delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, James Washington, was charged by indictment with criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 — 13(aXl)) and aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12— 14(aXl)). Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel where disciplinary proceedings were simultaneously pending against his defense counsel; (2) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where the victim’s testimony was neither corroborated nor clear and convincing; and (3) the trial court considered improper factors in determining the defendant’s guilt. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
The record reveals the following. The victim testified that on May 29, 1986, she and her boyfriend paid defendant $30 to rent a room for 30 days in his apartment. The victim testified that, prior to that date, she had never met the defendant and, to the best of her knowledge, neither she nor her boyfriend, P.S., had seen the apartment prior to the rental. When P.S. entered into the rental agreement, defendant gave him one key to the apartment. Subsequently, the victim and P.S. had two keys made. The first night that they stayed in the apartment, the victim and P.S. slept on a queen size bed with only a box spring. The next day they went grocery shopping, placed the food they had purchased in the refrigerator and left the apartment. While away from the apartment, they drank four bottles of wine. Upon their return, they discovered that the burglar bars on the apartment door were locked and they could not get inside. When some of defendant’s friends came to the door, Rick, who also lived in the apartment, let the friends in. At that time, the victim and P.S. also entered. Upon seeing the victim and P.S., defendant asked them to leave the apartment. Defendant and P.S. began fighting, and defendant took the apartment key from him and tore his pants pocket with a knife while looking for money. Thereafter, defendant went into the kitchen to search the victim, and upon completion of the search, she sat on the couch next to P.S. in the living room.
The victim further testified that she needed to use the bathroom and defendant followed her into the bathroom and told her to take off her pants. When she refused, defendant hit her on the head with a wine bottle and again ordered her to remove her pants. After a second refusal, he cut her on the left side of her back with the broken wine bottle. She then removed her pants and lay on the floor as instructed. Defendant removed his pants and proceeded to place his penis into her mouth, then her vagina, again in her mouth, and back in her vagina, where he ejaculated. Defendant then pulled up his pants and returned to the living room. The victim followed him shortly thereafter and saw P.S. sitting on the living room floor surrounded by five people. These individuals began threatening him and the victim. Subsequently, defendant allowed them to leave the apartment. Once outside, the victim told P.S. about the sexual attack by defendant and about her injuries. They went to a “pay phone” and called the police. When the police arrived, they took the victim to Michael Reese Hospital for treatment. The victim testified that, while at the hospital, she gave her apartment key to P.S. in order for him to accompany the police back to defendant’s apartment. She stated that she was not having a menstrual period on the day of the incident.
P.S.’s testimony was very similar to the testimony given by the victim. However, P.S. also testified that his friend Cordell told him about the availability of defendant’s apartment and that P.S., Cordell and defendant went to look at the apartment. P.S. stated that the bed that he and the victim slept on was “a little less than full size.” P.S. further testified that on the next day, when he and defendant were fighting, defendant tried to stab him with a “paring knife.” P.S. testified that the victim went to use the bathroom and defendant followed her into the bathroom and told his friends to keep P.S. in the living room. P.S. heard “pounding and scuffling” noises on the door and walls of the bathroom. Defendant was sweating when he came out of the bathroom, and the victim came out shortly thereafter. P.S. also testified that when he and the victim left defendant’s apartment, her head and hands were bleeding and she had a large spot of blood on the back of her blouse. They called the police, and the victim was taken to Michael Reese Hospital. While at the hospital, the victim gave P.S. her key to defendant’s apartment. When the police and P.S. arrived at defendant’s apartment, P.S. gave the key to the police, who opened the door and subsequently arrested defendant.
The parties stipulated that, if Dr. Gordon of Michael Reese Hospital were called to testify, he would state that when he examined the victim at the hospital, he noticed a .3-centimeter puncture wound on the left side of her back and a swollen laceration on her head. He would further testify that he took oral and vaginal smears from the victim which he gave to an evidence technician. It was also stipulated that Dr. Gordon would testify that when he examined the victim, she was found to be in the late state of her menstrual cycle and upon the taking of a blood sample, her blood-alcohol level was 293 milligrams. It was further stipulated that if Mary Ann Caporusso, a microanalyst for the Chicago police department, were called to testify, she would state that upon performing a test on the oral and vaginal smears, the oral smear tested negative for spermatozoa and semen and the vaginal smear tested positive for spermatozoa.
