be reckless or negligent.3
*560I cannot agree with the majority. Rather than review the sufficiency of the evidence as it is charged with doing, it improperly weighs the evidence considered by the jury. Although appellate courts have the power and are now expected to “pass upon [review] the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction,” Md. Const, art. 23,4 that review does not *561involve weighing the evidence. When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence needed to sustain a conviction obtained as the result of a criminal trial, rather than measuring the weight of the evidence to ascertain whether the State has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it determines whether there was any relevant evidence considered by the jury which would sustain a conviction. See Briley v. State, 212 Md. 445, 129 A.2d 689 (1957); Clarke v. State, 238 Md. 11, 207 A.2d 456 (1965); Pressley v. State, 244 Md. 664, 224 A.2d 866 (1966); State v. Devers, 260 Md. 360, 272 A.2d 794, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824, 92 S.Ct. 50, 30 L.Ed.2d 52 (1971), overruled in part by, In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988). Indeed, as even the majority acknowledged, review by the appellate court is limited to viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, to ascertain whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a *562reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 at 573 (1979); Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 175, 443 A.2d 78, 80 (1982). Quite recently, this Court noted that, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a criminal conviction, “[w]e do not measure the weight of the evidence; rather, our concern is only whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 457, 697 A.2d 462, 464 (1997) (emphasis added).
In a review of the sufficiency of evidence, it is not the place of this Court to weigh the finder of facts — the jury’s — credibility determination or any of the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Indeed, this Court should only measure, and not weigh, the evidence to ensure it is based on more than a scintilla of evidence. As such, the evidence on which a conviction rests is sufficient if it measures to “more than surmise, possibility, or conjecture ... [where] such evidence [is] of legal probative force and evidential value.” Ramsey v. D.P.A. Associates, 265 Md. 319, 324, 289 A.2d 321, 324 (1972) (internal citations omitted). See also Arshack v. Carl M. Freeman Associates, Inc., 260 Md. 269, 276, 272 A.2d 30, 34 (1971); Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 247, 213 A.2d 549, 554 (1965).
Neither does an appellate court weigh a witness’ expert testimony where the “facts upon which an expert bases his opinion ... permit reasonably accurate conclusions as distinguished from mere conjecture or guess.” See Sippio v. State, 350 Md. 633, 653, 714 A.2d 864, 874 (1998); State Dept. of Health v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 520, 209 A.2d 555, 559-60 (1965). It is then, according to Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 42, 542 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1988):
“proper to lay before the jury all the facts, which are necessary to enable them to form a judgment on the matters in issue; and when the subject under investigation requires special skill and knowledge, they may be aided by the opinion of persons whose pursuits or studies or expert*563ence, have given them a familiarity with the matter in hand.”
Therefore, if a jury’s judgment of conviction is supported by the testimony of a qualified expert, ordinarily the evidence is sufficient. See Jewell v. State, 216 Md. 110, 112, 139 A.2d 707, 708 (1958) (stating that expert evidence establishing value of stolen property was sufficient basis for conviction of grand larceny); Cook v. State, 84 Md.App. 122, 133, 578 A.2d 283, 288 (1990), cert. denied, 321 Md. 502, 583 A.2d 276 (1991) (opining that expert testimony of police officer permitted jury to conclude conspiracy to distribute cocaine existed and that appellants exercised joint and constructive possession of cocaine); Sutton v. State, 4 Md.App. 70, 72, 241 A.2d 145, 146 (1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 251 Md. 752 (1968) (holding testimony of police handwriting expert sufficient to convict); compare Davis v. State, 100 Md.App. 369, 389-90, 641 A.2d 941 (1994) (deciding expert opinion based solely on circumstantial physical evidence, not enough to support conviction, notwithstanding that conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence alone); but see, U.S. v. Duck, 423 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (holding that testimony of handwriting expert, standing alone, was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for forging endorsement on United States Treasurer’s check).
Once a jury has performed its task and deliberately decided to convict, appellate courts should be slow to second guess that decision. To be sure, a jury verdict that is based on insufficient evidence may be overturned, but the case is rare indeed, usually involving jury instructions that are inadequate. See, e.g., Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 237, 623 A.2d 630, 636 (1993) (failing to instruct jury that prosecution was required to prove specific intent, “resulted in a guilty verdict that otherwise would not have been rendered”); Franklin v. State, 319 Md. 116, 571 A.2d 1208 (1990) (overturning conviction because jury instruction that specific intent to kill was not required to establish crime of assault with intent to murder, was clearly erroneous); State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 205, 411 A.2d 1035, 1039 (1980) (reversing conviction because jury *564not instructed it could find defendant not guilty where “the error was likely to unduly influence the jury and thereby deprive the defendant of a fair trial”).
