I join in the decision of the Court that this case should be decided on its merits. However, I would go further and hold that the taxpayer's complaint in equity is proper and appropriate (and that quo warranto is not the sole and exclusive remedy), rather than merely "assume that a taxpayer's bill will lie." Cf. Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 185 A. 2d 135 (1962); Schrader v. Heath, 408 Pa. 79, 182 A. 2d 696 (1962); Wright v. Wagner, 405 Pa. 546, 175 A. 2d 875 (1961); Butcher v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 34, 114 A. 2d 120 (1955). I join also in that portion of the Court's opinion which holds that a councilman is an "officer" *27within the meaning of Section 10-107(5) of the Charter.
However, I desire to note my disagreement with the view of the majority that the suit was prematurely brought and that Defendant-Intervenor Tate did not become a “candidate” until he filed his nomination petitions. When he became a “candidate” is a question of fact to be determined by the record and not by any arbitrary test which is unrelated to what long experience and observation have demonstrated. The complaint filed on January 7, 1963, alleged that “On December 17th, 1962, James H. J. Tate announced that he was seeking the office of Mayor . . . and he offered himself for said office . . . and is at the present time a candidate for the office of Mayor.” This well-pleaded averment was undenied and on the record presented was an undisputed fact in the court below, as it is here.1 It is legally sufficient and conclusive on this factual issue. The word “candidate” in the Charter must be considered to have its usual and generally accepted campaign-for-election meaning. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Laughlin v. Green, 351 Pa. 170, 176, 40 A. 2d 492, 494 (1945). Even if it be conceded that a “public announcement” is a prerequisite to becoming a candidate, such announcement can be accomplished in a variety of ways, depending upon the political strategy employed—by a speech, statement, advertisement, or other communication reported or appearing in public media, or by any other technique for achieving the desired political effect.
In the light of the foregoing, if we attribute to his actions their usual significance, the conclusion is ines*28capable that Defendant-Intervenor Tate was a candidate by his choice and design long before the hour he filed his nomination petitions. His signed statement could have been no more articulate announcement of his candidacy. Prior to the date of his filing, not even the most casual observer of Philadelphia political life would have hesitated to describe him as an avowed and active candidate. For any judicial tribunal in the community (particularly one at the appellate level) to fail-to recognize this obvious fact is almost incredible. A man is a candidate when “his hat is in the ring’?, and the ..record here most convincingly and unquestionably establishes that Defendant-Intervenor Tate’s hat was in the ring when this proceeding was begun.
Further, I disagree with that portion of the decision of-'.the Court which concludes that James IT. J. Tate may be a candidate for Mayor without first resigning his councilmanic office and that Section 10-107(5) is not applicable to his present candidacy. To reach this result "would require an interpretation which excludes an elected councilman. from the explicit provisions of Section 10t107(5) of the Charter or a finding that an elected councilman (as here), when a candidate for Mayor, is not a councilman. There is nothing in the Charter or in the record or in “the well known exigencies! in the circumstances here present” or “the facts and the', exigencies of this unusual situation” or “the public interest’?2 which requires or even suggests such a.result. ..
The Charter is a practical document designed to improve and .advance the quality of local governmental operation. In seeking to attain that objective, the Charter limits the political activity of officers and employees “paid from the City Treasury.”3 Section 10-107(5) explicitly restricts the permitted candidacy of *29an elected official to re-election to the office to which he was elected—without first resigning. No greater harm could come to the Charter than a determination which fails to recognize and apply the clear language and meaning of Section 10-107(5). Not-to do so is, in reality, to rewrite the Charter and to frustrate its objective. ¡
The record before us is clear. Appellee Tate was elected a councilman for a term which has not expired". He is not running for re-election as Mayor because, he has never been elected to that office. The tenure of his office as councilman was not terminated by him and still continues. As an elected councilman, he may, during the term of his office, be a candidate for re-election only to the office of councilman. He is a candidate not for that office but for (mother office, and that is distinctly prohibited by Section 10-107(5) of the Charter. This conclusion is dictated by the Charter itself and is firmly supported by the record, reason, and reality.
I can find no factual or legal basis or acceptable rationalization for the result reached by the majority. I would, therefore, reverse the decree so that the provisions of the Charter may be applied.
The filing of preliminary objections constituted an admission of all well pleaded facts in the complaint. Bogash v. Elkins, 405 Pa. 437, 176 A. 2d 677 (1962) ; Erie v. Gulf Oil Corp., 395 Pa. 383, 150 A. 2d 351 (1959) ; Silver v. Korr, 392 Pa. 26, 139 A. 2d 552 (1958).
From majority opinion, pp. 8 and 16.
Section 10-107(3).