OPINION
WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.Few topics have been as controversial as that of the government’s right to restrict an individual’s capacity to carry a gun. The current controversy began when the plaintiffs, Charles H. Mosby (Mosby) and Steven Golotto (Golotto) (collectively re*1035ferred to as plaintiffs), applied to the Rhode Island Department of the Attorney General for permits to carry a concealed weapon. The defendants, the chief of the Rhode Island Bureau of Criminal Identification and the Rhode Island Attorney General (collectively referred to as the department), denied the plaintiffs’ applications. The plaintiffs sought Superior Court review of the department’s decision. A Superior Court motion justice concluded that an application to carry a concealed weapon was not a contested case because a hearing is neither required under the terms of the permitting statute nor under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the review of an application to carry a concealed weapon is not a contested case, the plaintiffs’ case was‘dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), G.L. 1956 chapter 35 of title 42. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
In 1998, plaintiffs submitted separate applications to the department seeking permits to carry concealed weapons pursuant to the Firearms Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 47 of title 11. The department, under § ll-47~18(a), is authorized to issue a concealed weapons permit ■ “upon a proper showing of need.” According to plaintiffs’ complaint, Mosby sought a permit because he is a gun collector who sometimes travels with large amounts of money. Golotto, a self-employed shopkeeper, submitted his application because he also travels with large amounts of money and is concerned about the number of robberies in the area where his shop is located.
The department reviewed and denied Mosby’s and Golotto’s applications by separate letters dated March 25, 1999, and April 29, 1999, respectively. Both denial letters said: “The Department * * * has determined insufficient need to issue a permit for you to carry a concealable weapon as defined in § 11-47-18 of the General Laws of Rhode Island, as amended.” Neither letter mentioned the possibility of meeting with the department to contest the denials. However, at Mosby’s request, he and his attorney met with former Chief of the Rhode Island Bureau of Criminal Identification, Vincent McAteer (Chief McAteer), to discuss the reasoning behind the rejection. After the meeting, Chief McAteer affirmed his rejection. Go-lotto never spoke with anyone at the department about the denial of his application.
In June 1999, the department first promulgated a document setting forth its guidelines for reviewing applications to obtain a permit under the Firearms Act. At the time plaintiffs submitted their applications, the department had no written guidelines explaining the application process or the criteria used to review applications. The plaintiffs’ applications were judged based on an unpublicized standard, under which individual applications were considered on a case-by-case basis. Decisions of the department were made based upon whether the applicant had demonstrated “an articulable risk” to his life or property and whether the applicant could change his lifestyle to prevent the need for a permit.
The plaintiffs brought the instant suit in Superior Court, arguing that the department’s denial of their original applications violated the APA and their civil rights as guaranteed under the Rhode Island Constitution. Consequently, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment or a writ of mandamus ordering that the licenses be issued. Alternatively, plaintiffs asked the department to (1) conduct a hearing on their *1036applications, (2) provide written copies of the rules, procedures and standards that the department used to review applications for licenses, and (3) pursuant to the APA, promulgate rules applicable to applications to carry concealed weapons filed under § 11-47-18.
The department moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The hearing justice determined that the APA did not vest the Superior Court with subject-matter jurisdiction to review the department’s decision because the application process under § 11-47-18 was not a contested case. Consequently, the hearing justice granted the department’s motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs appealed to this Court, and the parties were directed to appear and show cause why the issues raised in the appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing oral arguments on October 1, 2002, this Court concluded that cause had been shown and, because of the importance of the issues raised in the appeal, that further briefing and argument would be appropriate. We also invited the public to submit amicus curiae briefs discussing the issues in, the case. Many organizations accepted our invitation, and we gratefully acknowledge their memoranda.2
II
Appellate Filing Fees
We begin by addressing a procedural problem affecting Golotto’s appeal. The notice of appeal, filed on February 9, 2001, named both plaintiffs and was signed by their attorney. However, our records indicate that only one filing fee was tendered.3
Although Article I, Rule 3(b) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure allows two parties to file a joint notice of appeal, pursuant to Rule 5(a), each is required to pay the prescribed $150 filing fee. This Court repeatedly has held that the “[f]ailure of a party to tender the requisite fee renders its appeal invalid.” Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 288 (R.I.1993); see also Tateosian v. Celebrity Cruise Services, Ltd., 768 A.2d 1248, 1249 n. 1 (R.I.2001). Our records reveal that, of the two plaintiffs, the only name written on the *1037receipt issued by the Superior Court clerk’s office is Mosby’s. Thus, we conclude that the only fee tendered in this case was on his behalf. Consequently, Go-lotto is not a party to this appeal.
Ill
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The hearing justice dismissed Mos-by’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the APA. The APA’s judicial review provision provides that: “[a]ny person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available to him within the agency, and who is aggrieved by a final order in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter.” Section 42-S5-15(a). (Emphasis added.) The APA defines a contested case as “a proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a specific party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing.” Section 42-35-l(c).
The hearing justice considered whether the department’s decision on Mosby’s application must be made “after an opportunity for hearing” under two theories. Under the first, he considered whether the denial of Mosby’s application infringed on his right to keep and bear arms as provided by art. 1, sec. 22, of the Rhode Island Constitution. If so, the argument goes, then the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution would require that Mosby be afforded a hearing on his application. Alternatively, the hearing justice considered whether there is an implicit hearing requirement in the Firearms Act. We address each issue seriatim.
A
Due Process
“The Due Process Clause applies when government action deprives a person of liberty or property * * Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). Protected liberty or property interests “may arise from two sources — the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.” DiCiantis v. Wall, 795 A.2d 1121, 1126 (R.I.2002) (quoting Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989)).
In determining whether a person has a protected liberty or property interest, “we must look not to the “weight’ but to the nature of the interest at stake.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Lynch v. Gontarz, 120 R.I. 149, 157, 386 A.2d 184, 188 (1978) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701).