There are instances, of course, where this Court has overturned a criminal conviction because of insufficient evidence. In Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 697 A.2d 462 (1997), a conviction was reversed because, “any finding that [defendant] was in possession of marijuana could be based on no more than speculation or conjecture.” Id. at 459, 697 A.2d at 465. Judge Raker, for the court, further opined that:
“Circumstantial evidence may support a conviction if the circumstances, taken together, do not require the trier of fact to resort to speculation or conjecture, but ‘Circumstantial evidence which merely arouses suspicion or leaves room for conjecture is obviously insufficient. It must do more than raise the possibility of guilt or even the probability of guilt. [I]t must ... afford the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
Id. at 458, 697 A.2d at 465 (internal citation to treatise omitted).
Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 693 A.2d 781 (1997), is another example of this Court’s rare reversal of a jury verdict on the basis of the insufficiency of criminal evidence. There, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for burglary, concluding that the State failed to produce any evidence of an actual breaking and there was “even less [constructive] evidence upon which a jury could base an inference that Appellant’s entrance into the house was gained by ‘artifice, fraud, conspiracy or threats.’ ” Id. at 558, 693 A.2d 781, 796; see also Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 663, 612 A.2d 258, 275 (1992) (reversing conviction because evidence of breaking was insufficient). Plainly put, in a determination of “insufficiency of evidence it is necessary to show that there was no legally sufficient evidence or inferences drawable therefrom on which the jury could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 563, 276 A.2d 214, 220 (1971) (emphasis added). This is so because, as we pointed *565out in Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 214, 522 A.2d 1338, 1343 (1987), citing Talley v. Dept. of Correction, 230 Md. 22, 28-29, 185 A.2d 352, 356 (1962), “the individual and total weight assigned to the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury.” See also J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2251 (Chadborne rev.1981).
The majority correctly points out that, for an accused police officer’s conduct to amount to gross negligence, it must manifest, under the circumstances, such a departure from that of a reasonable police officer similarly situated, so as to amount to a disregard of the consequences and an indifference to the rights of others. See State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 501, 649 A.2d 336, 349 (1994); Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 590, 102 A.2d 277, 280 (1954). In this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, consisting of expert testimony and inferences drawable therefrom, clearly is legally sufficient. This simply is not a case in which the jury was left to speculate or guess either as to the respondent’s conduct or the quality of that conduct. The evidence clearly addressed both issues, and a jury could have found the respondent grossly negligent in failing to comply with the guidelines of the Baltimore City Police Department.
At trial, no less than thirteen witnesses, with six of them, i.e., Major Melcavage, Major France, Sergeant Meier, Mr. Vittetoe, Mr. Meiklejohn and Mr. Key, qualified and testifying as experts, provided evidence regarding the alleged violations of the police guidelines.5 On the basis of that testimony alone, *566the jury could fairly have been convinced that the respondent’s conduct was grossly negligent and that he recklessly endangered the lives of Preston Barnes and the passengers in the car Mr. Barnes was driving.6
The record is replete with testimony supporting the jury’s verdict convicting the respondent on the basis that closing on Mr. Barnes with his service weapon drawn,7 was a violation, recklessly done,8 of police department guidelines. Sgt. Vitte-toe testified, on direct examination:
*567“If [Pagotto] says that he stopped [the car] for suspicion of being stolen, this elevates the stop from not a routine, unknown risk stop, but this is now a high risk stop because you don’t know the other components involved in this, exactly how was the car taken. To me [closing] is reckless because if this is not a routine or unknown risk traffic stop, Sergeant Pagotto should have never left his vehicle or the area surrounding his vehicle.
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“His closing as we’ve heard in here, the closing of the distance, should have ceased when Sergeant Pagotto felt that something was wrong with this traffic stop.... I thought that Sergeant Pagotto was reckless in closing the distance, in having his gun out.”
Sgt. Vittetoe was corroborated by the following testimony elicited from Major France on cross examination:
“[DEF. ATT’Y]: All right, and what is the training of Baltimore City police officers on closing with a gun in your hand?
“[MAJ. FRANCE]: Closing with a gun in your hand is not good training. It’s not part of our training.
“[DEF. ATT’Y]: Why not?
“[MAJ. FRANCE]: I believe for a couple of reasons. One it limits your mobility. Two, you have nowhere else to go if you need the other hand and it’s a situation where there’s lethal force required, and, three, the gun can be taken from you and used against you.”
Several other witnesses, ie., Officer Wagner, Major Melca-vage, Sergeant Meier, Mr. Key, and the respondent himself, provided further corroboration. Officer Wagner testified that an officer is not supposed to close with a gun in hand because “the assailant is close enough he can take that gun away from you and use it on you ... you can struggle, whatever.” Major Melcavage testified that if a handgun is introduced into a closing situation, then you “unnecessarily endanger the police officer, the subject you are trying to control, or anyone else.” Sergeant Meier testified that closing with the suspect with the *568weapon drawn may end up in a “struggle over that weapon, a discharge of that weapon which may injure or kill the police officer, or may injure and kill the suspect or any innocent bystanders that are around.” Mr. Key, the defense witness, even stated that the respondent should not have closed with his weapon drawn because it was “not consistent with guidelines.”
