Wayne R. Doolittle, as Executor of the Estate of Isaac H. Doolittle, Deceased, appellant herein, brings this appeal from an adverse decision, in the St. Joseph Superior Court No. 2 of St. Joseph County. The appellant is the defendant and cross-complainant below.
The appellee, Gail Kunsehik, the daughter of Isaac H. Doolittle, and half-sister of the appellant, brought this action demanding that certain United States Savings Bonds in possession of appellant-executor and which had been inventoried by him as a part of decedent’s estate be stricken from the inventoried assets; that the appellee be delcared the sole owner of the same, and said bonds be delivered to her.
Appellant filed a cross-complaint in two paragraphs. He alleged in the first paragraph that appellee, Gail Kunsehik, was a constructive trustee for the proceeds of said bonds, that the trial court so hold her a constructive trustee for the proceeds of said bonds and order her as trustee to deliver the proceeds of said bonds to the estate. In the second paragraph of the cross-complaint, appellant prays that the appellee be declared a resulting trustee for the proceeds of said bonds, and that appellee, Gail Kunsehik, as resulting trustee, deliver the proceeds over to the decedent’s *128estate for distribution in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Isaac H. Doolittle, Deceased.
Pleadings raised the issues to determine whether or not Gail Kunschik, appellee, would be designated a trustee based upon the theory of a resulting trust. Appellant, by his cross-complaint of two paragraphs sought a determination that appellee, Gail Kunschik, as a trustee under either one of the two theories advanced in said cross-complaint be directed to surrender the proceeds from said bonds to the appellant’s estate for distribution in compliance with the will of the decedent.
Trial was had by the court with a finding in favor of appellee, Gail Kunschik, on her complaint, and against the defendant-appellant. The court further found in favor of appellee and against appellant on appellant’s cross-complaint. Consistent judgment on finding was entered thereon by the court.
Appellant timely filed a motion for a new trial which was overruled by the court. This appeal was perfected within the rules.
Specifications in the motion for a new trial set forth by appellant were:
“1. The decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence,” and
“2. The decision of the court is contrary to law.”
Appellant’s Assignment of Errors charged error by the court in overruling his motion for a new trial.
The factual situation in the case at bar may thus be briefly summarized:
Dr. Isaac H. Doolittle, from the early 1930’s and continuously up to his death in 1947, was engaged in “research and the preparation of a certain manuscript purporting to deal with the history of the Doolittle *129Family,” and thereby had compiled a voluminous record which was in existence but had never been published. The writings composing this manuscript were the subject referred to in the correspondence between Dr. Doolittle and his daughter, Gail D. Kunschik, and others.
In early 1943, Dr. Doolittle wrote his daughter, Gail, that he contemplated setting up a fund for defraying the cost of publication of “The Story of the Doolittle Family” authorized by himself; that he expected to invest $3,000.00 in cash in Series E Government Bonds and have the same issued in the names of Dr. Isaac Doolittle or Mrs. Gail Kunschik, and thence placed in escrow with Gail Kunschik as a fund to be converted in cash and the proceeds, as much thereof as needed, to meet expenses of the publication of 1,000 copies of said story aforesaid. This agreement with the daughter, Gail, was contingent upon the death of Dr. Doolittle, prior to the publication of the manuscript. If this situation came to pass, Gail Kunschik would assume the responsibility and labor necessary to have the book published and for such labor and responsibility she was authorized to keep 20 percent of net cash income derived from the sale of the book and the remainder paid equally to his five descendants, one of whom was Gail Kunschik.
Ada Powell, a sister of Gail, testified that she urged Gail to give up the agreement to publish the Doolittle papers. In March, 1944, Gail turned over the bonds to Dr. Doolittle, who accepted the bonds and as a part of his release included the following:
“These bonds represent all the securities I have ever placed in their custody and I have no further claim against said Gail Kunschik and Paul Kunschik.”
