dissenting.
I dissent. The sole issue in this sewage rate dispute is whether the trial court erred in submitting the case to a jury. The Townships have the right to a jury trial in this case, based' on Article 1, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides: “Trial by jury shall remain as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate.” In William Goldman Theaters, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 93, 173 A.2d 59, 64 (1961), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 897, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 *483L.Ed.2d 93 (1961), this Court construed Article I, Section 6 to mandate a jury trial “in every situation in which [an individual] would have been entitled to such a trial at the time of the adoption of our State Constitution of 1790... ”. In this case, the relationship between the parties is based on a written contract. This contract contains a clause which provides that the sewage rates charged by the Authority will be sufficient to meet the Authority’s operating expenses and to amortize the Authority’s debts.1 The essence of this clause is that the sewage rates will be uniform and reasonable. This case is nothing more than a dispute regarding an ordinary contract term. Jury trials were undoubtedly available for contract disputes in 1790. See Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416 (Pa.1808). Consequently, a jury trial was properly granted in this case.
The Commonwealth Court erred when it concluded that no right to trial by jury regarding these sewage rates could have existed in 1790, since municipal authorities did not exist before 1935. Obviously municipal authorities and sewage rates did not exist in 1790, but that is not the real issue. Even though movie theaters and pornographic films did not exist in 1790, in the Goldman case this Court concluded that *484movie theaters charged with exhibiting pornographic films had a right to a jury trial because in 1790 “utterance of obscene matter” was triable to a jury. Likewise, the Townships are entitled to a jury trial because contract disputes were triable to a jury in 1790. Technology may have advanced, but the underlying legal categories are the same.
The Commonwealth Court also determined that judicial review of the reasonableness of sewage rates is a proceeding created by the Municipal Authorities Act, and that jury trials are not available in proceedings created by statute unless the statute so provides, or unless the proceeding has a common law basis. See Appeal of Watson, 377 Pa. 495, 105 A.2d 576 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 879, 75 S.Ct. 120, 99 L.Ed. 692 (1954), reh’g denied, 348 U.S. 922, 75 S.Ct. 301, 99 S.Ct. 723 (1955) (no jury trial in disputes involving statutory teacher tenure); W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 191 Pa.Super. 136, 155 A.2d 429 (1959), allocatur refused (no jury trial for violation of Public Utility Law); Commonwealth Department of Environmental Resources v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 22 Pa. Cmwlth. 280, 348 A.2d 765 (1975) (no jury trial in air pollution regulation).2 Those cases are distinguishable from the present case because, unlike teacher tenure, public utility law, or air pollution control, etc., this lawsuit has a common law, contractual basis.3 The rate provision, which *485was explicitly included in the contract by the parties, would be subject to judicial review at common law as an ordinary contract term. Since the lawsuit has a common law basis, it is irrelevant that the Municipal Authorities Act fails to specifically provide for jury trials.
The Commonwealth Court misinterpreted the Act when it concluded that the legislature intended that sewage rate cases be tried non-jury because they involve “intricate questions of law, of the interpretation of contracts, of economics, of engineering and of municipal management... ”. No reference to pertinent legislative history is provided, and the words of the Act certainly do not support this conclusion. An interpretation of a statute which operates to deprive an individual of a jury trial is not favored. See Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 246 A.2d 859 (1968); Gordon v. Biesinger, 335 Pa. 1, 6 A.2d 425 (1939). In fact, the words of the Act support the opposite conclusion. The Act expressly designates the court of common pleas as the forum for sewage rate cases involving municipal authorities.4 Jury trials have traditionally been available in actions at law in the court of common pleas, and designating the court of common pleas as the tribunal inherently includes the concept of a jury trial unless specifically excluded. Finally, the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion is completely inconsistent with the strong public policy which favors jury trials. See Commonwealth v. Baxter, 282 Pa.Super. 467, 422 A.2d 1388 (1980). This Court has characterized trial by jury as the “jewel of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence”. Commonwealth v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 29, 198 A. 99, 111 (1938).
*486For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court and reinstate the order of the trial court.
FLAHERTY, J., joins this dissenting opinion.. The contract clause is as follows:
The Authority’s schedule of sewage service charges shall be uniform as to reasonable classes of services throughout the entire service area of the Sewage Disposal System, and shall be so calculated as to yield in the aggregate the amount required for paying all current administrative and operating expenses of the Authority, the interest on, and the principal of, all outstanding bonds as the same become due and payable, any and all other expenses and obligations of the Authority arising out of or incident to the construction, operation and maintenance of the Sewage Disposal System, and to create such reserves for such purposes as may be required by the resolution authorizing the issuance of its bonds or in the trust indenture securing the same.
The Authority’s schedule of sewage service charges shall fix reasonable minimum charges, may include such block rates for metered water users and such coverage for flat rate users as the Authority shall determine, and shall provide extra charges for commercial and industrial wastes which impose an extraordinary burden on the Sewage Disposal System. The schedule shall be adjusted from time to time in such manner as the Authority shall deem necessary or proper to insure the collection of adequate revenues to meet its financial requirements.
. Other cases which support this proposition are: Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955) (no jury trial in statutory arbitration); Commonwealth v. Bechtel, 384 Pa. 184, 120 A.2d 295 (1956) (no jury trial under Mental Health Act); In re Tahiti Bar, Inc., 186 Pa.Super. 214, 142 A.2d 491 (1958), aff'd, 395 Pa. 355, 150 A.2d 112 (1959) (no jury trial in liquor license revocation); Tax Review Board v. Weiner, 398 Pa. 381, 157 A.2d 879 (1960) (no jury trial before Tax Review Board); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa.Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967) (no jury trial in juvenile court); Commonwealth v. Marco Electric Manufacturing Corp., 32 Pa.Commw. 360, 379 A.2d 342 (1977) (no jury trial in tax appeal).
. In Calabrese v. Collier Township Municipal Authority, 430 Pa. 289, 240 A.2d 544 (1968) this Court held that Section 4B(h) of the Municipal Authorities Act provides the exclusive remedy for testing the reasonableness of rates set by Municipal Authorities — an action at law, and not in equity, in the court of common pleas. See *485Tornetta v. Plymouth Township Municipal Authority, 31 Pa.Commw. 353, 375 A.2d 1381 (1977). The holding in Calabrese is perfectly consistent with the conclusion that the present lawsuit has a common law, contractual basis.
. By contrast, the Public Utility Commission is the forum for certain other rate disputes. See East Hempfield Township v. City of Lancaster, 441 Pa. 406, 273 A.2d 333 (1971); Yezioro v. North Fayette County Municipal Authority, 193 Pa.Super. 271, 164 A.2d 129 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Shirk v. Lancaster County, 313 Pa. 158, 169 A. 557 (1933).