Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that suit in the instant case was properly brought in Allegheny *69County and, therefore, must dissent. In my view, proper venue in an action against a decedent’s estate lies only in the county in which the letters were issued, see Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, §621, 20 P.S. §320.6211 or, in the instant case, in the county in which the automobile accident out of which the suit arises occurred. See Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, §1303, as amended, 75 P.S. §1303 (Supp. 1964).2 Since the instant action was instituted in neither of these counties, appellant’s preliminary objection to venue in the court below should have been sustained.
“(1) When a resident of another county. By a duly deputized sheriff of any other county of the Commonwealth in which he shali be found.” Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, §621, 20 P.S. §320.621. This provision, as the successor to §37 of the Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, see Commission’s Comments, Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, 20 P.S. §320.621, is applicable to suits against the fiduciary in his representative capacity. There have been no appellate decisions construing the Act of April 19, 1949, supra. The majority’s conclusion that the Act does not restrict venue to the county in which the letters were issued is reinforced only by reference to Harris v. Blatt, 28 Dist. 11 (C.P. Lancaster Cty, 1918), a decision construing §37 of the Act of June 7, 1917, supra. I do not find the decision persuasive. See also Act of August 10, 1951, P. L. 1163, §305, 20 P.S. §2080.305 which makes identical provision for venue in a suit against a decedent’s estate in the' county in which the letters were issued: “AVhen a Pennsylvania orphans’ court has jurisdiction of a decedent’s or a minor’s estate, except as otherwise provided by law, the venue for all purposes shall be ... . in the county where the letters are granted to the personal representative . . . .”
*70The majority, in concluding that venue was proper in Allegheny County, relies upon Pa. R. C. P. 1006(a)3 and holds that the Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, §621, 20 P.S. §320.621 does not limit suit against a decedent’s estate to the county in which the letters were issued. I am unable to agree. My analysis leads me to conclude that except for suit in the cause of action county,4 the Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, §621, 20 P.S. §320.621, in the absence of waiver, limits venue to the county in which the letters were issued.
Pa. R. C. P. 1006(a) provides that an action against “an individual” may be brought in any county in which he may be served. Although the rule specifically refers to actions against individuals and makes no mention of decedents’ estates, the majority concludes that it is applicable in both instances. Such a construction is unjustified and is contrary to the settled distinction between individual and representative actions. To ignore this distinction, as does the majority, places an unwarranted and unreasonable burden upon a decedent’s estate.
Under the majority’s construction of Pa. R. C. P. 1006(a), a decedent’s estate in effect is carried with an individual fiduciary in his travels through the Commonwealth. Thus, such estate may be subjected to suit in any county, no matter how distant or inconvenient, in which the fiduciary is served with process even though his presence in that county may be wholly unrelated to his duties or responsibilities to the estate.
*71I see no justification for equating, for purposes of venue, a decedent’s estate with an individual. Such a construction, in my view, is not sufficiently responsive to those considerations which are relevant in the determination of the appropriate situs for suit. While an individual may be subjected to suit in any county in which he elects to expose himself to service of process, a decedent’s estate, once placed in the “hip-pocket” of a fiduciary, may be drawn to an inconvenient and distant forum without a similar degree of choice. Since the Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, §621, 20 P.S. §320.621 provides for deputized service in any county and thereby ensures that a fiduciary may not, by removing himself and remaining absent from the county in which his letters were issued, insulate the estate from suit, I see no reason for a construction which places undue emphasis on the problem of securing service of process at the expense of other considerations more relevant to the issue of proper venue.
The exposure to distant suit which the majority sanctions by its construction of Pa. R. C. P. 1006(a) and by its failure to respect the limitation embodied in the Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, §621, 20 P.S. §320.621, is all the more unfortunate when it remains possible for a plaintiff to secure the appointment of an administrator, as was done in the instant case, for the purpose of making service upon a defendant estate. Such a fiduciary, under the majority’s construction, by making himself amenable to service of process in the county of plaintiff’s choice, may make the situs of suit solely a matter of plaintiff’s discretion.
In my judgment, the likelihood that, the fiduciary, while pursuing his individual and personal interests, will not expose the estate to suit in an inconvenient forum is too speculative to justify a rule which sanctions *72such a possibility.5 The doctrine of forum non conveniens is far too uncertain a safeguard to rely upon to preclude such a result. For these reasons, I believe that Pa. R. C. P. 1006(a) has no application under such circumstances and that venue in a suit against a decedent’s estate is governed by the Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, §621, 20 P.S. §320.621.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this dissent.The Act provides: “Any proceeding may be brought against a personal representative or the surety on his bond in the county where his letters have been granted, and if the personal representative or surety does not reside in that county, process may be served on either of them personally, or as follows:
Provision is made for suit in the county in which .the cause of action arose: “All civil actions for damages, arising from the use and operation of any vehicle, may, at the discretion of the plaintiff, be brought ... in the county wherein the alleged damages were sustained ... in the court of common pleas of said county . . . .”
The majority does not expressly refer to Pa. R. C. P. 1006(a). However, it is only by reference to this rule that the present action could be sustained in Allegheny County, the county in which the administrator of the estate was served with process. It is therefore evident that the majority must be viewed as construing this rule to govern venue in actions against decedents’ estates as well as actions against individuals. See Pa. R. C. P. 1042.
See note 2, supra.
Since, a corporate fiduciary does not “travel”, estates which employ such are less likely to be drawn to suit in a distant forum and are thereby favored by the construction of Pa. R. C. P. 1006(a) which the majority adopts.