concurring.
I concur in the conclusion of Judge Dar-den’s lead opinion which states that Kalber-ers’ son is not entitled to recover under the underinsured motorist provision. I reach that conclusion not because the moped upon which James was riding was not an insured vehicle under the policy, but rather because the clear language of the policy provision excludes such coverage.
As correctly noted in Judge Darden’s opinion, and as recently stated in Ramirez v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. (1995) Ind.App., 652 N.E.2d 511, 515: “ ‘An insurance company is free to limit its liability in any manner not inconsistent with public policy, and an unambiguous exclusionary clause in ordinarily entitled to construction and enforcement.’ ”
The basic uninsured-underinsured motorist coverage in the policy before us covers a person “while occupying a car or, as a pedestrian”. The moped occupied by James was clearly not a car as defined within the policy itself. It is also clear that he was not a pedestrian.
With respect to the medical benefits coverage, the policy covers a person “in a car accident while occupying a car or from having been struck by a motor vehicle.” Although, as earlier noted, James was not occupying a car, he was involved in a “ear accident” and was “struck by a motor vehicle”. Nevertheless, the policy contains a clear provision which excludes “Anyone occupying ... a motor vehicle owned by you ... and not insured under this insurance.” It is undisputed that the moped is a motor vehicle,2 was owned by Lewis Kalberer and was not insured under the policy. For the reasons stated, I concur in the decision which reverses the summary judgment entered in the trial court.
. I.C. 9-13-2-105, cited in Judge Chezem’s separate opinion, defines "motor vehicle” only for purposes of I.C. 9-21 dealing with traffic regulations. It does not exclude mopeds from the definition of "motor vehicles” in all contexts and for all purposes. As Judge Chezem notes, a moped "is a motor vehicle pursuant to the contract definition.”