Defendant testified that he was a recovering alcoholic and he did not know the victim until he met her on May 30, 1986, at Aleo drugstore with P.S. He stated that the victim followed him out of the store and asked him if he wanted a date. Defendant responded that he did not have enough money, but others at his apartment might want to put together a package deal. The victim then accompanied him to his apartment, where they started drinking and the victim began "talking in riddles.” Thereafter, P.S. came to the apartment and angrily took the victim to the bedroom, where they started fighting. Defendant went into the bedroom, “broke up” the fight, and noticed that the victim had blood on her face. P.S. and the victim left the apartment, and defendant discovered that his door key and wallet were missing. Defendant denied that he had rented a room to the victim and P.S. and that they had spent the night in his apartment. Defendant further denied having sexual intercourse with the victim because she was drunk and could not set a price. Defendant testified that he receives disability insurance because his left hand has been paralyzed for three years and, as a result of the paralysis, he does not have any strength in the left hand. Defendant also testified that after he had gone to bed on the night in question, the police entered his apartment with a key and searched the apartment. The police did not recover any broken bottles and they did not discover any blood.
Detective Robert Utter testified that he was assigned to investigate the rape of the victim. When he returned to the apartment with P.S. to arrest defendant, he did not find any broken glass on the bathroom floor and he observed defendant take out his keys and wallet when he put on his trousers. Detective Utter further testified that defendant resisted the arrest and, because of defendant’s strength, it took both him and another officer to handcuff defendant.
Defendant initially argues that he was denied his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel where defense counsel was subject to pending disciplinary proceedings for professional misconduct while he was acting as defendant’s counsel. Defendant asserts that defense counsel’s alleged incompetence was shown by his inadequate preparation for trial as evidenced by his: (1) failure to question the victim about sexual relations with another on the night of May 30, 1986; (2) failure to introduce medical records documenting defendant’s disability; and (3) conducting rambling cross-examinations indicating his failure to conduct a pretrial investigation.
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel is to insure that the defendant will receive a fair trial. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.) Moreover, the benchmark for determining an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether counsel’s performance so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. (People v. Cunningham (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 332, 337, 547 N.E.2d 765.) In order for a defendant to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must show that counsel’s performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the performance prejudiced the defense of the case. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; People v. Barnard (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 218, 233, 470 N.E.2d 1005.) In order for a defendant to establish prejudice, he must demonstrate, “not simply a possibility of prejudice, but that the claimed error worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage.” People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 303, 318, 544 N.E.2d 276.
In determining whether a defendant has been prejudiced, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) In making this determination, the trier of fact must consider the totality of evidence presented. (People v. Daniels (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 518 N.E.2d 669; People v. Wilson (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 501 N.E.2d 863.) It is not necessary that courts determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before analyzing the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1137.
In the present case, the State correctly argues that a strong presumption exists that conduct by counsel which involves trial strategy falls within reasonable professional judgment. Therefore, a review of counsel’s competence will not be extended to his exercise of judgment, discretion or trial tactics. (People v. Cunningham (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 332, 547 N.E.2d 765.) Defendant argues that at the time of trial, there were disciplinary proceedings pending against counsel which impaired counsel’s performance resulting in an inability to adequately defend his client and, therefore, a denial of competent representation.
Although the pendency of disciplinary proceedings alone does not necessarily establish that an attorney is incompetent to defend a person charged with a crime (People v. Perry (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 534, 540 N.E.2d 379), in certain circumstances, pending proceedings before the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (the ARDC) during the same period that the attorney is representing a defendant in a capital case may affect counsel’s ability to represent his client. (People v. Williams (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 309, 444 N.E.2d 136.) In Williams, defendant was sentenced to death following his convictions of murder, aggravated kidnaping and rape. Defendant appealed directly to the supreme court on the ground that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. The supreme court affirmed the convictions and sentence. While defendant’s petition for rehearing was pending, a disciplinary case involving his attorney, Archie Weston, was argued before the supreme court. In that case, the Hearing Board and Review Board of the ARDC recommended that Weston be disbarred on the grounds that, in matters unrelated to defendant’s case, he had neglected legal matters entrusted to him, had committed acts prejudicial to the administration of justice and acts which intentionally caused damage and prejudice to his client, and had commingled and converted a client’s funds. Weston neither answered the complaint nor appeared to defend himself. Consequently, the allegations were considered admitted and the supreme court found them adequately supported by the evidence. As a result, Weston was disbarred.