The constitutionally protected concept of liberty has not been defined with exactness. “Liberty * * * is a broad concept including not only freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, and generally to enjoy privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by a free people.” In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives Bill 85-H-7718, 519 A.2d 578, 581 (R.I.1987) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S.Ct. 2701).
Only when we conclude that a constitutionally protected interest has been *1038infringed “[will] we inquire whether the procedures afforded were ‘constitutionally sufficient.’” DiCiantis, 795 A.2d at 1126 (quoting Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904). When protected interests are implicated, the right of some type of pre-deprivation hearing is paramount. Lynch, 120 R.I. at 155, 386 A.2d at 187 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-71, 92 S.Ct. 2701).
Article 1, Section 22
We begin by considering whether the constitutional right to keep and bear arms as enumerated in art. 1, sec. 22, of the Rhode Island Constitution is violated by the licensing framework set forth in the Firearms Act. We do so, however, in light of the well established principle that this Court “will refrain from passing on a constitutional question when it is clear that the case before us can be decided on another point and that a determination of such a question is not indispensably necessary for a disposition of the case.” McElroy v. Hawksley, 97 R.I. 100, 107, 196 A.2d 172, 176 (1963); see also Rock Ridge Limited v. Assessor of Taxes, 667 A.2d 778, 780 (R.I.1995) (per curiam). This Court’s purpose in construing the Rhode Island Constitution is to effectuate its framers’ intent. See City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I.1995). In doing so, this Court applies the traditional rule of construction that when words in the constitution are unambiguous, they must be given their plain, ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Id. “Every clause of the constitution must be given its due force, meaning, and effect, and no word or section can be assumed to have been unnecessarily used or needlessly added.” Id. “This [C]ourt presumes that the language in a clause was carefully weighed and that the terms imply a definite meaning.” Id. We also look to the historical context under which art. 1, sec. 22 was adopted, for “ ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic’ in determining the extent of state * * * constitutional limitations.” In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 688 A.2d 288, 291 (R.I.1997) (quoting Kass v. Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System, 567 A.2d 358, 360 (R.I.1989) and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349, 41 S.Ct. 506, 65 L.Ed. 963 (1921)). Whether a particular provision has been amended may give guidance about the intended meaning of an ambiguous provision. Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56, 62 (R.I.1996). Further, “this [C]ourt properly consults extrinsic sources, including the proceedings of constitutional conventions and any legislation related to the constitutional provision that was enacted at or near the time of the adoption of the constitutional [provision].” Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 45.
Article 1, section 22 of the Rhode Island Constitution provides that: “[t]he right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” By its express terms, it cannot be denied that art. 1, sec. 22 recognizes some form of a right to keep and bear arms. To discern the nature and extent of the right, however, we must look beyond the plain text of that provision.
It seems clear from even a cursory review of the various versions of the right to bear arms, as reflected in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and in several state constitutions, that these provisions implicitly, if not explicitly, encompass the concept of “bearing arms” for the common defense.
This Court has not, before today, had the occasion to interpret the nature of the right provided by art.l, sec. 22. Indeed, the closest we have come to an examination of that section was in State v. Storms, 112 R.I. 121, 308 A.2d 463 (1973). In that case, the defendant was convicted *1039of carrying an unlicensed pistol. In dicta, we noted that, if the defendant relied on art. 1, sec. 22 to challenge his conviction,
“he would have been burdened with persuading us of the weakness of what is apparently the prevailing view, viz., that a constitutional guarantee to keep and bear arms is not infringed upon by legislation which, in broad terms, forbids the unlicensed carrying of a pistol or revolver upon one’s person excepting only in his home and place of business or upon his land.” Storms, 112 R.I. at 123, 308 A.2d at 464 (citing Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 248 A.2d 521 (1968) and Matthews v. State, 237 Ind. 677, 148 N.E.2d 334 (1958)).
As we discuss infra, based on the text, structure and history of the constitution, we hold that art. 1, sec. 22 provides individuals with a right to keep and bear arms, subject, however, to reasonable regulation by the state in exercising its police power.
The constitutional right to bear arms derives from section 7 of the English Bill of Rights: “the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.” Thus the law permitted persons of certain rank, or property, (notably Protestants) to keep a firearm. Akhil Reed Amar, Response: An(other) Afterword on the Bill of Rights, 87 Geo. L.J. 2347, 2360-61 (1999) (quoting section 7 of the English Bill of Rights of 1689).
The English Bill of Rights, the precursor to our own Bill of Rights, was adopted in response to the abuses and oppressions of King James II, among which were “‘raising and keeping a standing Army within this Kingdom in time of Peace without consent of Parliament, and Quartering Soldiers contrary to Law1 ”; and “ ‘causing several Good Subjects being Protestants to be Disarmed at the same time, when papists were both Armed and Imployed contrary to Law.’ ” H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 403, 460 (2000).
These long-held beliefs against official oppression survived the colonization of North America and became bedrock principles for our fledgling nation, particularly its thirteenth state. The right to keep and bear arms has been of paramount concern to Rhode Islanders for more than two centuries. When ratifying the United States Constitution in 1790, this state’s delegates proclaimed “[tjhat the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free state.” Ratification of the United States Constitution, pt. XVII (Newport, May 29, 1790). The delegates made this declaration even though the United States Constitution, in its original form, contained no comparable provision. Only when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791 did the United States Constitution specifically recognize a right to bear arms under the Second Amendment.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” Because plaintiffs’ claim is grounded on the Rhode Island Constitution rather than the United States Constitution, we need not join the heated debates over the origins and proper interpretation of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1086 (9th Cir.2002) (“Text, History, and Precedent All Support the Collective Rights View of the Amendment”); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir.2001) (“Second Amendment protects individual *1040rights”). It is sufficient to note the United States Supreme Court’s observation that “[t]he sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia — civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.” United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the right to keep a particular weapon unrelated to the “preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia” is not guaranteed under the Second Amendment. Id. at 178. Rather, the role of the Second Amendment is clear: “[t]his is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the National government * * *.” Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265, 6 S.Ct. 580, 29 L.Ed. 615 (1886).
