(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
An understanding of the issue requires an understanding of the interrelated functions of power presses and diesets. Power presses. vary in complexity and design, but they have two basic parts, a bed and a ram. Dies are especially made to produce shaped manufactured parts. A dieset for a power press has two basic parts, an upper die and a lower die, which in use are attached to the ram and bed of the press. The workpiece, which is positioned between the two dies, is reformed into a desired shape when the ram, with the upper die attached, presses the workpiece against the lower die on the bed, much like the human arm cuts a cookie by pushing a cookie cutter down on the dough, pressing it onto the cutting board.
All machines with powered moving parts offer a hazard to people in close proximity. Power presses pose an obvious special threat to employees operating them, and to prevent the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff, all manner of guards and systems have been devised. Guards are sometimes attached to the press, and sometimes to the dies, and perhaps at times to both. The purpose of guards is to prevent any part of the human anatomy from being in the strike zone at the time the ram comes down. Safety systems may include *590special controls and methods of feeding the workpiece into and out of the work zone other than by hand. Whether a press is permanently adapted to a particular operation, or whether it is used on different jobs from time to time, is a factor which influences safety methods actually used. In a given case the proper method of protecting a press operator must be determined by persons with a knowledge of the press, ;the dies, and the manufacturing process. Cost factors may influence the method of providing safety actually employed.
The dies being used in the press at the time of plaintiff’s injury were owned by General Motors. They had been used in a power press at Lindell Drop Forge of Lansing, Michigan, to manufacture General Motors parts under a contract with its Saginaw Steering Gear Division until a labor dispute closed the Lindell Drop Forge plant. General Motors acquired possession of the dies, negotiated a contract with Manistee Drop Forge to have parts manufactured by Manistee Drop Forge, and then shipped the dies to the new supplier. The arrangement between General Motors and Manistee Drop Forge was that the latter would make such revisions in the dies as necessary to adapt them to use on a press owned by Manistee Drop Forge.
Although the plaintiff did not plead that General Motors knew that its supplier would operate a press without guards, he made a request for an admission of such a fact. In his opening statement he said, "We will show you that General Motors knew how these dies would be used and they knew that there was a danger in that method of using those dies”. The trial judge in his opinion sáid, "Now, if the court views the plaintiff’s position correctly, it is the position of the plaintiff in this case that the defendant, General Motors, knew the *591method that Drop Forge was going to use to make these dies, that they knew also that this would be a dangerous operation”. In his opening statement the defendant’s attorney said that General Motors does not take any steps to tell its suppliers how to run their businesses, and that General Motors wants the part, and that the cheapest, the most economical, and the safest way to produce it is up to the suppliers. A factual issue as to the extent of General Motors’ knowledge of Manistee Drop Forge’s unsafe method of operation was framed.
Liability, if any, would be based on (1) the defendant’s status as bailor of the die; (2) the defendant’s status as a contracting purchaser of parts with knowledge of the supplier’s manner of operation; or (3) the combination of these factors.
1. A press is a machine. A die is one of many parts for the machine. There is no allegation that the part itself was defective. Even if it is assumed that the bailor’s liability1 is at least coextensive with that of a seller, and that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all favorable precedent in the law of warranty as well as in the law of negligence, there is no authority whatsoever for imposing liability on the supplier of a nondefective part for an unguarded machine.2
2. It is the general rule that a general contractor is not liable for the negligent acts of an independent subcontractor, in the absence of the right of control, except when the work to be done is of such character that it necessarily subjects third *592persons to unusual danger. Barlow v Krieghoff Co, 310 Mich 195; 16 NW2d 715 (1944); Munson v Vane-Stecker Co, 347 Mich 377; 79 NW2d 855 (1956); Dees v L F Largess Co, 1 Mich App 421; 136 NW2d 715 (1965); Mulcahy v Argo Steel Construction Co, 4 Mich App 116; 144 NW2d 614 (1966); Royal v McNulty, 17 Mich App 713; 170 NW2d 318 (1969); Nemeth v Detroit Edison Co, 26 Mich App 481; 182 NW2d 617 (1970); Huntley v Motor Wheel Corp, 31 Mich App 385; 188 NW2d 5 (1971); Funk v General Motors Corp, 37 Mich App 482; 194 NW2d 916 (1972), leave to appeal granted 387 Mich 764 (1972); Kirner v General Motors Corp, 41 Mich App 211; 199 NW2d 827 (1972).