Moreover, there was testimony, including that of the respondent, indicating that the respondent was familiar with the applicable guideline. Sergeant Meier testified that on the 1994 in-service training test, the respondent correctly answered the question of whether an officer should close on a suspect with a drawn weapon. Mr. Meiklejohn testified that on the 1995 in-service training test, the respondent again correctly answered the question regarding closing on a suspect. The respondent himself conceded his actual knowledge of the applicable guideline:
“[OFFICER PAGOTTO] (reading): An officer should not close with or tackle a running suspect but should direct other units to contain him or her---- If possible, officers should not close with suspects to frisk or handcuff until backup officers arrive to assist.... Maintain a safe reactionary distance-ten feet or more when the pistol is drawn.... If the suspects run, pursue them but do not close with or tackle them.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Okay. Now, are you familiar with those concepts?
“[OFFICER PAGOTTO]: Yes, sir.
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“[OFFICER PAGOTTO] (reading from 1995 in-service training test): Closing with a suspect with your weapon drawn could very likely result in the suspect grabbing the officer’s weapon?
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: And the answer to that is what?
“[OFFICER PAGOTTO]: True.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y: And you answered it correctly?
*569“[OFFICER PAGOTTO]: Yes, sir.”
There was also evidence that supported the jury’s finding that the respondent attempted a one-armed vehicular extrication in violation of police regulations. Major Melcavage, on direct examination, testified why a one-armed vehicular extrication was, and is, improper:
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Was part of the training [you provided to defendant] ever to use or hold a handgun in one hand while applying a defense tactic?
“[MAJ. MELCAVAGE]: No, sir.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Why is that?
“[MAJ. MELCAVAGE]: No. Because all the techniques I know that I taught required two hands. Plus, if you enter the handgun into the equation, you unnecessarily endanger the police officer, the subject you are trying to control, or anyone else.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Now would this training be altered in that aspect whether the person who the defense tactic is being applied to is either on the street or in a vehicle?
“[MAJ. MELCAVAGE]: No, sir.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: If you have a gun in your hand and you intend to remove a driver from a vehicle through the use of a control tactic, what should you do with the weapon?
“[MELCAVAGE]: You should holster your weapon.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: And why is that?
“[MELCAVAGE]: Because you need two hands to gain control of an individual or to apply a technique as taught at the academy as I taught. And by keeping the gun in the situation, you are unnecessarily endangering yourself. They can take the gun from you just as well, the subject could take the gun from you just as well as you using it on them, or the gun could go off and you could injure innocent bystanders, yourself, or the subject.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Okay. Would that fact change whether the vehicle was stationary or moving?
“[MELCAVAGE]: No, sir.
*570“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: If you have your weapon drawn and it is not safe to holster it in order to use the control tactic, what should you do?
“[MELCAVAGE]: It [sic] is not safe to holster them, you need to seek cover and call for assistance, call for other officers. You have to disengage.”
There was more testimony which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied upon in finding that the respondent’s conduct was grossly negligent. Sgt. Vittetoe added:
“At one point in time in Sergeant Pagotto’s report he had indicated that he reached in for a control tactic on [Preston Barnes]. That goes beyond modern police standards. There is nothing that I know of today where a police officer controls someone with one hand and with a gun in the other. And this is for a reason. First of all, it’s difficult to control somebody with one hand. You don’t know of their physical size, strength, abilities, or anything else, and it generally requires two hands. Also, for the protection of the firearm, once you take it out and are dealing with a suspect, you don’t want to present that gun to that person because that weapon can now be used against you. If an altercation were to occur at that point in time, it could not only deal in injuries involving the person you are dealing with or other innocent parties that may not be in that conflict, for example, passengers in the vehicle or innocent civilians standing away from this particular scene.... ”
Major Melcavage testified, on cross examination, that approaching an open car door with a gun in hand and reaching into that car as a defense tactic is a violation of the standard and “is not in keeping with the training of the police academy.” Major France agreed:
“[DEF. ATT’Y]: In other words, that door opens and he can’t see everything going on and he makes a decision for his own protection to get that guy — and to reach in and get that guy for his own protection, you really think that’s a problem?
“[MAJ. FRANCE]: I have a problem with that.”
*571Mr. Meiklejohn opined that the respondent “should have never been up to that vehicle close enough to where he’s reaching in. I believe that reaching in is extremely reckless on his part.”
One of the passengers, a Mr. Jackson, testified on direct examination:
“[MR. JACKSON]: The only reason why Preston was scared, [Officer Pagotto] hopped out of the car with the gun in his hand.
“[DEF. ATT’Y]: The car was drifting?
“[MR. JACKSON]: He had to hold his hands on the steering wheel.
“[DEF. ATT’Y]: The car was drifting because he wanted it to drift?
“[MR. JACKSON]: No, it was something with the automatic.
“[DEF. ATT’Y]: Are you telling me that he couldn’t put his foot on the brake and stop that car?
“[MR. JACKSON]: Yeah, it was on the brake.