It has been said that the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment supports a “collective rights” theory, which “guarantees the right of the people to maintain effective state militias, but does not provide any type of individual right to own or possess weapons.” Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060, 1066 n. 16. Many courts and academics have argued strenuously over the wisdom of such a view. Under the countervailing “individual rights” theory, a right to keep and bear arms, in one form or another, is given to individuals irrespective of a militia connection. Id. at 1060.
Rhode Island, despite gaining its independence in 1776, did not operate under a state Constitution until 1842.4 This Constitution was enacted following Dorr’s Rebellion, a revolt against Rhode Island’s aristocratic and undemocratic government. David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 827, 845 (2002). Despite its creation in the aftermath of what the constitutional framers most certainly considered an “illegitimate armed insurrection,” id., art. 1, sec. 22 explicitly proclaimed that “[t]he right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” (Emphasis added.)
Important to our holding today is the use of the phrase “the people,” which is not unique to art. 1, sec. 22. The preamble to the Rhode Island Constitution states, “We, the people of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations * * * do ordain and establish this Constitution of government.” Article 1, section 2 recognizes that “All free governments are instituted for the protection, safety, and happiness of the people.” In article 1, section 6, the framers assure that “the people” will be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. Section 17 of article 1 secures the right of “[t]he people” to exercise their “rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore.” This Court has held that “the term ‘people,’ as used in the Constitution, is broad and comprehensive, comprising in most instances all the inhabitants of the State.” In re Incurring of State Debts, 19 R.I. 610, 613, 37 A. 14, 15 (1896).
There is no indication that the framers of the Rhode Island Constitution intended to attribute a restricted meaning to the phrase “the people” in art.l, sec. 22. Accordingly, we attribute the ordinary meaning to the phrase “the people;” ie., that it includes all inhabitants of the state. Thus, like the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and other rights provided to “the people,” we believe *1041that the right provided in art. 1, sec. 22 flows to the people individually.
We now must consider what the right to “keep and bear” arms entails. We are of the opinion that the “keeping” and “bearing” of arms involve different concepts. So holding, we are able to attribute significance to both of the terms use in that phrase. See Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 45 (noting that constitutional terms imply a definite meaning).
Just two years before the Rhode Island Constitution was ratified, the Supreme Court of Tennessee explained the significance of the phrase “bear arms” as it was used in that state’s constitution. In Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840), the defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed knife in public in violation of state law. The court rejected the defendant’s contention that the statute under which he was convicted violated his rights guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution. At that time, article 1, section 26, of the Tennessee Constitution declared “‘That the free white men of this State, have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defence.’ ” Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 156. The court held that the phrase “bear arms” “has a military sense, and no other * * Id. at 161. As the court artfully described “A man in pursuit of deer, elk and buffaloes, might carry his rifle every day, for forty years, and, yet, it would never be said of him, that he had bone arms * * Id.
The Ninth Circuit has also offered its interpretation of the phrase “bear arms.” See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1072. Focusing on the second clause of the Second Amendment, the court noted that “the phrase ‘bear arms’ is a phrase that customarily relates to a military function.” Id. Reviewing considerable research on the sub: ject, the court was convinced that “the use of the term ‘bear arms’ generally referred to the carrying of arms in military service — not the private use of arms for personal purposes.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion in interpreting the same “bear arms” language of the Second Amendment. In Emerson, 270 F.3d at 231-32, the court held the Second Amendment’s use of the phrase “bear arms” also refers to the carrying of arms by a civilian.
Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits relied on persuasive historical evidence in reaching their divergent conclusions about the meaning of the word “bear.”5 Indeed, both courts marshaled an impressive array of writings to support their respective positions. For purposes of interpreting the Rhode Island Constitution, however, we find it noteworthy that both courts looked to a page in Rhode Island history to find evidence of the military .connotation of the phrase “bear arms.” Specifically, they cited to the Rhode Island ratification of the United States Constitution. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1074 n. 31; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 230 n. 28. The Rhode Island delegates, in addition to their suggested precursor to the Second Amendment described above, declared that “any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.” Ratification of the United States Constitution, pt. XVIII. It is clear that this conscientious objector provision and its reference to “bear arms” relates exclusively to military service.
*1042Accordingly, we are satisfied that Rhode Island’s historical use of the phrase “bear arms” in connection with the ratification of the United States Constitution, relates to military service and the common defense. This implied relationship between the bearing of arms and military service, however, does not undermine the individual right to “keep” arms in one’s home or in his or her place of business. It is the keeping of arms that is the sine qua non of the individual right under art. 1, sec. 22.
Although the right to bear arms was related to bearing for purpose of the militia, the militia was composed of individuals, “civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.” Miller, 307 U.S. at 179, 59 S.Ct. 816. History' reveals that the policy of Rhode Island called for individuals to keep arms to defend the state “when the alarm sounds.” Stephen P. Halbrook, A Right to Bear Arms 102-03 (Greenwood Press 1989). Indeed, the Militia Act of 1798 provided that a member of the militia must “provide himself with a good musket or firelock,” powder and ammunition. An Act to organize the Militia of this State, P.L. 1798, § 1 at p. 423-24. “The horseman was to furnish himself with a pair of pistols and a saber.” Halbrook, at 103 (citing the Militia Act, of 1798, p. 426). Every member of the “Senior Class,” which comprised people exempt from militia service, was expected to “provide himself with arms and accoutrements, in like manner as the members of the militia * * * and shall be liable to be called out in ease of the invasion of the State.” An Act to establish the Senior Class, P.L. 1798, §§ 1, 3 at p. 442-43. To deny the people their individual right to keep appropriate arms could transform the militia into a toothless tiger. In the absence of an individual right to keep arms, the government could, by legislative act, deprive the people of their right to defend the state.