Under the "inherently dangerous activity” theory, the general contractor or employer is held liable not for his own culpable negligence, but the negligence of the independent contractor engaged in an activity of such a character that it necessarily subjects third persons to unusual danger. Inglis v Millersburg Driving Assn, 169 Mich 311; 126 NW 413 (1912); Mulcahy, supra; Huntley, supra. Almost, any power operation is dangerous if performed without any kind of guarding. In my opinion, however, the operation of a power press is not an inherently dangerous activity within the meaning of the exception to the rule.
I find no case imposing or denying liability in which there was knowledge or even an allegation that the defendant had knowledge that the independent contractor was going to proceed to perform a task, not inherently dangerous, in an unsafe manner.
By statute the primary obligation to protect the employee is that of the employer:
"Each employer shall establish and maintain condi*593tions of work which are reasonably safe and healthful for employees. Each employer’s methods, processes, devices and safeguards, including methods of sanitation and hygiene, shall be such as are reasonably necessary to protect the life, health and safety of his employees.” MCLA 408.852; MSA 17.49(2).
In my opinion the mere knowledge that the independent contractor intends to proceed in an unsafe manner, unless specifically required to do so by the defendant, does not create a cause of action.
3. Having concluded that neither ownership of a part used by a bailee thereof in an unsafely guarded machine, nor knowledge that the supplier intends to proceed in a negligent manner creates a cause of action, what then is the law if these two factors are combined?
Although the plaintiff’s argument did not contain the words "negligent entrustment”, there is a language in the Michigan case law which tends to support his cause of action on this theory:
"There is another circumstance, however, where liability at common law is imposed upon the owner of a chattel for injuries resulting from its negligent use by another. Such liability arises when the owner permits an incompetent or inexperienced person to use his chattel with knowledge that such use is likely to cause injuries to others.” Haring v Myrick, 368 Mich 420, 423; 118 NW2d 260, 261 (1962).
The "negligent entrustment” doctrine has been given no application except with respect to a motor vehicle. A motor vehicle, like a power press, is a whole working machine. Here we have an allegation of "negligent entrustment” of a part.
Whether we describe the issue in terms of vicarious liability, imputed negligence, or negligent en*594trustment, we are dealing with an important issue of first impression.
Allegations of knowledge about another business firm’s operations are easy to make, easy to infer, and almost impossible to rebut. A rule such as contended for here will open a whole new area of litigation. If recovery is allowed in this case, it will mean that assembling manufacturers, like General Motors and many others, will be unable to permit their independent contract suppliers to use the purchaser’s dies without exercising a substantial degree of control over the supplier’s operations. The potential economic impact of such a rule is, at best, unpredictable.
Furthermore, if liability is to be imposed, it ought not to hinge on mere ownership of a part, which fact is not the keystone of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, but rather on the fact that by making the contract, with or without the bailment of a part, the defendant knowingly puts into motion a dangerous industrial practice. Our system has devised other and more efficient means of reducing accidents and compensating employees who are injured.
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court order dismissing the complaint.
See 131 ALR 845; 46 ALR2d 404; also, Erickson v Soyars, 356 Mich 64; 95 NW2d 844 (1959).
In Jennings v Tamaker Corp, 42 Mich App 310; 201 NW2d 654 (1972); Byrnes v Economic Machinery Co, 41 Mich App 192; 200 NW2d 104 (1972); Hill v Clark Equipment Co, 42 Mich App 405; 202 NW2d 530 (1972), and every other machine-guarding case cited the action was against the supplier of the working machine. '