Following the determination of the disciplinary case against Weston, the supreme court found that fundamental fairness required them to consider the information that the disciplinary case had put before them when considering defendant’s petition for rehearing in the criminal case, which petition was predicated on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. After reviewing the evidence as to the charges of murder, aggravated kidnaping and rape, the supreme court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the court also found that because of the newly acquired evidence as to the disciplinary proceedings against defense counsel at the same time he was representing defendant, it could not say, with any degree of certainty, that defendant had received effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, it reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. In reaching its decision, the Williams court stated:
“Moreover, while we do not believe that the burden of defending three clients for capital murder before two juries, standing alone, necessarily reduced counsel’s effectiveness, that fact in view of the new information now before us cannot be disregarded. In our original opinion we noted the additional burdens the simultaneous trials before separate juries placed on both the court and counsel, and for this and other reasons cautioned against their future use. That added burden, of course, accentuates the problems now posed.” 93 Ill. 2d at 325.
Similarly, in the present case, while defense counsel was representing defendant at trial, he was simultaneously defending his own case before the ARDC. In fact, as a result of the disciplinary proceeding, defense counsel was eventually disbarred. (In re Levin (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 77, 514 N.E.2d 174.) As in Williams, based on the foregoing, we cannot say with any degree of certainty that defense counsel’s pending disciplinary proceedings did not have a bearing on the quality of representation received by the defendant.
With respect to the alleged conflict of interest waiver prepared by defense counsel, defendant asserts that it was an acknowledgement, not a waiver, and, consequently, did not waive defense counsel’s potential conflict of interest. The alleged waiver stated:
“ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I, James Washington, acknowledge that I wish to retain SHERWOOD L. LEVIN for a criminal case I now have pending.
I have been advised by said SHERWOOD L. LEVIN that he has disciplinary charges pending and knowing that it is still my desire that he represent me in this matter.
DATED: August 1,1986
(Signature)’’
The defendant has a fundamental right to receive effective assistance of counsel which requires that the defendant be afforded counsel who is free of conflicting interest or inconsistent obligations. (Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708; People v. Thomas (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 104, 545 N.E.2d 654; People v. Olinger (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 324, 493 N.E.2d 579.) The defendant is not required to show the existence of prejudice in order to justify a reversal of his conviction where defense counsel has an actual or possible conflict of professional interest. (People v. Thomas (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 104, 545 N.E.2d 654; People v. Free (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 154, 492 N.E.2d 1269; People v. Washington (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 104, 461 N.E.2d 393.) Although the defendant may waive the right to a conflict-free counsel (Holloway v. Arkansas (1978), 435 U.S. 475, 483 n.5, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 433 n.5, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178 n.5), the waiver is not valid unless he is admonished regarding the existence and the significance of the conflict. (People v. Olinger (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 324, 493 N.E.2d 579; People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162, 361 N.E.2d 569.) In determining whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel, the circumstances surrounding the claimed waiver must be reviewed and the accused’s background, experience, and conduct should be considered. People v. Washington (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 104, 461 N.E.2d 393; Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019.
In the present case, the following colloquy occurred in the presence of the defendant:
“MR. LEVIN: Judge, I’m told, as I indicated to the Court, I thought there was a written waiver in the court file.
THE COURT: Okay. Record should reflect that I talked to Counsel concerning some ARDC problems that he may be having, and he has indicated that his client is aware of that and there’s a waiver, is that right, Mr. Washington?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
MR. LEVIN: I again talked with him, Judge, and he’s indicated to me he wishes to proceed today with my representing him, and wishes to persist in his waiver of a jury trial.
THE COURT: And if I recall right, none of the problems that you are having or were having had anything to do with ability.
MR. LEVIN: That’s correct, your Honor.