Legislation enacted -just after the Rhode Island Constitution was ratified sheds further light on our interpretation of art.l, sec. 22. In section 36 of the 1843 Rhode Island Acts and Resolves concerning Militia Law, the General Assembly provided that “[e]ach chartered regimental company of light infantry, grenadiers, and riflemen, raised at large, shall be furnished with muskets or rifles, and every such company of cavalry, with sabres, belts, and pistols * * *.” Those arms could be delivered to the company “for the safe keeping * * * [provided there is] satisfactory evidence that a suitable armory or place of deposite for such muskets or rifles has been provided * * * which arms so furnished shall be carefully kept for the use of such company for military purposes only.” Id. (Emphasis added.) This statutory language indicates that the keeping of arms contemplates storage in an appropriate location rather than carrying the same in public.
We discern no jurisprudential support in this state for the dissent’s conclusion that the term “bear arms” extends beyond the military context. The fact that the terms “bearing arms” and “arms-bearing activity” have found their way into two recent opinions of this Court — both authored by the dissent and issued after this case was first argued and placed on the full argument calendar — is of no moment to this appeal. The Supreme Court does not decide constitutional issues by reference to adverbial phrases that are, at best, dicta. What is of significance, however, is that in the one-and-one-half-plus centuries since the Rhode Island Constitution was adopted, no other Rhode Island jurist in any opinion ever has referred to the possession of a firearm, particularly during the commission of murder, as “arms-bear*1043ing activity.”6
Although we conclude that the “bear arms” language of art. 1, sec. 22 is employed in the military context, we also recognize an individual right flowing to the people to keep and bear arms. However, we are not convinced that resolution of the issues before us today requires us to define the extent of these rights or establish the limits of art. 1, sec. 22 because we are of the opinion that, when viewed in its entirety, the statutory framework under review serves to vindicate an individual’s right to keep and bear arms and that the licensing scheme set forth in the Firearms Act is reasonable legislative regulation of weapons that falls squarely within the state’s police power.7
*1044[14] Numerous jurisdictions have recognized that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms under a state constitution is not absolute and that reasonable regulatory control by the Legislature to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens uniformly has been upheld. “That the right to bear arms is not an unlimited right and is subject to reasonable regulation is an accepted principle among other jurisdictions.” Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163, 172 (1993). Accord People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (1975); State v. Rupp, 282 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 1979); In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.1980); State v. Angelo, 3 N.J.Misc. 1014, 130 A. 458, 459 (N.J.Sup.1925); State v. Dees, 100 N.M. 252, 669 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct.App.1983); State v. Buckner, 180 W.Va. 457, 377 S.E.2d 139, 146 (1988) (citing Bristow v. State, 418 So.2d 927, 930 (Ala.Crim.App.1982) (right to bear arms is not absolute and is subject to reasonable regulation)); State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Wyo.1986); Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 871 (Wyo.1982). “[T]he right to keep and bear arms is not absolute; * * * ‘regardless of the basis of the right to bear arms, the State, nevertheless, has the power to reasonably regulate it.’ ” State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481, 483 (N.D.1987) (quoting People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 235 N.W. 245, 246 (1931)). Because the right to keep and bear arms is not absolute there is no “constitutional right to carry loaded weapons at all times and in all circumstances.” State v. Warren, 975 P.2d 900, 902 (Okla.1998).
Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has been rejected in .favor of a reasonableness test—“the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.” State v. Cole, 264 Wis.2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328, 337 (2003). Athough deferential, this standard of review is “generally distinct from the type of review that challenges under other constitutional rights receive.” Id. (quoting Jeffrey Monks, Comment, The End of Gun Control or Protection Against Tyranny ?: The Impact of the New Wisconsin Constitutional Right to Bear Arms on State Gun Control Laws, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 259 (2001)). The test for determining the constitutionality of a ban on handguns is whether the enactment is reasonable, that is whether the statute is a reasonable limitation of the right to bear arms, rather than a reasonable means of promoting the public welfare. Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 338.
Recently, the state of Connecticut, in upholding a statutory ban on assault weapons, concluded that the regulation did not infringe on the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the Connecticut Constitution because that state’s law “continue[d] to permit access to a wide array of weapons.” Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 662 A.2d 1226, 1235 (1995). Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the right to possess a handgun, whether a fundamental liberty interest or not, is not absolute and is subject to reasonable regulation. We are further satisfied that the *1045statute under review, § 11-47-18, is a restriction on the type of firearms one may lawfully possess but not a total ban on the right to bear arms.
The Firearms Act
When passing upon the constitutionality of enactments of the General Assembly, in light of the “broad plenary power of the General Assembly, this [C]ourt’s evaluation of legislative enactments has been extremely deferential; * * * we have interfered with such enactments only when the legislation at issue could palpably and unmistakably be characterized as an excess of legislative power.” Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 44-45. “In interpreting the scope of a grant of power made by the General Assembly, we carefully consider the legislation in its entirety along with the circumstances that motivated its passage.” Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 866 (R.I.1997) (citing Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.1987)). Our task is to evaluate the constitutional issues presented and “if two alternate interpretations are possible, we shall favor that which presents no potential constitutional difficulties.” Id. (citing Kass v. Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System, 567 A.2d 358, 360 (R.I.1989)); see also Rhode Island State Police v. Madison, 508 A.2d 678, 683 (R.I.1986). We begin with the well established principle that a statute is presumed to be valid and constitutional, Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 45, and the party challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of convincing this Court beyond a reasonable doubt that the enactment violates the state or federal constitution. Seibert v. Clark, 619 A.2d 1108, 1113 (R.I. 1993); see In Re Christopher S., 776 A.2d 1054, 1057 (R.I.2001) (citing In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 659 A.2d 95, 100 (R.I.1995)).
