dissenting:
Because the issue here is one properly within the visitatorial power of the State Board of Education, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority in this case correctly observes, the statutory authority of the State Board is “ ‘a visitatorial power of the most comprehensive character.’ ” Wilson v. Board of Education, 234 Md. 561, 565, 200 A. 2d 67 (1964); and “the totality of these statutory provisions [of Article 77] ‘invests the State Board with the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education.’ ” (emphasis added).
As early as Shober v. Cochrane, 53 Md. 544 (1880), this Court affirmed the State Board’s power over local school employees. In that case, Cochrane had been the secretary, treasurer and examiner of the county school commissioners *84until they removed him and replaced him with Shober. Contrary to the decision of the local school commissioners, the State Board decided that the position belonged to Cochrane, and this Court upheld the State Board’s authority over the matter. A similar result was reached in Underwood v. School Board, 103 Md. 181, 63 A. 221 (1906), where our predecessors, in holding that the State Board had the power to determine which of two persons should be recognized as a teacher of a school, stated, “There can be no doubt that the State Board had power to advise the County Board, and that it was the duty of the latter to follow the advice of the State Board on the subject.” 103 Md. at 188 (emphasis in original).
This doctrine was followed in Zantzinger v. Manning, 123 Md. 169, 90 A. 839 (1914), a case in which the State Board had decided that a teacher was improperly dismissed and should be reinstated:
“... In the case at bar the dispute is ‘between functionaries of the department of public education’; the question to be determined is ‘which of two persons shall be recognized as a teacher of a school,’ and the issue is clearly one involving the proper administration of the public school system. The School Commissioners’ control of high schools, and their authority to appoint the principals of said schools is subject to the provisions of the public school law of the State, and to the summary and comprehensive visitatorial power conferred by that law upon the State Board. ...” 123 Md. at 181-82.
Similarly, in School Com. of Car. Co. v. Breeding, 126 Md. 83, 90, 94 A. 328 (1915), this Court said:
“Cases may arise where a purely legal question is involved, as in Duer v. Dashiell [91 Md. 660 (1900)], and School Commissioners v. Henkel, 117 Md. 97, and which the Court has power to determine, but where the dispute is between ‘functionaries of the department of public education,’ or a question of school administration is involved this Court has refused to decide it. ...”
*85Thus, the Court concluded in Wilson v. Board of Education, supra, 234 Md. at 565, that
“. . . [i]n any aspect the problem of screening employees is one of administrative policy, and the mere fact that the solution is initially within the scope of the County Board’s authority does not negative the power of the State Board to review it and set it aside, as the cases cited demonstrate. .. .” (emphasis added).
See also Metcalf v. Cook, 168 Md. 475, 178 A. 219 (1935); School Commissioners v. Morris, 123 Md. 398, 91 A. 718 (1914); Wiley v. School Comm’rs, 51 Md. 401 (1879). This established line of authority makes it abundantly clear, therefore, that where, as here, the “educational policy or the administration of the system of public schools” is involved, the State Board possesses the authority to issue orders which the County Board must follow.
In the present case, as the majority has noted, the State Board found that:
“. . . no other conclusion [could be reached] but that the Superintendent’s decision to terminate the services of Petitioner was not based on a professional evaluation of her general performance as a teacher but was based solely on the issues and circumstances which had been considered by the County Board . . . and . . . decided by it on April 14, 1971.” (emphasis added).
When the County Board had met for the purpose of determining whether Miss Zeitschel’s contract was terminated for reasons independent of the disciplinary hearing, the Superintendent had merely asserted that he possessed such reasons, without specifying what they were. In light of the suggestion that the termination was based on improper grounds, viz., the prior charge of misconduct, the hearing examiner for the State Board, whose findings of fact and conclusions of law were adopted by that Board, was dismayed that the reasons for the termination of Miss *86Zeitschel’s contract had not been delineated by the County Board. He consequently refused to accept the Superintendent’s “bald assurance” that reasons existed, independent of those associated with the suspension hearing, for the termination. Hence, the State Board ordered that Miss Zeitschel be reinstated with tenure.
I agree, as the majority holds, that it is:
“. .. beyond question that the power of visitation vested in the State Board is one of general control and supervision; it authorizes the State Board to superintend the activities of the local boards of education to keep them within the legitimate sphere of their operations, and whenever a controversy or dispute arises involving the educational policy or proper administration of the public school system of the State, the State Board’s visitatorial power authorizes it to correct all abuses of authority and to nullify all irregular proceedings.. ..”
In the case of probationary teachers, the State Board’s power is comprehensive; for while Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.) Art. 77, § 114 grants the county boards the power to suspend or dismiss teachers for “immorality, misconduct in office, insubordination, incompetency, or willful neglect of duty,” it specifically provides that “Nothing in this section shall preclude the State Board of Education from adopting bylaws providing for a probationary period of employment not to exceed two years.” (emphasis added). It is the State Board, therefore, that has the power to regulate and supervise the probationary period, and to settle all disputes that arise out of it. The key question on review, consequently, is whether on the record as a whole, “a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion” reached by the State Board. Insurance Comm’r v. Nat’l Bureau, 248 Md. 292, 309, 236 A. 2d 282 (1967).
In sustaining the termination of Miss Zeitschel’s contract, the majority holds, in effect, that there is no evidence upon which the State Board could reasonably have concluded that *87the termination was for improper reasons. It is with this view of the facts that I must disagree. The witness for the County Board testified that had the Superintendent not given assurances that Miss Zeitschel’s contract was terminated for reasons independent of the disciplinary hearing, the County Board would not have accepted the recommendation; hence the County Board’s action rests on the ground that there was such an independent reason. In light of the suggestion that improper factors were considered, however, the State Board was justified, for the following reasons, in concluding that the termination was based on inadequate grounds: that “the only evidence offered at the hearings reflective of petitioner’s job performance showed her to be a satisfactory teacher” ; that although given the opportunity, the County Board either could not or would not produce evidence to the contrary; and that no specific reasons for the termination were given.
Since the resolution of this dispute lies within the visitatorial power of the State Board, and since sufficient evidence exists for the State Board to have reasonably reached its conclusion, the judgment of the Circuit Court for Carroll County should be reversed, and the order of the State Board of Education reinstated. Judge O’Donnell authorizes me to state that he concurs in this opinion.