dissenting:
The court holds that where an attorney’s misconduct would warrant disbarment, addiction to cocaine attributable to the inten*541tional use of that drug can not be used as a mitigating factor in determining sanction. This rule has some appeal because it is somewhat simple to apply and strongly condemns the criminal conduct in which an addict necessarily engages in order to obtain controlled substances to feed his addiction.1 However, as the Board on Professional Responsibility (BPR) points out, A[i]t is not necessary or desirable for this Court to close the door in every case to consideration of the subject. “In spite of the majority’s effort to reserve the possibility of considering in mitigation of sanction a lawyer’s Aefforts to rehabilitate himself from addiction to unlawful drags, and conceivably even the addiction itself,”2 the rationale underlying the court’s rejection of mitigation in this case applies in every case of addiction to illegal drags, and therefore would seem to foreclose that possibility. In virtually all, if not all, instances a person addicted to controlled substances necessarily engages in illegal conduct to acquire the drags while a member of the profession.3 In addition, drawing the line at “intentional use,” as the court does here, also nets virtually every case, accepting the rationale relied upon by the majority that, “at some point in time, while the choice [is] still his, [an addict chooses] the path which ultimately [leads] to his cocaine addiction.” See In re Rentel, 107 Wash.2d 276, 729 P.2d 615, 621 (1986).
The issue raised by the BPR and the Lawyers Counseling Committee of the District of Columbia Bar (LCC) is not whether sanctions should be eliminated where a lawyer’s misconduct is caused by his or her addiction to illegal substances, but whether the presumed sanction should be, and can be, tempered under the circumstances while maintaining the integrity of the profession and protecting the public from unethical or incompetent lawyers. Using a more flexible approach in addressing this complex issue, other jurisdictions seem to manage to do so. See, e.g., In re Phillips, 260 Kan. 909, 925 P.2d 435 (1996); The Florida Bar v. Marcus, 616 So.2d 975 (Fla.1993); In re Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154, 791 P.2d 1037 (1990); People v. Geller, 753 P.2d 235 (Colo.1988); In re Winston, 137 A.D.2d 385, 528 N.Y.S.2d 843 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1988) (per curiam). In Marcus, for example, in lieu of disbarment, the Florida Supreme Court imposed a three year suspension, followed by three years of probation with drag testing, as a sanction for an attorney’s misappropriation of client funds causally linked to his narcotic addiction. 616 So.2d at 978. The court considered in mitigation that Marcus’ period of addiction was of short duration; that he had remained drag free for almost six years; that he recognized the need for treatment and promptly obtained it; that he took a role in helping other addicts; and that he made restitution. Id. The court further explained that:
[t]he misappropriation of a client’s funds “is one of the most serious offenses that a lawyer can commit” and, “absent sufficient mitigating factors, compels the extreme sanction of disbarment.” ... In this case we find that the mitigating factors of cocaine addiction, successful rehabilitation, the lengthy delay in resolving the matter, and the previous consent judgment warrant the imposition of less than the presumed discipline of disbarment.
Id. (internal citation omitted). Similar considerations guided the determinations in each of the cases cited above, resulting *542in less severe sanctions than might be otherwise indicated, with strict treatment and monitoring conditions, as briefly summarized in the margin.4 Nevertheless, in imposing sanctions, these courts have still addressed the goals of the disciplinary system of protecting the public, deterring other attorneys from similar misconduct, and protecting public and private rights. See In re Appler, 669 A.2d 731, 738 (D.C.1995). The hard and fast rule which the majority adopts would eliminate consideration of the type of factors identified in Marcus, supra, which might support the imposition of a sanction of suspension instead of disbarment followed by a lengthy probationary period with conditions established to assure rehabilitation. In my opinion, the courts of Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Kansas and New York have the more enlightened approach to addressing this complex issue, while protecting the goals of the disciplinary system. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court, and I would remand to the BPR for additional evidence and a determination of whether Marshall can show that he is substantially rehabilitated.5 See In re Stanback, 681 A.2d 1109 (D.C.1996); In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987).
. Although the question was not then before the court, a majority in In re Reynolds, 649 A.2d 818 (D.C.1994), suggested that under D.C. Bar R. 8.4(b), “repeated illegal use of drugs affecting a lawyer’s fitness to practice law may well result in discipline without regard to whether it involved 'moral turpitude.’ ” 649 A.2d at 820.
. See majority opinion at n. 21.
.The opinion expresses agreement with Bar Counsel that “[t]o permit mitigation on grounds of illegal drug use effectively would reward the attorney for illegal conduct occurring after he assumes his professional responsibilities. ... Simply stated, people go to jail for conduct that Respondent offers as a mitigating factor.” See majority opinion at-.
. See Rivkind, supra, 791 P.2d at 1041 (two year suspension and probation for two years with random drug testing, practice and sobriety monitors, and attendance at Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous as the sanction for felony conviction for attempted possession of cocaine); Geller, supra, 753 P.2d at 237-38 (where pattern of misconduct related to cocaine use — nolo contendere plea, to unlawful use of controlled substance and other disciplinary violations related to failure to appear and advise client, and deposit of client funds — sanction mitigated, and three year suspension imposed with requirement of demonstrating mental stability, rehabilitation, and fitness to practice upon application for reinstatement); Winston, supra, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 845 (where cocaine-induced mental illness caused attorney’s misconduct, including conversion of escrow deposit, sanction mitigated to suspension for three years with reinstatement conditioned upon demonstrated continued rehabilitation and medical reports attesting to mental and physical capability of resuming practice); Phillips, supra, 925 P.2d at 438-39 (mental disability and drug dependency considered in mitigation of sanction for multiple disciplinary violations, and respondent given three years supervised probation with conditions of drug testing and treatment and strict practice monitoring).
. The BPR denied Marshall’s post-hearing motion to present additional evidence of rehabilitation because it concluded that even if the Kersey rule applied, Marshall had failed to show that his legally cognizable disability caused his misconduct. I agree with the Hearing Committee that causation was adequately established.