A careful review of the Firearms Act in its entirety reveals an orderly statutory scheme designed to regulate the possession and use of an array of weapons, including pistols, rifles and other deadly weapons. Besides banning the unlicensed possession of a firearm, the Firearms Act embraces a host of weapons and activities. Under its provisions a person convicted of a crime of violence or a felony is precluded from possessing a firearm8 and a person who commits a crime of violence while armed with a firearm is guilty of a felony subject to a mandatory period of incarceration.9 See State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 905, 907-08 (R.I.2003) (no double jeopardy bar to sentencing a defendant for the crime of use-of-a-firearm and committing a crime of violence, namely, murder, while armed with a firearm because, inter alia, the Legislature specifically has authorized a criminal sentence consecutive to the underlying violent felony). Further, “person[s] who [are] under guardianship or treatment or confinement by virtue of being a mental incompetent,” a drug addict or a drunkard may not own or possess any firearm;10 nor may an illegal alien own a firearm.11 It is unlawful for anyone in Rhode Island, whether licensed or exempt from the licensing statute, to carry or transport a firearm while intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics.12 The Firearms Act prohibits the sale and transfer of any firearm to a minor;13 nor may one sell or convey any ammunition to a *1046person under eighteen years of age.14 Anyone convicted of a drug crime while in possession of a firearm, whether licensed or not, is guilty of a felony.15
The possession, manufacture and sale of a machine gun is generally prohibited.16 Likewise, no one may possess or have under his or her control a sawed-off shotgun or sawed-off rifle.17 It is unlawful to alter the marks of identification on firearms.18 The sale or possession of a silencer device designed to deaden or muffle the sound of a gunshot is outlawed,19 as is the manufacture, sale and possession of armor-piercing bullets.20 No one may possess a bomb or other explosive substance unless specifically authorized to do so by statute.21
In addition to the restrictions and prohibitions concerning guns, the Firearms Act outlaws many other weapons — no person may carry or possess a blackjack, slingshot, billy[club], sandclub, sandbag, metal (brass) knuckles, slap glove, bludgeon, stun gun, or any kung-fu weapons. Possession of a dagger, dirk, stiletto, sword-in-cane, bowie knife or any other knife with a blade measuring more than three inches is also prohibited.22
Gun dealers must be licensed by the local authorities and are subject to mandatory restrictions and regulations.23 The General Assembly has required a seven-day waiting period before one may purchase a pistol or revolver24 or a rifle or a shotgun25 and anyone who owns a firearm shall report its loss or theft within twenty-four hours of the discovery of the loss or theft.26 It is unlawful to ‘fire any firearm in a compact area of any city or town within the state,27 anywhere within the Blaekstone Valley flood plain or marshes,28 across a public road or street;29 nor may one carry a loaded rifle or shotgun in a vehicle.30 Further, every physician who attends or treats a gunshot wound or powder burn, must report the case at once to the local police.31
To protect children from negligent gun owners, the Legislature recently has required the safe storage of firearms in the home.32 Notably, in doing so, the General Assembly declared that its intent was not “to reduce or limit any existing right to purchase and own firearms and/or ammunition” or to “infringe upon the privacy of any family, home or business except by lawful warrant.”33 Thus, while attempting to promote greater gun safety in *1047the home, the General Assembly carefully has avoided any restriction on gun ownership by a homeowner or landowner. Additionally, retail dealers are now required to provide a trigger lock or other safety device before a pistol is delivered to a purchaser.34 Finally, in response to the explosion of gun violence, particularly in Providence,35 the General Assembly has provided for stiff penalties for anyone convicted of a “drive-by” shooting36 or who possesses a firearm on school grounds.37 Clearly, the regulation of weapons falls within the police power of the General Assembly and is both reasonable and necessary. A statute that vests the department with discretionary authority to issue a gun permit “upon a proper showing of need,” § 11-47-18, is part of this comprehensive scheme and does not unconstitutionally infringe on “[t]he right of the people to keep and bear arms.” R.I. Const, art. 1, sec. 22.
Gun Permits in General
Two separate and distinct licensing procedures are set forth in the Firearms Act: § 11-47-18, now before the Court, provides for the discretionary grant of a firearms license by the department “upon a proper showing of need,” and § 11-47-11(a), a mandatory licensing provision that provides in pertinent part:
“The licensing authorities of any city or town shall, upon application of any person twenty-one (21) years of age or over having a bona fide residence or place of business within the city or town, or of any person twenty-one (21) years of age or over having a bona fide residence within the United States and a license or permit to carry a pistol or revolver concealed upon his or her person issued by the authorities of any other state or subdivision of the United States, issue a license or permit to the person to carry concealed upon his or her person a pistol or revolver everywhere within this state for four (4) years from date of issue, if it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear an injury to his or her person or property or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol or revolver, and that he or she is a suitable person to be so licensed.” (Emphases added.)
Because the Firearms Act provides for both discretionary and mandatory licensing to qualified applicants, the constitutional guarantee to keep and bear arms is fulfilled. Mosby, a resident of Massachusetts who holds several gun licenses from other states, was entitled to a carrying permit from the licensing authority of any city or town. An avid gun collector, plaintiff has a proper reason for carrying a pistol or revolver and there is no suggestion that he is an unsuitable person. In contrast to § 11-47-18, the statute now before the Court, § 11 — 17-11 is mandatory — an applicant who meets the criteria set forth in § 11-17-11 is entitled to a gun permit. See Schubert v. DeBard, 398 N.E.2d 1339, 1341 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (“[I]f it is determined * * * that the applicant has met the conditions of the statute, the [licensing authority] has no discretion to withhold the license.”). Although we are mindful that the “suitable person” provision in § 11-47-11 vests the local licens*1048ing authority with discretion to reject an application filed by an unsuitable person, this leeway does not affect the requirement that the licensing authority shall issue a permit to a suitable person who meets the requirements set forth in the statute. The finding that an applicant is a suitable person involves an exercise of discretion, but certain individuals are unsuitable as a matter of law, including convicted felons, habitual drunkards, mental incompetents, illegal aliens, and anyone who has failed to meet the minimum firing qualification score.38 Moreover, if a license is refused on the ground that a person is not suitable,- this determination is subject to review by this Court on certiorari. See Krivitsky v. Town of Westerly, 823 A.2d 1144, 1144 (R.I.2003) (“unless ‘a right of appeal is specifically provided by statute,’ ” the proper procedure for denial by a town council of a license application is by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court). Because anyone who meets the conditions of § 11-47-11 is entitled to a gun permit, this mandatory requirement supplies the necessary safeguards to the right to bear arms in this state and vindicates the rights set forth in art. 1, sec. 22, of the Rhode Island Constitution. Thus, the fact that the Firearms Act contains an additional licensing provision by which the department may issue a gun permit under certain, more stringent, conditions does not affect our holding. As argued by the state and found by the trial justice, the inclusion of the word “may” in § 11 — 4Y—18(a) expressly confers broad discretion upon the department to issue or decline to issue gun permits. This does not, however, have an impact upon “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.”
