The defendant, Robert P. Murphy, was charged under G. L. c. 90, § 23, with operating a motor vehicle after his license had been suspended. At issue is whether the complaint is defective and must be dismissed for failure to allege that he operated the motor vehicle on a public way. We hold that the statute does not require that the violation occur on a public way.
*666The parties stipulated that had the case gone to trial, the Commonwealth would have attempted to prove the following facts. On December 22, 1988, Officer Michael Perron of the Westford police department was driving on Littleton Road in Westford when he noticed the tail lights of a moving automobile in a store parking lot. Knowing that the store was closed, and that stolen cars had been left in the area on two prior occasions, he entered the lot. He observed the automobile parked partially behind the building with its engine running. The defendant was seated in the driver’s seat and a female companion in the passenger seat. Perron approached the vehicle, and asked to see the defendant’s license and registration. The defendant responded that he had forgotten his license. On checking with the Registry of Motor Vehicles, Perron discovered that the Commonwealth had revoked the defendant’s license for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors and had not reinstated the license.
The defendant was arrested and convicted in a bench trial of a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 23. He appealed to a jury-of-six session in the Lowell Division of the District Court Department. He then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a crime because there was no allegation he operated a motor vehicle on a public way. The judge granted the motion on June 12, 1989. The Commonwealth appeals. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (c), 378 Mass. 871 (1979); Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (1), 378 Mass. 882 (1979).
General Laws c. 90, § 23, provides, in relevant part: “Any person convicted of operating a motor vehicle after his license to operate has been suspended or revoked . . . and prior to the restoration of such license . . . shall ... be punished . . . .” The statute does not restrict such prohibited motor vehicle operation to any particular location. The defendant contends that we should nevertheless rule that an element of the crime set forth in the statute is that the operation occurred on a “way.”1
*667“When the meaning of a statute is brought into question, a court properly should read other sections and should construe them together . . . Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp., Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm’n, 394 Mass. 233, 240 (1985). Chapter 90, § 23, originally was enacted in 1903. See St. 1903, c. 473, § 9. In addition to the section penalizing the operation of an automobile after revocation or suspension of a license, the Legislature also provided that “no automobile or motor cycle shall ... be operated upon any public highway or private way laid out under authority of statute unless registered,” St. 1903, c. 473, § 3, and that “no person shall . . . operate an automobile or motor cycle upon any public highway or private way laid out under authority of statute unless licensed so to do,” St. 1903, c. 473, § 5 (emphasis added). Other sections of c. 90 also specify where the operation of a motor vehicle may or may not occur. See, e.g., G. L. c. 90, § 3 (motor vehicles owned by nonresidents “may be operated on the ways of this Commonwealth”); § 3A (nonresident accepts service upon registrar by operating motor vehicle “on a way, or private way if entrance thereto was made from a way, or in any place to which the public has a right of access”); § 10 (forbidding person under age of sixteen from operating a vehicle “upon any way”); and § 24 (forbidding operation of vehicle “upon any way or in any place to which the public has a right of access, or upon any way or in any place to which members of the public have access as invitees or licensees” while under the influence of drugs or alcohol). Clearly, the Legislature knew how to specify a location of operation, and could have done so in the provision in question had it intended to penalize only those operations on a public way.
The wording of the statute indicates that the Legislature intended that operation of a motor vehicle anywhere in the Commonwealth after license suspension or revocation would be forbidden. The Legislature chose not to limit the application of the statute to public ways. Such an intention ration*668ally reflects the penal purposes of the license revocation. Thus, even though in the first instance a driver need obtain a license only if he or she wishes to operate a motor vehicle on a “way,” see G. L. c. 90, § 10, the Legislature in § 23 determined that the suspension or revocation of a license deprived the individual of a right to operate a motor vehicle anywhere in the Commonwealth.
Our construction answers the defendant’s argument that the statute is void for vagueness. “[A] law is not vague if its meaning is ascertainable by reference to similar or related statutes .... Further, even a vague statute may be made constitutionally definite by giving it a reasonable construction.” (Citations omitted.) Commonwealth v. Sefranka, 382 Mass. 108, 111 (1980). The statute clearly prohibits the operation anywhere of a motor vehicle by a person whose license has been suspended or revoked.
The defendant asserts that Commonwealth v. Guerro, 357 Mass. 741 (1970), and Commonwealth v. Armenia, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 33 (1976), require a construction of the statute which limits its application to public ways. We do not agree. In Guerro, we analyzed a similarly-worded provision of a different statute, G. L. c. 266, § 28, as amended through St. 1966, c. 191, § 2.2 The provision punished “[wjhoever . . . without the authority of the owner operates a motor vehicle after notice of the suspension or revocation of his license or right to operate has been issued by the registrar.” In Guerro, the question was whether a different provision in § 28 criminalizing the knowing receipt of a stolen automobile was a lesser included offense in the provision criminalizing the unauthorized use. In comparing the elements of the two provisions, the court stated that the elements of unauthorized operation are “operation of the vehicle by the defendant without authority of the owner on a public way after his license has been suspended by the Registry of Motor Vehi*669cles” (emphasis added). Id. at 750. The “public way” element, recited by the court even though not specified in the statute, was not crucial to the holding of the case and is therefore dictum. Further, the Guerro statute and the statute at issue are entirely different in purposes and effect. General Laws c. 90 establishes a comprehensive scheme for registering automobiles and licensing drivers, while G. L. c. 266 punishes certain crimes against property, including the theft and concealment of automobiles.
In Commonwealth v. Armenia, supra, the Appeals Court held that G. L. c. 266, § 28, applied only to unauthorized motor vehicle operation occurring on a public way. The court declared itself “bound to reject” the Commonwealth’s argument (which it had deemed “quite persuasive”) that G. L. c. 266, § 28, was not concerned with place of operation because of Guerro. Id. at 37-38. The holding in Armenia was grounded on dictum in Guerro, which we decline to follow in the context of G. L. c. 90, § 23. Therefore, Armenia does not support the defendant’s argument.
Because the Legislature did not require “public way” as an element of the crime, the complaint was sufficient. We remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent, with this opinion.
So ordered.
“Way” is defined in G. L. c. 90, § 1 (1988 ed.), as “any public highway, private way laid out under authority of statute, way dedicated to public use, or way under the control of park commissioners or body having like powers.”
General Laws c. 266, § 28, was rewritten in 1980 and no longer includes that particular provision. St. 1980, c. 463, § 4.