dissenting
I respectfully dissent.
I fail to find that the admission of the questioned evidence affected the substantial rights of Jones. In the opening statement, Jones’ counsel stated to the jury:
“I don’t think that there’s going to be any question that the evidence is going to show that Mr. Jones operated a vehicle. That’s not our dispute today, but the evidence will not show beyond a reasonable doubt in the meaning of the law that he had been suspended for life as of that date.”
Therefore, the only question the jury had to decide was whether Jones’ driving privileges had been suspended for life.
There was placed in evidence a certified copy of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles Official Driving Record of Jones which showed that the Noble County Court had suspended his license for life. Upon cross-examination Jones’ counsel established the fact that the number assigned to the Noble County Court cause was a misdemeanor number and the license suspension for life does not follow a conviction for a misdemeanor. Upon redirect, the State offered a certified copy of the Noble County Court’s record of the convic-' tion which showed that the conviction was for a felony and the court forfeited Jones’ privileges of operating a motor vehicle for life.
Jones’ counsel objected on the grounds of relevancy. The trial court ruled properly when he overruled the objection. The eounty court record was relevant to show that Jones’ driving privileges had been forfeited for life. This was the exact and only question before the jury. It was also relevant to show that the conviction was for a felony and not a misdemeanor as Jones’ counsel had sought to establish on cross-examination. No objection was made to any specific part of the court record and no request was made to redact any part of the record.
In that court record the trial court made extensive findings concerning Jones’ prior criminal record. These were set out to support the trial court’s findings on aggravating circumstances. The majority opinion finds such was too prejudicial and added heavily to the burden on the defense. However, if such was error, it was certainly harmless.
In this trial there was no element of intent, no character dispute, no credibility dispute and no question of who was driving the vehicle. The sole question was whether the driving privileges had been forfeited for life. This was shown by overwhelming evidence based on the Bureau of Motor Vehicles records and the Noble County Court records.
I would affirm the conviction as to Count I, Operating a Motor Vehicle While His Driving Privileges were Forfeited for Life.
As to Count II, False Informing, I would affirm the conviction. In Jones’ opening and closing statements, no reference was made to Count II. As stated above, the only question was whether or not Jones’ driving privileges were suspended for life. There was overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence to support the False Informing charge. No instruction was offered limiting the Noble County Court record to Count I, and at no time was such a request made. Any error (if any) was harmless and did not place Jones in peril or prejudice his defense.
I would affirm the trial court on both counts.