Discretionary Gun Permits
We are of the opinion that the licensing statute now under review is discretionary. Significantly, for purposes of a constitutional liberty-interest analysis, § 11 — 47—18 vests the department with extremely broad discretion to grant or deny a license even when there has been “a proper showing of need.” Many courts, when confronted with a discretionary licensing statute, decline to construe a protected liberty interest in obtaining a license. See Gonzales v. Commissioner, Department of Public Safety, 665 A.2d 681, 683 (Me.1995) (no constitutionally protected property interest in obtaining a gun permit when there is broad discretion to withhold the license). Likewise in Gifford v. City of Los Angeles, 88 Cal.App.4th 801, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 164, 168-69 (2 Dist.2001), the California Court of Appeals concluded that mandamus does not lie when a state statute grants broad discretion to the licensing authority to issue or refuse to issue a firearms license upon a “showing of good cause.” In Erdelyi v. O’Brien, 680 F.2d 61 (9th Cir.1982), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “[w]here state law gives the issuing authority broad discretion to grant or deny license applications in a closely regulated field, initial applicants do not have a property right in such licenses [that is] protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 63 (citing Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir.1980)).
Accordingly, because the statute under consideration vests the Attorney General with discretion to refuse a license even if a person makes “a proper showing of need,” we are of the opinion that it has no impact on any constitutionally protected liberty interest, nor are we persuaded that the refusal of the Attorney General to issue a permit under the provisions of § 11-47-18 violates the “right of the people to keep and bear arms.”
*1049Consequently, although the Firearms Act regulates and prohibits the ownership and possession of numerous weapons, including handguns, the statute includes both mandatory and discretionary licensing provisions that satisfy the constitutional guarantee to keep and bear arms. The citizens of this state are free to possess a rifle or a shotgun, or a pistol or revolver in their homes, places of employment and on their property. Therefore, due process concerns are not triggered and Mosby is not entitled to a hearing on his initial application filed under § ll-47-18(a).39
Implicit Hearing Requirement Under § 11-47-18
Alternatively, Mosby argues that § 11-47-18 requires a hearing on his application. A hearing is required by law for purposes of the APA if one is provided for in the statute under which a plaintiff submits an application. See Bradford Associates v. Rhode Island Division of Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 489 (R.I.2001) (citing Property Advisory Group, Inc. v. Rylant, 636 A.2d 317, 318 (R.I.1994)). In Bradford, we held that a failure to expressly provide for a hearing by statute renders a case “uncontested” for purposes of the APA. Id.
Mosby acknowledges that § 11-47-18 does not expressly provide for a hearing, but argues that one is implicitly required under the statute. To support his argument, Mosby cites Colonial Hilton Inns of New England, Inc. v. Rego, 109 R.I. 259, 284 A.2d 69 (1971). In that case, this Court considered whether a hearing was required to review an application to fill submerged lands filed under G.L.1956 § 46-6-2. Rego, 109 R.I. at 261-63, 284 A.2d at 70-71. Although § 46-6-2 did not expressly provide for a hearing, we held that such a proceeding was a contested case as defined by the APA because an applicant’s “ ‘rights, duties or privileges’ are to be determined.” Id. at 263, 284 A.2d at 71.
An application to carry a concealed weapon filed under § 11-47-18, however, is distinguishable from an application to fill submerged lands filed under § 46-6-2. Section 46-6-2 expressly provides: “that nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair the rights of any riparian proprietors to erect wharves authorized to be erected under any of the laws establishing harbor lines within the state or otherwise by the [Gjeneral [Assembly.” Impairment of a riparian owner’s rights authorized by the General Assembly is a deprivation of a state-created interest. See Hamilton v. Myers, 281 F.3d 520, 529-30 (6th Cir.2002) (acknowledging that riparian rights should be protected by procedural due process). Thus, procedural due process would call for a hearing to determine whether the state’s decision to deny an application would im-permissibly impair a riparian owner’s rights.
Conversely, § 11-47-18 contains no analogous limitation on the licensing of individuals to carry concealed weapons. Unlike § 46-6-2, § 11-47-18 does not im*1050pose an express limitation on the department’s decision-making authority. Thus, § 11^7-18 does not implicitly require a hearing, and filing an application to carry a concealed weapon under that statute does not create a “contested case.”
Required Procedures Under § 11-47-18
Although we are satisfied that the licensing scheme set forth in the Firearms Act is both reasonable and lawful, we are mindful that decisions of the Attorney General in licensing matters are not immune from judicial review. As this Court’s decision in Storms clearly indicates, the Attorney General’s role under the Firearms Act is that of a finder of fact, not a master of puppets.