“[DEF. ATT’Y]: Well, then why was the car moving if he didn’t want it to move?
“[MR. JACKSON]: It wasn’t in park.
“[DEF. ATT’Y]: I understand — the car — you understand—
“[MR. JACKSON]: He was nervous. In the car he was nervous.
“[DEF. ATT’Y]: I understand he was nervous, but if the car is in drive and his foot is off the gas and on the brake won’t the car stop?
“[MR. JACKSON]: Maybe because he thought the car was in park.”
Adding a moving vehicle to the equation, testimony revealed, makes what the respondent did more dangerous and reckless.9 Sergeant Vittetoe addressed the issue on direct examination:
*572“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Sergeant Vittetoe, would [your opinion that Officer Pagotto was reckless the night in question] be altered in any way or influenced if there were evidence in the case that Preston Barnes was fleeing from the police at the time of the shooting?
“[SGT. VITTETOE]: Yes, sir, it would change.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: And how’s that?
“[SGT. VITTETOE]: First of all, it would worsen. I would feel that his actions would be more so reckless and against his agency policy. His policy or guidelines do indicate that they are not supposed to chase after someone fleeing. Yes, they are to observe them and do certain things but not to chase them, particularly with your gun out. So I would look at that as being even more so reckless than my previous statement.”
Nor is there evidence that Mr. Barnes did anything justifying the respondent’s actions. Mr. Barnes’ hands were visible at all times after the respondent approached the car. Mr. Jackson testified that even when the respondent opened the car door,10 Mr. Barnes only placed his hands near his face in a defensive gesture. On cross examination, Mr. Jackson continued to assert that Preston Barnes’ hands were visible.11
*573This testimony was corroborated by that of the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner. Regarding the location of Mr. Barnes’ hands just prior to being shot to death, he testified that the wound path was both consistent with Preston Barnes’ hands being on the steering wheel and with his hands up to protect his face.
The testimony of Officer Wagner regarding his actions during the traffic stop, that he never drew his gun and neither received any communication from the respondent indicating the need to do so, is both relevant and telling. In particular, Officer Wagner testified:
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Was there any activity in the vehicle that you could observe that would cause you to draw your weapon?
“[OFFICER WAGNER]: There [sic] were very excited and moving, but none to make me draw my weapon, no----
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: At any time during the course of this car stop did you receive any communication from the defendant that would indicate you should be concerned or draw your weapon?
“[OFFICER WAGNER]: No.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Is there any practice or protocol that should kick in when a — one officer in a team of two makes observations on the street that would be important to the other officer?
“[OFFICER WAGNER]: The officers should communicate to what they see and observe in the vehicle.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: All right. So if one officer sees activity that he believes is suspicious of an armed individual in the vehicle such that he draws his weapon, that should be communicated to the partner?
*574“[OFFICER WAGNER]: Should be.”
The jury also heard testimony, which it could have believed, and obviously did, regarding the third allegation, the placement of the respondent’s trigger finger on his weapon’s slide, and how that violation of the guidelines amounted to gross negligence. Major Melcavage testified as to why there is a requirement that the finger be placed under the trigger guard: to avoid “an accidental discharge, shooting the weapon off, unnecessarily injuring somebody.” He explained on cross examination, the reason for the change of the requirement from placing the finger on the slide,12 ie., “at times at the Police Academy, there were accidental discharges with them, with them like this (indicating placement).”
The State also elicited testimony from Sergeant Meier regarding his expert opinion that the violation of the finger placement regulation was the cause of death of Mr. Barnes:
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Sergeant Meier, do you have an opinion, based on the statement rendered by the defendant in this case, whether his actions caused the death of Preston Barnes?
“[SGT MEIER]: Yes.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: What is it?
“[SGT. MEIER]: I believe his actions did cause the death of Preston Barnes by having his finger on the trigger of a weapon when he shouldn’t have, for one thing, and closing with an individual that he felt could bring great harm or even death to him.”
And from Mr. Meiklejohn, the following testimony was elicited:
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Mr. Meiklejohn, if the defendant had his finger where it was supposed to be according to his training, this discharge never would have taken place?
“[MR. MEIKLEJOHN]: It’s my opinion that your statement is correct.”
*575Finally, it is significant that there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that the respondent’s life was not in immediate danger. Mr. Meiklejohn testified to reading the respondent’s statement and seeing “nothing that shows that his life is in immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury.”
