DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge KELLEY.I respectfully dissent.
After recommitting Seilhamer as a convicted parole violator to serve his unexpired term of two months and twenty-five days, the Board set a new maximum term expiry of February 11, 2009. Because the maximum term of Seilhamer’s confinement has expired, the instant appeal is moot. Taylor v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 746 A.2d 671 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000); Lawson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 105 Pa.Cmwlth. 427, 524 A.2d 1053 (1987); Sands v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 40 Pa.Cmwlth. 189, 896 A.2d 914 (1979). As a result, Attorney Ursiak’s petition for leave to withdraw as counsel is also rendered moot.
However, even if it is assumed that the instant appeal should not be dismissed as moot, the instant matter should then be remanded to the Board for the appointment of new counsel. It is well settled that a parolee has the right to the effective assistance of counsel at each stage of the revocation proceedings. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 271 Pa.Super. 138, 412 A.2d 614, 615 (1979), appeal after remand, 275 Pa.Super. 544, 419 A.2d 34 (1980). This right to the effective assistance of counsel extends to the administrative appeal process with the Board, and in an appeal to this Court of the Board’s denial of a request for administrative relief. Bowman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 709 A.2d 945 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 556 Pa. 696, 727 A.2d 1123 (1998); Larkin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 124 Pa.Cmwlth. 184, 555 A.2d 954 (1989).
In addition, Rule 3.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous-” Pa.R.P.C. 3.1. Thus, “[wjhere, as here, a lawyer knows that his or her client’s case lacks any legal merit, the lawyer is not only justified in refusing to represent the client but also mandated to do so. Peace v. Department of Public Welfare [93 Pa.Cmwlth. 300] 501 A.2d 1164 (1985).” Adams v. Department of Public Welfare, 781 A.2d 217, 221 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001).1 More importantly, counsel for a parolee is specifically empowered to withdraw at the administrative appeal stage by submitting a letter to the Board where there is no basis in law or fact supporting such an appeal. Bowman.
In the instant case, present counsel2 states that the sole claim that was raised in Mr. Seilhamer’s counseled request for administrative relief that was submitted to *46the Board, and the sole claim that he raised in Mr. Seilhamer’s counseled petition for review filed in this Court, is “frivolous and without merit”. Counsel’s An-ders Brief at 5. And yet, as outlined above, prior counsel was required by the Rules of Professional Conduct to request leave to withdraw his representation of Mr. Seilhamer before the Board because the only claim that he raised on Mr. Seil-hamer’s behalf with the Board has been conceded to be “frivolous and without merit”. Adams; Bowman.3 Moreover, by failing to request leave to withdraw, and by only raising one admittedly frivolous claim in Mr. Seilhamer’s request for administrative relief, prior counsel waived any and all other claims that Mr. Seilhamer could have raised to the Board with respect to the revocation of his parole. Pa.R.A.P. 1551; McCaskill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 450, 681 A.2d 1092 (1998), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 537 Pa. 655, 644 A.2d 739 (1994).4
There could have been no reasonable basis for prior counsel to engage in such a course of conduct in effectuating Mr. Seil-hamer’s rights. Such a course of conduct is a sine qua non, to a finding of the ineffective assistance of Mr. Seilhamer’s counsel. See, e.g., Scott v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 739 A.2d 1142, 1145 (1999) (“The standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is well-settled in the Commonwealth. A criminal defendant sustains a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel by proving by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s performance had no reasonable basis; and (3) that counsel’s ineffectiveness worked to his prejudice....”) (citations omitted).
Finally, because both prior counsel and present counsel work in the Luzerne County Public Defender’s Office, as a general rule, present counsel is precluded from arguing the ineffectiveness of either his or prior counsel’s representation of Mr. Seilhamer. Commonwealth v. Green, 551 Pa. 88, 709 A.2d 382 (1998); Commonwealth v. Ciptak, 542 Pa. 112, 665 A.2d 1161 (1995). In addition, because prior and present counsel’s ineffective assistance cannot be conclusively determined from the present state of the certified record of this case, the matter should be remanded to the Board, for the appointment of new counsel. Green; Ciptak,5
*47Accordingly, unlike the Majority, I would either dismiss the petition for review and the petition for leave to withdraw as moot or, in the alternative, remand the matter to the Board for the appointment of new counsel.
. See also Craig v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 93 Pa.Cmwlth. 586, 591-92, 502 A.2d 758, 761 (Pa.Cmwlth.1985) ("We also duly note the dictates of the Code of Professional Responsibility that was adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.... These provisions not only provide the justification for counsel to withdraw from a frivolous appeal but they mandate that he do so.”) (citations omitted).
. The certified record of this case shows that present counsel, who is representing Mr. Seil-hamer in this Court, and prior counsel, who represented Mr. Seilhamer before the Board, are both employed by the Luzerne County Public Defender’s Office.
. See also Commonwealth v. DeHart, 539 Pa. 5, 24 n. 10, 650 A.2d 38, 47 n. 10 (1994) ("In view of the multitude of specious arguments, previously litigated issues, and assertions contradicted by the facts of record in this appeal we deem it necessary to remind Appellant's PCRA counsel that there exists a duty not to pursue baseless claims or frivolous issues. See [Pa.R.P.C. 3.1]; ... Smith v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 524 Pa. 500, 574 A.2d 558 (1990) (appellate court had the power to assess attorney's fees against court-appointed counsel who had filed a frivolous appeal). It is apparent that prior counsel was mindful of this duty in choosing not to appeal every adverse ruling or decision.”).
. Likewise, by only raising one admittedly frivolous claim in the petition for review that he filed in this Court, present counsel again waived any and all other claims that Mr. Seilhamer could have raised with respect to the revocation of his parole. Pa.R.A.P. 1513; Werner v. Zazyczny, 545 Pa. 570, 681 A.2d-1331 (1996); Siers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 725 A.2d 220 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 562 Pa. 678, 753 A.2d 822 (Pa.1999); Pierce v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 46 Pa.Cmwlth. 507, 406 A.2d 1186 (1979).
.See also Scott, 739 A.2d at 1145-1146 (“The reason, we presume, that our Supreme Court denied Scott's motion was because the proper procedure for raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is to file a petition before the Board, even if the case is on appeal. *47The necessity of having the Board first consider the matter is that this Court is not the proper forum to first raise the issue.... [C]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel can involve factual questions that cannot be determined on appeal and would have to be determined by the Board in the first instance. While this case appears to involve a purely legal issue, counsel could have had a reasonable basis for raising the issue only on federal constitutional grounds; otherwise ipso fac-to — if you do not raise a federal or state constitutional analog or vice versa — there is an automatic ineffective assistance of counsel. The reasons why it was not presented should first be presented to the Board for fact-finding as well as addressing in the first instance whether Scott has been prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness. Even if it is conceded in this case that the claim is purely legal, that does not mean that this Court can hear the case in the first instance any more than we can hear a case involving a legal question that would otherwise be filed in a common pleas court.”) (footnotes omitted).