THE COURT: Or competency to handle matters, okay? Mr. Washington, your desire is still the same in relation to a jury? In other words, you are. still giving up your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Jury waiver received.”
In our view, the record does not reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver by defendant. Neither the alleged written waiver nor the explanation given by the trial court reveals the reasons as to why there could be a conflict of interest. Moreover, the trial court did not explain the significance of the conflict and its potential impact on the attorney’s representation. Additionally, the record is devoid of any evidence that would support an argument that the trial court considered the background, conduct and experience of defendant when it determined that there had been an intelligent waiver. Under the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that defendant knowingly waived his right to be represented by counsel free of conflicting interest.
Notwithstanding the pending disciplinary proceedings and the invalid waiver, the evidence has established that in light of the actual and substantial prejudicial impact of counsel’s deficiencies, the defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to question the victim about sex with someone other than the defendant on the night of May 30, 1986, and failed to introduce medical records documenting defendant’s disability in his left hand. Defense counsel’s failure to question the victim about sex with others on the night in question prejudiced defendant since sexual intercourse with another would have been very relevant in explaining the existence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina in light of defendant’s claim that he never had sexual intercourse with the victim. Similarly, defense counsel’s failure to introduce medical records documenting defendant’s disability in his left hand also prejudiced defendant. In particular, defendant maintained that he lacked the physical strength in his left hand to “hold a knife” or “swing a bottle” as P.S. and the victim alleged he had done. The trial court expressed concern with the evidence presented regarding defendant’s disability by stating that, “[Tjhere is no question about the fact that the defendant has a problem with his left hand. Whether its anywhere near as serious as he indicates, I doubt it. But he does have some kind of problem with his left hand. And he does have a hand that apparently cannot be opened all the way.”
Our supreme court has previously held that it is unnecessary for hospital records to be admitted in order to elicit an expert medical opinion. (Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322.) Instead, an expert witness may give an opinion in response to a hypothetical question based on facts contained in medical records even if the hospital records are not in evidence. (Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322; People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171. See also People v. Cornille (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 484 N.E.2d 301.) While medical records are inadmissible into evidence without a proper foundation (Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322), expert medical testimony based on medical records documenting the defendant’s disability in his left hand would have been relevant to resolve the conflicting claims as to defendant’s physical strength. Therefore, if expert testimony based on medical records would have supported defendant’s claim of lack of strength, failure to introduce such testimony was prejudicial to defendant’s case.
Defendant'also asserts that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is further supported by defense counsel’s rambling cross-examination indicating a failure by counsel to conduct a pretrial investigation. Defendant’s assertion is not supported by the record. In this case, defense counsel was operating under unique, high-pressure circumstances while simultaneously conducting a defense. The record indicates that the trial judge commented on defense counsel’s “extensive job” of cross-examining the victim, witnesses and police officers even though “little impeachment” resulted. Defendant did not identify any specific examples of rambling, and a review of defense counsel’s cross-examination does not support defendant’s contention that defense counsel failed to conduct a pretrial investigation.
Defense counsel is required by the sixth amendment to serve as a true advocate of the accused. (People v. Hattery (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 449, 488 N.E.2d 513; United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039.) We are not convinced that defense counsel in the present case provided the type of representation to the defendant he is required to provide under the United States and Illinois Constitutions. (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8.) Since the totality of the circumstances leads us to believe that there does exist a reasonable doubt that the results of these proceedings would have been different but for defense counsel’s failure to question the victim about sex with others on the night of May 30, 1986, and defense counsel’s failure to introduce expert testimony based on defendant’s medical records regarding the disability in his left hand, counsel’s performance undermines our confidence in the outcome of the trial. In our view, these omissions by defense counsel fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. We therefore conclude that the defendant failed to receive his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and he must be given a new trial. In light of our disposition of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it is unnecessary to address the remaining issues on appeal.
Finally, we believe that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Our belief regarding the sufficiency of the evidence does not mean we are making a finding as to defendant’s guilt or innocence which would be binding on retrial, but rather our consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence admitted at trial will remove the risk of subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy. See People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289, 391 N.E.2d 366.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
BUCKLEY, P.J., concurs.