Thus, the State produced evidence, which, if accepted, proved that the respondent initiated the vehicle stop in question on an admittedly pre-textual basis. Having made the stop, he left his police cruiser and closed on the “suspects” with his service weapon drawn. When the driver of the car failed to come to a complete stop and, in fact, attempted to flee, the respondent, with gun still in hand and his finger on the trigger, opened the door of the drifting car in an effort to effect an one-armed vehicular extrication. Certainly the respondent’s conduct — closing with a drawn weapon, attempting a one-armed vehicular extrication and placing his finger on the trigger slide rather than the under the trigger guard-violated departmental guidelines and, based on expert testimony, was reckless and criminally negligent. As a result of that conduct, Mr. Barnes was shot and killed. The jury accordingly was presented with ample evidence on the basis of which it could, and obviously did, convict the respondent.13
*576As the majority and I agree, the conduct of the respondent must be viewed from the eyes of a reasonable similarly situated police officer. In this case, we need look no further than the respondent’s partner. Officer Wagner, who was present on the night in question, testified that had he observed dangerous activity then he would have “discarded my *577flashlight, pulled my weapon and used the radio that I had to call for additional units or a uniform backup.” Thus, he would not have closed on the “suspects” with a drawn police weapon, and in fact, saw no need to ever draw his weapon. Neither would he have opened the vehicle door, or had his finger on the trigger of his weapon while attempting a one-armed vehicular extrication.
The latest statement of Maryland law in this area is Al-brecht, supra. In Albrecht, this Court, with Judge Raker also writing for the majority, upheld the conviction of a police officer who killed a civilian during a vehicle stop, following however, a chase, concluding that the record was “replete with evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that Albrecht did not comply with Montgomery County departmental guidelines, procedures or practices.” Id. at 502-03, 649 A.2d at 349. As in Albrecht, “[ultimately, deadly force was used, without justification, and [Mr. Barnes] was killed. [I] conclude that sufficient evidence was presented from which a rational trier of fact could have found that [the respondent’s] actions on [February 7, 1996], in their totality, were both grossly negligent and reckless.” Id. at 486, 649 A.2d at 341.
To be sure, the facts and circumstances surrounding the police shooting in Albrecht differ significantly from those in this case. There, Officer Albrecht and Officer Thomas responded to the scene of a stabbing. When they arrived, they learned that the suspects, one whom Albrecht knew by name, might be armed and had fled the scene in a green Chevrolet driven by Rebecca Garnett. The officers spotted the green Chevrolet and gave chase. Although they lost the vehicle, further searching revealed it parked in a neighborhood parking lot. Exiting his cruiser, Albrecht yelled “Stop! Freeze!” and, at that time, removed his customized shotgun from its rack inside his vehicle, immediately placed a shotgun shell in the chamber and “racked” the shotgun into its final stage of firing capability. He then aimed the shotgun directly at Garnett, who at that time posed no threat or danger to any other person. Taking account of the facts and circumstances in that case, ie., Albrecht’s drawing and racking of a shotgun *578fitted with a bandolier and bringing it to bear, with his finger on the trigger, on an unarmed individual who did not present a threat to the officers or any third parties and in a situation where nearby bystanders were exposed to danger, we rejected Albrecht’s argument that the shooting was unintentional and thus not reckless. We reasoned, 336 Md. at 486, 649 A.2d at 341:
“[T]he evidence was sufficient to establish that, notwithstanding the fact that Rebecca Garnett did not pose any danger to either Albrecht himself or to third parties, Al-brect took substantial steps to use deadly force against her — to wit, racking his shotgun and aiming it, with his finger on the trigger, at Garnett. Ultimately, deadly force was used, without justification, and Rebecca Garnett was killed. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented from which a rational trier of fact could have found that Albrecht’s actions ... in their totality, were both grossly negligent and reckless.”
The majority notes that, although “the two cases are facially similar, there are [five factors specifically identified in Al-brecht ] that are not present in this case.” 361 Md. at 554, 762 A.2d at 111. That is true, of course; however, that is also to be expected. These cases are fact specific and therefore must be decided on their unique facts and circumstances. Consequently, simply because all of the same facts and circumstances that informed the Court as to the actions of Albrecht, in that case, do not exist in this case, does not mean that the reasoning underlying Albrecht does not apply here. In point of fact, the relevant facts and circumstances of the instant case include the placement of the respondent’s trigger finger, whether the victim posed a threat to the officer, and whether the officer’s actions exposed others to danger, factors also present in Albrecht. Analyzing the facts and circumstances of this case, the jury could have concluded, and obviously did, that the respondent had his finger on the trigger of his service weapon, in violation of departmental guidelines; that, while so holding the weapon, he closed on the stopped car and all “suspects,” in violation of another departmental guideline; and *579that he tried to extricate one “suspect” from the car with one hand, while continuing to hold the weapon, with finger on the trigger, in violation of yet another departmental guideline. Because there was evidence that Mr. Barnes’ hands were not hidden from view, and, in fact, were on the steering wheel or the dashboard, the jury could have and in all probability did, conclude that the two passengers in the car driven by Mr. Barnes were exposed to danger, thereby rejecting the “finding” made by the majority that the confrontation “took place at night on an empty street.” 361 Md. at 555, 762 A.2d at 111.
