dissenting:
When my colleagues say that Saunders acted as he did solely for his “personal convenience” (189 Ill. 2d at 631), I do not know what they mean. Saunders was hit by a forklift at work while on his way to a scheduled break on his employer’s premises. The break was part of his official workday, and he needed it in order to continue working efficiently.
The reason Saunders rode a forklift is that it enabled him to complete this portion of his workday in an expeditious and direct way. Had the accident not occurred, both Saunders and the employer would have profited. Saunders would have been better off because he would have been able to eat lunch sooner. The employer would have been better off because the amount of time Saunders was away from his regular job duties would have been reduced.
The majority’s contention that Saunders’ injury did not arise out of his employment is not supported by the case law. In situations such as this, where an employee sustains injuries while taking his lunch break, our court has held that:
“the most critical factor in determining whether the accident arose out of and in the course of employment is the location of the occurrence. Thus, where the employee sustains an injury during the lunch break and is still on the employer’s premises, the act of procuring lunch has been held to be reasonably incidental to the employment. [Citations.] This rule remains true even where the injury was not actually caused by a hazard of the employment. [Citation.] The rule is also unchanged by the fact that the employee receives no pay for the lunch break and is not under the employer’s control, being free to leave the premises. [Citations.]” Eagle Discount Supermarket v. Industrial Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 331, 339 (1980).
While Saunders may have been careless in riding on the forklift as he did, negligence on an employee’s part is not a bar to recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 563 (1976). Similarly, Saunders is not disqualified from receiving benefits under the Act simply because his conduct violated company safety rules. The Illinois General Assembly has never made safety rule violations a defense under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and no such statutory defense exists.
If an employee is acting within the sphere of his employment, doing the work he is employed to do, he is entitled to compensation even if he is guilty of violating work rules. Heyman Distributing Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 376 Ill. 90, 92-93 (1941). “[I]t does not matter in the slightest degree how many orders the employee disobeys or how bad his conduct may have been ***.” Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 302 Ill. 401, 406 (1922).
Lumaghi Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 318 Ill. 151 (1925), the case upon which the majority’s decision is founded, is inapposite. There the injured employee had gone to an area of the employer’s premises where he was not permitted to be and used equipment he was not authorized to use. Neither of those circumstances is present here. Saunders was allowed to use forklifts and was in a place he was allowed to be.
The facts of this case are analogous to those presented in Chadwick v. Industrial Comm’n, 179 Ill. App. 3d 715 (1989), where an employee was fatally injured when he fell from a scaffold. The employee knew he was supposed to tether himself to a lifeline, but failed to do so. Coworkers testified that they neglected to use the lifeline because it was “inconvenient.” In reversing the denial of benefits, the appellate court held that the injury was compensable notwithstanding the decedent’s obvious negligence because the decedent was where he was supposed to be doing what he was hired to do. Chadwick, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 717-19.
The Workers’ Compensation Act is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose. Pathfinder Co., 62 Ill. 2d at 563. Consistent with this view, our court has allowed recovery of workers’ compensation benefits where an employee was injured while playing softball after hours and off premises (Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 6 Ill. 2d 304, 312-16 (1955)), died in an automobile accident while driving home from a company golf outing (Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery v. Industrial Comm’n, 36 Ill. 2d 410 (1967)), sustained lacerations while sunbathing after taking a lunch-hour swim (Scheffler Greenhouses, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 66 Ill. 2d 361 (1977)), and got hurt tossing a frisbee on the company’s parking lot during an authorized lunch break (Eagle Discount Supermarket v. Industrial Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 331 (1980)). If those claimants were entitled to benefits, as we found them to be, there is no just reason for denying benefits to someone like Timothy Saunders. He was doing the best he could to get on with the job he was hired to do and he was injured in the process. Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, he deserves compensation. I therefore dissent.
JUSTICES BILANDIC and FREEMAN join in this dissent.