dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Horner Electric, Inc. As the majority opinion appropriately points out the statute of limitations begins "to run from the date the plaintiff knew or should have discovered that she (he) suffered an injury or impingement and that it was caused by the product or act of another." Degussa Corp. v. Mullens, 744 N.E.2d at 410. Morgan was first diagnosed with anxiety disorder on October 30, 2001.
It is true that Morgan reported to his doctor on May 25, 2001, that he "felt nervous." Dr. Kalra noted his symptoms and told Morgan to let him know if these symptoms were ongoing. That is exactly what Morgan did on October 30, 2001, *552when he returned to Dr. Kalra complaining of sleeplessness, panic, dizziness and light-headedness several times a day. Dr. Kalra's diagnosis on October 30th was the trigger date.
It is apparent to me that all of those symptoms were not present on May 25th, the day after he sustained the injury. It was only after five months, when the symptoms persisted and became a continual problem, that Morgan was first diagnosed with having a mild cognitive impairment, clinical anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. He did follow up as his doctor ordered because his symptoms worsened.
Morgan did exercise ordinary diligence in following his doctor's orders and did timely pursue a more specific diagnosis for his condition. I would reverse the entry of summary judgment and find that the claim against Horner did not violate the statute of limitations.