In State v. Storms, 112 R.1.121, 124, 308 A.2d 463, 464 (1973), we considered whether the General Assembly properly delegated a legislative function under the Firearms Act. In holding that the delegation was proper, we looked to the structure and purpose of the act. Id. at 125, 128, 308 A.2d at 465, 467. The purpose of the Firearms Act is “to prevent criminals and certain other persons from acquiring firearms generally and handguns in particular without at the same time making unduly difficult such acquisition for other members of society.” Id. at 127, 308 A.2d at 466. After “establishing primary standards,” the General Assembly appropriately delegated to administrative agencies the right to “determine the existence or nonexistence of the facts upon which the enactment is intended to operate * * Id. at 126, 308 A.2d at 466. To accomplish the purpose of the Firearms Act, the General Assembly established licensing procedures and broad parameters that must be used to guide the licensing body in determining the facts upon which the right to be licensed to carry a handgun hinged. Id. at 127, 308 A.2d at 466. Describing those procedures, we noted:
“the Legislature provided that an applicant for a license must show, for example, that he has a ‘need’ or ‘proper reason’ for carrying such a weapon, that he is qualified to use it, and that he is an otherwise ‘suitable person.’ But to make those determinations, calls for an exercise of the fact-finding function which the Legislature obviously is in no position to supply. Hence, to give operative effect to the law and to prevent it from becoming a nullity required a delegation of authority which, in this instance, the Legislature made to those who by reason of their training and experience and the facilities at their command were probably more competent than any others to exercise the delegated power.” Id. at 127-28, 308 A.2d at 466-67.
Having provided adequate guidance to the licensing bodies, it is within the province of the courts to review the licensing decision here to ensure that the General Assembly’s intent is being effectuated. The opportunity for judicial review of a licensing body’s decision under the Firearms Act is especially important when considering the nature of. the right sought to be vindicated through the application process. As a matter of policy, this Court will not countenance any system of permitting under the Firearms Act that would be committed to the unfettered discretion of an executive agency. Although the court’s authority to review the decision is limited, it is not nonexistent. One does not need to be an expert in American history to understand the fault inherent in a gun-permitting system that would allow a licensing body carte blanche authority to decide who is worthy of carrying a concealed weapon. The constitutional right to bear arms would be illusory, of course, if it could be abrogated entirely on the basis of an unreviewable unrestricted licensing scheme. *1051Such review is available through a common-law writ of certiorari.
To review a decision on certiorari, however, certain procedural steps must be employed to allow a meaningful review by this Court. We previously have conveyed the prerequisites for decisions of administrative agencies acting as fact-finders. In Dionne v. Jalette, 641 A.2d 744, 744 (R.I.1994), we considered the procedure required of a law enforcement committee in finding a former captain of the Woonsocket Police Department guilty of two charges of violating department rules and regulations. We noted that neither this Court nor the Superior Court had the power to make findings of fact in these matters. Judicial review of the committee’s conclusion “is limited to determining whether there is evidence in the record to support its findings. The hearing panel must, at a minimum, indicate the evidence upon which it relies.” Id. at 746.
Notwithstanding our previous decisions declaring that there is neither a constitutional entitlement to parole nor a right to a parole-determination hearing, even the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (DOC) must provide the basis for its decisions in the inmate classification context. In DeCiantis v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections, 840 A.2d 1090, 1092-93 (R.I.2003) (per curiam), we noted that “although the DOC director has unfettered discretion concerning classification determinations, when he or she exercises that discretion, an inmate is entitled to know the reasons upon which that decision is based.” The same logic applies in the gun-permitting context, especially when, as here, the Department’s determination is subject to certiorari review.
We hold that the Attorney General must adhere to minimum procedural requirements when rejecting an application filed under § 11-47-18. A rejected applicant is entitled to know the evidence upon which the department based its decision and the rationale for the denial. Armed with this information, an aggrieved applicant can petition this Court for a writ of certiorari so that we may review the department’s decision for error of law. In conducting such a review, this Court will not weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. See State v. DeCiantis, 813 A.2d 986, 988 (R.I.2003); State Department of Environmental Management v. State Labor Relations Board, 799 A.2d 274, 277 (R.I.2002). Rather, we will inspect the record to determine whether the department’s findings are supported by any legally competent evidence. Id. Because Mosby has not sought review by way of certiorari, we cannot review the merits of the department’s determination in this case.
Conclusion
The department’s exercise of its broad discretion to deny Mosby’s application under § 11-47-18 did not have an impact upon “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.” Further, § 11-47-18 does not require a hearing on an individual’s application for a gun permit. Based on our decision herein, the decision to grant or deny an application to carry a concealed firearm is not a contested case for purposes of the APA. Accordingly, the Superi- or Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review the department’s decision pursuant to the APA. Rather, the only method to obtain judicial review of a denial of an application filed under § 11-47-18 is to seek a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.
For the reasons stated herein, we- affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record shall be remanded to the Superior Court.
. The Citizens’ Rights Action League, the Rhode Island Affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, the Rhode Island Police Chiefs Association, the Rhode Island Chapter of the Million Mom March, the National Rifle Association of America, Inc., the Rhode Island State Rifle & Revolver Association, and the Violence Policy Center have submitted amicus curiae briefs. Many of the arguments presented by the amici support each party’s position in one respect or another.
. After we ordered full briefing and argument, Golotto not only failed to pay the filing fee, but also elected not to file a brief. After the second oral argument, when it was again pointed out to counsel that Golotto was not properly before the Court, counsel simply forwarded a check to the clerk with instructions that she "bring this to the Court's attention as this matter is currently under deliberation." In an order dated December 15, 2003, we rejected Golotto’s tender as having been untimely filed pursuant to Article I, Rule 4(a), of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires a notice of appeal and a filing fee to be submitted "within twenty (20) days of entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from.” Justice Flanders dissented to this order. However, after this appeal was argued to the Court for the second time, counsel simply forwarded a check and made no attempt to explain his failure to pay the filing fee. Although the dissent correctly notes that failure to pay the filing fee is fatal to an appeal, it faults the Court for not "giving him an opportunity to show excusable neglect” before dismissing the appeal. The travel of this case demonstrates otherwise. Golotto's appeal was not appropriately before the Court and Mosby is the only appellant.