*130Included with the four $1,000.00 (maturity value) bonds were included two $1,000.00 (maturity value) bonds in the names of Dr. Isaac H. Doolittle or Wayne L. Doolittle. These two latter bonds had been placed by Dr. Doolittle in Gail’s care, when it appeared that Wayne would likely be inducted into the armed forces.
At the death of Dr. Doolittle, the bonds which were turned over to him by the Kunschiks, were in his possession with the same named beneficiaries as when Gail turned the bonds over to him.
Wayne Doolittle, appellant, testified at the trial that a short time prior to the death of Dr. Doolittle, his father handed him the bonds and stated to him that the bonds were to be used to meet the cost of publishing' the family story subsequent to Dr. Doolittle’s death.
Appellant comes to this court challenging the overruling of his new trial motion by the trial court.
The first allegation of appellant — that the decision of the court was not sustained by sufficient evidence— would only be applicable to that part of the finding relative to appellee’s complaint. But the decision on the appellant’s counter-claim or cross-complaint was negative in nature and an assignment of errors questioning the sufficiency of the evidence to support a negative finding or decision on the cross-complaint presents no question for review. Hayworth v. Bromwell (1959), 239 Ind. 430, 158 N. E. 2d 285; Hinds, Executor Etc. v. McNair, et al. (1955), 235 Ind. 34, 129 N. E. 2d 553; Jones et al. v. Greiger, Trustee etc. et al. (1960), 130 Ind. App. 526, 166 N. E. 2d 868; Metrailer et al. v. Bishop et al. (1959), 130 Ind. App. 77, 162 N. E. 2d 94; Robison v. Page et al. (1959), 129 Ind. App. 289, 156 N. E. 2d 389.
*131The crux of appellant’s argument on his remaining allegations that the decision on appellee’s complaint was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the decision on appellee’s complaint and on appellant’s cross-complaint was contrary to law, is that either a constructive or a resulting trust was established relative to the United States Government Bonds or the proceeds thereof.
The asserted claim is that the proceeds of the bonds when secured by appellee belong to the estate by reason of a trust set up by the decedent. So, the vital question to be decided is: Who is entitled to own the proceeds of the bonds?
To determine this we must consider the contentions of a resulting and constructive trust.
The fact that the government regulations provide for payment to the party or person named on the bond does not of itself, in our opinion, operate to conclusively establish the real or undisclosed rightful owner of the proceeds after the government has paid the proceeds to the named party. We question severely that the regulations can take away the power and authority of the court to determine who is the actual and true owner of the proceeds and under what conditions such ownership may arise.
It seems to us that we are controlled by the decedent’s intent as expressed by what he did or did not do with the bonds as evidencing the right to the proceeds thereof. When Gail Kunschik returned the bonds to her father and he accepted the same and gave her a complete release, we think any trust relationship, if any, existing between them terminated and ceased by mutual consent.
*132Therefore, Dr. Doolittle having full, complete and absolute control and possession of the bonds could have cashed them in or changed the names of the beneficiaries or payees of the bonds.
Dr. Doolittle died in 1947 holding the bonds for three years after they were delivered back to him and any trust relation thereto was terminated. Now during the three years he said nothing and did nothing concerning appellee’s rights to the proceeds of the bonds upon his death. It follows then that his expressed intent was that appellee was to take the proceeds of the bonds and in the absence of any evidence of a trust, wrongful act by appellee, or any bequest to the contrary, there is absolutely nothing to forclose or alter her right under the law and the regulations to the absolute ownership of the proceeds.
Dr. Doolittle made no actual delivery of the proceeds at any time. He invested money in Gail’s name and his name with the right of the survivor to take the whole. Although he may have made the investment with the idea of certain use of the proceeds, he was legally authorized to change his original purpose or idea and leave the investment for appellee without reference to his original idea. Whether he did so or not was a fact question for the court upon all the evidence. The court apparently concluded that decedent intended for appellee to take and have the investment (or the benefit of the investment) he had made. There was ample evidence to support the court’s conclusion.
We are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
*133Gonas, P. J., Kelley, J., concur.
Pfaff, J., concurs with opinion.