The dissenter in Albrecht focused on the aiming of the gun and not the actual discharge thereof, to assert that in the split second before the gun went off the officer was not criminally liable. Id. at 507, 649 A.2d at 351 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). The rationale, in other words, was that we should “freeze in time the split second before the gun went off and inquire as to whether, at that instant Officer Albrecht could have been found guilty of gross criminal negligence and reckless endangerment or not.” Id. at 508, 649 A.2d at 352. We rejected that argument, id. at 505, 649 A.2d at 350; it was wrong then, and it is wrong now. As we pointed out in Albrecht, that approach ignores the facts and circumstances that inform the defendant’s actions. Id. As related to that case, we said, it “ignores the testimony at trial ... and particularly that on the day in question, considering the facts and circumstances facing Albrecht, he should not have had his finger on the trigger, but rather it should have been on the trigger guard.” Id.
Judge Chasanow, concurring, while also rejecting the freeze frame approach, took the analysis a step further, requiring an analysis of the very act that caused the ultimate injury, the pulling of the trigger, “[b]ut we should not freeze frame and stop our analysis before the trigger was pulled. We cannot access Albrecht’s culpability in taking Rebecca Garnett’s life and, in doing so, exclude the ultimate act that took her life-pulling the trigger.” Id. at 506, 649 A.2d at 351. He went on to explain:
*580“The trial judge found that the act of pulling the trigger was unintentional; he did not find that it was reasonable. The intermediate appellate court assumes the unintentional shooting is a non-negligent shooting. Albrecht did not intentionally pull the trigger, but the trial judge was justified in finding he negligently, carelessly or even recklessly pulled the trigger. There was no external cause for the shotgun discharge, and the fact that Albrecht may have been ‘startled into pulling the trigger’ of a loaded, racked, and aimed shotgun need not, as a matter of law, excuse his carelessness in doing so. The pulling of the trigger could be found to be a careless act that, when considered along with all the antecedent acts, at least tips the scale to permit a finding of gross negligence.”
Id. This applies equally well to the facts sub judice. Particularly in this case, when one considers that the respondent’s service weapon was equipped with three safeties that prevented it from firing unless the trigger was pressed with Wk pounds of pressure, making it almost impossible to discharge if dropped or struck against an object.
I dissent.
. As we are required to do, we set out the facts in the light most favorable to the State. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999); Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 535, 573 A.2d 831, 833 (1990).
. The purpose of the police guidelines, as testimony established, is to determine the reasonableness of police conduct, within the department itself:
"[SGT. MEIER]: The purpose of these guidelines is to present the topic of the police use of deadly force in a way which prepares officers to make quick sound decisions under extremely stressful conditions. The information contained herein is consistent with and in support of General Order 288C 2, Rules and Regulations, Rule 3, Firearms. Officers will be held accountable for adhering to the specific requirements of this guideline.”
And they apply throughout the department, even to special units:
"[THE COURT]: Does an officer assigned to the gun squad, if I might, have — are there different expectations of that officer with respect to training, fulfillment of duties, policy of the Baltimore City Police Department?
"[MAJ. SHREVE]: No, not at all. They're all expected to adhere to policies and procedure [and guidelines].”
. Indeed, the majority today purports “to sit as a jury and set aside the lawful juty’s findings of fact.” Anderson v. Fuller, 455 U.S. 1028, 1033, 102 S.Ct. 1734, 1737, 72 L.Ed.2d 150, 152 (1982) (Burger, C.J., O’ Con-nor, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari). In Anderson, the Court decided that the petitioner, who may have been acting as a lookout, was convicted by insufficient evidence, which did not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner intended to burn a home and cause the subsequent death of two children. The evidence in Anderson consisted of a neighbors testimony that she saw a young man named Fuller, along with a few other boys, standing in front of the Turner house on the morning of the fire. A 14-year-old, Coleman, testified that he saw Fuller and Meadows, both young men, behind the house. Coleman further testified that Fuller looked up and down the alley while Meadows was setting the fires. Fuller's mother testified that he was home asleep until 9 o’clock on the morning of the fire and therefore, could not have been involved.
The dissenters in Anderson noted, id. at 1031, 102 S.Ct. at 1735, 72 L.Ed.2d at 151, that the “verdict shows the jury did not believe Fuller’s mother and accept his alibi defense. The jury obviously accepted as true the testimony of Coleman and the testimony of two other witnesses *560who said that they saw Fuller at the scene on the morning of the fire.” The caution of that dissent, id. at 1033, 102 S.Ct. at 1736-37, 72 L.Ed.2d at 152, directed to the Anderson majority, is also an appropriate caution to the majority in the case sub judice:
"It is sheer nonsense to suggest that, on this record, the 12 jurors acted irrationally. With all respect, I suggest that the ... majority forgot that it is the function of the jury to determine who is telling the truth. Judges betray their function when they arrogate themselves over the legal fact finder. Either we accept the jury system with the risk of human fallibility or we ought to change the structure of the system and redefine the standard of review____The [court's below] did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as the law and their oaths require. If they had, they could not have rationally concluded that the jury could not reasonably reach the result it reached. Instead, the courts reweighed Coleman’s testimony, noting that he was young, that he had been placed in a youth house because he ran away from home, and that he attended a ‘special school.' Put simply — and bluntly, as this case demands — the ... judges who set aside this ... judgment acted like jurors, not jurists.”
. Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as relevant, provides:
“In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.”
For clarification as to the power of the jury to judge the law, see Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 174-75, 423 A.2d 558, 562-64 (1980); Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 89, 437 A.2d 654, 657 (1981); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 611, 468 A.2d 45, 83-84 (1983); Brooks v. State, 299 Md. 146, 149, 472 A.2d 981, 983 (1984); In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 318, 539 A.2d 664, 682 (1988). See also, Jenkins v. Smith, 38 F.Supp.2d 417, 420 (D.Md.1999). In Stevenson, the Court construed the broad language of Article 23 as only giving the jury limited power to judge all aspects of the law. Currently, however, the jury’s power to judge any of the law is nonexistent, as the Court opined, (“[w]hat it all boils down to now is that the jury’s right to judge the law is virtually eliminated; the provision, as we have construed it, basically protects the jury’s right to judge the facts”). In re Petition, supra, 312 Md. at 318, 539 A.2d at 682.
Prior to 1950, the legal sufficiency of the evidence was a question exclusive to the jury, and was not subject to review by this Court. See, *561e.g., World v. State, 50 Md. 49 (1878); Deibert v. State, 150 Md. 687, 133 A. 847 (1926); Rasin v. State, 153 Md. 431, 138 A. 338 (1927); Willie v. State, 153 Md. 613, 139 A. 289 (1927); Davis v. State, 168 Md. 10, 176 A. 281 (1935); Folb v. State, 169 Md. 209, 181 A. 225 (1935); Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410, 20 A.2d 146 (1941); Wilson v. State, 181 Md. 1, 26 A.2d 770 (1942); Meyerson v. State, 181 Md. 105, 28 A.2d 833 (1942); Foreman v. State, 182 Md. 415, 35 A.2d 171 (1943); Peters v. State, 187 Md. 7, 48 A.2d 586 (1946); Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306, 49 A.2d 787 (1946); Brack v. State, 187 Md. 542, 51 A.2d 171 (1947); Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 52 A.2d 484 (1947); Abbott v. State, 188 Md. 310, 52 A.2d 489 (1947); Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 56 A.2d 818 (1948); Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 63 A.2d 599 (1949); Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 69 A.2d 456 (1949); appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 940, 70 S.Ct. 797, 94 L.Ed. 1357 (1950); Winkler v. State, 194 Md. 1, 69 A.2d 674 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 919, 70 S.Ct. 621, 94 L.Ed. 1343 (1950). A review of the history of the 1950 Amendment to the Maryland Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Article 23 (previously Article 15, Section 5), shows that the reason for the present day change was because it was believed that common jurors came "from all classes of people, whose education and business cannot as a general rule have qualified them to decide legal questions...." Judge Stedman Prescott, Juries As Judges of the Law: Should the Practice Be Continued?, Address Before the Maryland State Bar Association (June 24, 1955), in Transactions: Maryland State Bar Association, 60th Annual Meeting, June 1955, at 255-56. Therefore, because of the restrictive history of this Court’s power to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, it should sparingly wield the power to overturn a jury verdict.
. It is useful to sum up the curriculum vitae of the various dramatis persona: Major Melcavage, a former instructor at the Baltimore City Police Training Academy; Major France, the commanding officer for the Eastern District, Baltimore Police Department; Sergeant Meier, an instructor with the Firearms Training Unit of the Education and Training Division of the Baltimore City Police Department; Sergeant Vitte-toe, a former instructor at the Maryland State Police Academy; Mr. Meiklejohn, a retired Captain of the Montgomery County Police Department, who had been involved for years in training members of that department; and Mr. Key, a defense witness, who was a former instructor at the Baltimore City Police Academy and the author of the guidelines in question.
. For example, Sergeant Vittetoe, responding to the question whether, in his opinion the respondent violated his own guidelines, explained:
"Regarding this traffic stop. Sergeant Pagotto, it indicates in the guidelines that if there reaches a point in time where you exercise or use deadly force, certain criteria should be satisfied. The satisfaction, or to satisfy that, the police officer should notify the department what is happening at the location, the information. The police officer should not close distance at that time. If the suspect were to leave, meaning to flee or to drive away at that point, they are not to pursue or to chase, however, to keep them under observation at that point.
* $ $ $
"At the time that Sergeant Pagotto decided to draw his gun, he made no notification to his partner nor to any other police officers as to what he had or what he could be involved in. With his weapon drawn, he decided or indicated in his report that he closed distance in an attempt to control Preston Barnes which is in direct violation of his own guidelines. He attempted to control the actions of this person physically with one hand, with the gun in the opposite hand. This goes against all modern police standards and training.”
. As we have seen, the respondent testified that he believed the car that he stopped had been stolen. This testimony is not indicative of a routine traffic stop.
