dissenting.
I dissent from the Majority Opinion. Fraud has never been tolerated by the law in any form, yet the Majority has given its blessings to fraud in this case because the agreement apparently "... achieved her original desired ends." At p. 141. Even if this were true, it does not excuse validating an agreement draped in fraud. There is no evidence that her original desired ends were the same desired ends that she had in mind when she signed the agreement under extreme pressure, unrepresented by legal counsel in the office of Richard's fellow attorney and friend James Nagy. She was told that there would be no marriage tomorrow if she did not sign the agreement. After she signed the agreement, Richard kept all the copies. Sharon is a high school graduate. She was not represented by legal counsel. Matter of Estate of Palamara (1987), Ind.App., 513 N.E.2d 1223, 1230.
Sharon testified that she did not fully understand the extent of the corporation's interest in her home (an understanding no doubt bolstered when she wrote an interest check to Richard, who tore it up saying "Don't be silly, we're married now." Record, p. 204.) Furthermore, the majority summarily disregards Sharon's argument that she was unaware of the corporation's assets. I find equally incredulous the suggestion that every secretary employed by a professional corporation is familiar with its financial structure merely by virtue of his or her employment with the corporation. The majority imputes this knowledge to Sharon, apparently disbelieving her testimony that she was unaware of the corporation's extensive holdings (including the mortgage on her house). Record, pp. 230-35. Later, Richard instituted a foreclosure action on Sharon's house.
My specific reasons for dissenting are:
1. The Majority has completely ignored the trial court's findings of fact. An Ind.Trial Rule 52(A) motion was made and complied with by the trial court. T.R. 52(A) has been abolished by the Majority and rendered meaningless.
2. By ignoring the findings of fact, the Majority has re-weighed the evidence and substituted its own judgment for that of the trial court.
8. The Majority has abandoned the standard of review on appeal which the parties and the trial court are entitled to rely upon.
4. There is ample evidence in the record to support the findings and judgment of the trial court. Under the proper standard of review this Court is bound to apply, the trial court should be affirmed.
The trial court concluded from its findings of fact that:
2. Richard has failed to prove that the Antenuptial Agreement was entered into freely, without fraud, duress and misrepresentation and that it was not unconscionable under the circumstances.
3. The process by which Richard procured the Antenuptial Agreement was unconscionable.
4. Richard fraudulently procured Sharon's signature on the Antenuptial Agreement by not disclosing the extent of the property and assets he sought to protect through the agreement and not affording her adequate time to read the document and seek full counsel and advice.
What were the findings of fact that supported these conclusions of the trial court? These are the findings:
4. That Sharon has been employed as a legal secretary since her graduation from high school but that the law firm for which she has been em*143ployed for the last seven (7) years does not practice domestic relations law.
5. That Richard graduated from Wisconsin University and from Indiana University School of Law and is licensed to practice in the states of Illinois and Indiana; his practice includes real estate, probate and domestic relations law.
6. That because of Richard's superior education and experience in such matters, as well as the love and trust Sharon had for Richard, Sharon relied upon Richard to be honest and fair in preparing an agreement reflecting their mutual wishes.
7. That on the Monday evening prior to the marriage of Sharon and Richard celebrated on Saturday, May 23, 1987, Richard gave Sharon a copy of the Antenuptial Agreement that he had prepared.
8. That Richard did not furnish her with a copy of the attachment to the Ante-nuptial Agreement which listed his property and assets. Richard told Sharon that he was working on the property list and that he needed it for insurance purposes, anyway.
9. Sharon thereafter showed the Ante-nuptial Agreement to her employer (who is her counsel in this case) and was told that it appeared to be a form agreement but that he could not determine the effect of the agreement without lists of the property.
The Majority has not applied the standard of review which requires that we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Vanderburgh County Board of Commissioners v. Rittenhouse (1991), Ind.App., 575 N.E.2d 663, 665, trans. denied. The judgment will be reversed only when clearly erroneous, ie., when the judgment is unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on the findings. DeHaan v. DeHaan (1991), Ind.App., 572 N.E.2d 1315, 1320, trans. denied. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. Id. To determine whether the findings or judgment are clearly erroneous, we consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. We will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Id. Moreover, we will construe the findings together liberally in favor of the judgment. Matter of Palamara, supra, at 1227.
The Majority pays lip service to this standard of review but fails to follow it. The judgment of the trial court is not clearly erroneous. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.