. The Rhode Island Constitution was ratified in November 1842 and came into effect in May 1843.
. Although both decisions interpret the term as it is used in the United States Constitution and would not be binding on this decision, they do provide probative discussions of the history of the term as it is used in a constitutional sense generally.
. These cases, Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699 (R.I.2003) and State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109 (R.I.2003), concern the use of a firearm to commit murder criminal behavior that has nothing to do with the right to bear arms and are not relevant to this discussion. In Volpe, 821 A.2d at 703, a mentally ill man shot his unsuspecting neighbor three times in the head and body with a shotgun; his homeowner-mother was held responsible for the wrongful death, id. at 718, because she negligently allowed her son to "keep and store guns and ammunition on her property.” In McGuy, we noted that the victim of a second-degree murder had engaged in "gun-toting conduct,” but held that the behavior was not sufficiently threatening "to allow defendant to preemptively pull out his gun and shoot [him] to death.” McGuy, 841 A.2d at 1114. Accordingly, these are criminal cases that tragically resulted in death; they have no relevance to the right to keep and bear arms. Indeed, in Volpe, the weapons were kept at the assailant’s home, a situation far removed from the issues facing us today.
. We disagree with the dissent’s assertions about the law of self-defense in Rhode Island as it relates to deadly force. Neither of the two opinions from the nineteenth century cited by the dissent involved a firearm. State v. Ballou, 20 R.I. 607, 40 A. 861 (1898) and State v. Sherman, 16 R.I. 631, 18 A. 1040 (1889). In this state, one is not entitled to "stand his ground, and if need be, kill his assailant” with a handgun unless unable to retreat and faced with deadly force. Sherman, 16 R.I. at 633, 18 A. at 1041. The law of self-defense is well-settled; it is grounded on necessity and includes the doctrine of retreat. Rather than "stand[ing] his ground,” before one may employ deadly force, he or she must retreat "when an open, safe avenue of escape is available and he [or she] is consciously aware of this fact.” State v. Guillem-et, 430 A.2d 1066, 1069 (R.I.1981); see also State v. Rieger, 763 A.2d 997, 1002-03 (R.I.2001). A person may stand his ground and not retreat only if he employs less than deadly force against the assailant. Guillemet, 430 A.2d at 1069. Obviously, this has no relevance to firing a loaded revolver. There are long-standing and well recognized limits on the amount of force one can lawfully employ in self-defense:
"The law concerning self defense in Rhode Island permits persons who believe that they are in imminent peril of bodily harm to use such nondeadly force as is reasonably necessary in the circumstances to protect themselves.” State v. Quarles, 504 A.2d 473, 475 (R.I.1986) (citing State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1082 (R.I.1981)). (Emphasis added.)
"Before resorting to the use of deadly force, the person attacked must attempt retreat if he or she is consciously aware of an open, safe, and available avenue of escape.” Id. (citing Guillemet, 430 A.2d at 1069). (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, notwithstanding the century-old opinions cited by the dissent, with respect to the use of deadly force (with a handgun), one may not "stand his or her ground 'and if need be kill his [or her] assailant.' " Nothing in the law of self-defense in any way has an impact upon the "right of the people to keep and bear arms.” Simply put, the Legislature, in its duty to act in the public’s welfare and to exercise its police power, has determined that a limited class of firearms, pistols and revolvers, may not be carried outside one's home, place of employment or on one’s property without a license.
The Castle Doctrine is a recognized exception to the duty to retreat before one may employ deadly force to repel an attack, and has both statutory and common-law origins. Pursuant to G.L.1956 § 11-8-8, an owner, *1044tenant, or other occupier of premises has no duty to retreat and may use deadly force to repel an attack by a person engaged in the commission of a crime. Further, "one need not retreat from [his or her] place of dwelling before using deadly force to repel an assailant.” State v. Fetzik, 577 A.2d 990, 994 (R.I.1990). This exception to the Doctrine of Retreat is not available to repel an attack by a co-tenant or roommate and one must attempt to retreat in the face of a deadly attack by a co-occupant. Quarles, 504 A.2d at 476. Of course, neither of these exceptions is relevant to the right to keep and bear arms because one has an absolute right to keep firearms in one’s home or place of business.
. G.L.1956 § 11-47-5.
. Section 11 — 47-3.
. Section 11-47-6.
.Section 11-47-7.
. Section 11-47-52.
. Section 11-47-30.
. Section 11 — 47-31.
. Section 11 — 47-8(c).
. Section ll-47-8(a).
. Section ll-47-8(b).
. Section 11-47-24.
. Section 11-47-20.
. Section 11-47-20.1.
. Section 11-47-21.
. Section ll-47-42(a)(l).
. Section 11-47-38.
. Section 11-47-35.
. Section 11-47-35.2.
. Section 11-47-48.1.
. Section 11-47-50.
. Section 11-47-49.1.
. Section 11-47-49.
. Section 11-47-51.
. Section 11-47-48.
. Section 11-47-60.1.
. Section 11-47-60.1(a).
. Section 11 — 47-60.3.
. According to statistics issued by the United States Department of Justice, the rate of homicides in Rhode Island committed with a gun has been on the increase since 1996. In 1998, 50 percent of the homicides were committed with a firearm, in 1999, 55.6 percent of homicides were committed with a firearm and this figure increased to 71.1 percent in 2000.
. Section 11-47-61.
. Section 11-47-60.
. See §§ 11-47-5, 11-47-6, 11-47-7, and 11-47-15.
. We note that a different result may be reached if the Department sought to discontinue or revoke a permit that already had been obtained. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) ("There is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has * * * and being denied a conditional liberty one desires.”). Also, in ruling that the denial of Mosby’s application filed under § 11-47-18 deprived him of no constitutionally protected rights, we offer no opinion as to how a similar case would be analyzed upon a rejection of an application filed under § 11-47-11.