. The passengers in the Barnes car testified to the respondent’s use of his service weapon. Mr. Thompson stated that the only reason Preston Barnes was scared was because the respondent "hopped out of the car with the gun in his hand.” The other passenger, Mr. Austin added, on cross examination:
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: The officer you saw get out of the police vehicle with the gun in his hand, what did he do?
"[MR. AUSTIN]: He went to the driver's side pointing the gun at him.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Driver’s side of whose car?
"[MR. AUSTIN]: Preston’s car.
"[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Okay. And, you say he did what with the gun?
"[MR. AUSTIN]: He was pointing it at him."
. It is uncontroverted that Preston Barnes was attempting to flee the scene and that the Subaru was moving. But, as Sergeant Meier testi*572fied — "I think Preston Barnes had a reasonable expectation to believe that he would not be shot for fleeing from a simple traffic stop.”
. The respondent maintains that he made the "move into ambush” because the car door suddenly "sprung open.” Curiously, the majority adopted the respondent’s version of how the car door opened because it was “the only version in evidence.” 361 Md. 528, 553 n. 7, 762 A.2d 97, 110 n. 7 (2000). On the contrary, it was not the only version in evidence because Mr. Jackson testified that the respondent actually opened the door and initiated the "move into ambush.” Although the majority initially mentioned the existence of Mr. Jackson’s testimony, see 361 Md. at 537, 762 A.2d at 102, it unfortunately neglected to adopt that version. According to the correct standard of review, it is that testimony which should have been accepted, because it is more favorable to the State.
. The colloquy was as follows:
"[MR. JACKSON]: Uh — huh, but when the cop opened the door his hands were on the black [dashboard].
*573“[DEF. ATT’Y]: His hands were on the black, not on the steering wheel. Now, which version are you telling the jury today?
"[MR. JACKSON]: It was in front of him — they was in front of him. They was in front of him. [Officer Pagotto] could see his hands.”
. Officer Pagotto testified he believed his trigger finger was along the slide instead of where it should have been, under the trigger guard.
. But there was also ample evidence from which the jury could have inferred the respondent’s guilt. Of significance in that regard is evidence contradictory to the respondent’s version of the events, thus undermining the respondent’s credibility. The respondent contended that his weapon accidentally discharged when he hit his hand against the vehicle as it sped away, and as he was falling to the ground. But the jury had before it testimony indicating that perhaps the respondent’s gun did not discharge accidentally.
First, Sergeant Donald Kramer, a firearms expert, testified that ten and a half pounds of pressure was needed to be exerted on the trigger of the respondent’s service weapon before it would release. Such a blow, of ten and a half pounds of pressure on a concentrated area, should leave a bruise. However, Major France, a 26 year police veteran — trained to observe, nor Major Shreve, a 31 year police veteran — also trained to observe, saw any signs of injury to the respondent’s hands directly after the shooting.
Second, Sergeant Kramer testified that when an officer shoots while falling down, as the respondent maintained he did, the trajectory of a *576bullet will be in an upward direction. The Deputy Chief Medical Examiner testified that the angle of the single bullet was slightly down through the window, not up.
Third, the respondent testified that the increased speed of the car caused the "accidental discharge.” In contrast, Mr. Jackson testified that it was the "accidental discharge” which caused the increased speed of the car:
"[MR. JACKSON]: Well, the whole time, like I say the car was still drifting, the officer was beside the car still trying to get him to stop it.
“[STATE’S ATT’Y]: Okay, what happened after he pulled off?
"[MR. JACKSON]: I heard a shot.
"[STATE'S ATT'Y]: And, what happened when you heard the shot or just after you heard the shot?
"[MR. JACKSON]: Well, Preston said ‘oh, shit.’ Then that's the last I heard and then the car started' — the car started speeding up.
* * * * *
"[MR. JACKSON]: We didn’t start going fast until Preston was shot.”
Additionally, there was evidence of other violations of police regulations, the tendency of which is to suggest that the respondent attempted to cover up his reckless deviations from the Baltimore City Police Guidelines. Exemplary of this evidence is that involving the respondent’s failure to notify his supervisor that he had been involved in a shooting, the respondent’s leaving the scene of the shooting, the respondent’s failure to go directly to headquarters from the scene — while placing unofficial telephone calls and conducting unofficial meetings on street corners and the fact that the respondent waited nearly three weeks before giving an official statement of his version of the events surrounding the shooting. The jury heard testimony concerning each of these acts and the explanation as to why there were violations.
There was even conflict concerning why the respondent left the scene of the shooting. He testified that he left the scene because he feared for his safely due to the "hostile” nature of "about twenty” citizens. But, the jury heard testimony from Major France that perhaps the hostility was fabricated or perceived. Major France stated that, although people did form, he did not recall a crowd being there initially "at that time.” He also stated that people formed "ten to fifteen minutes [later] and the people who formed I later found out who they were. So there were people coming to the location from other places.” Sergeant Parker, the respondent’s immediate supervisor, also testified that a crowd of maybe twenty, including police officers, formed, but significantly indicated that, as far as he was concerned, "there wasn’t anything unusual about [the] crowd.”