Appellants William and Mona Smith appeal the denial of an adoption petition. The facts indicate that Barbara Dzuroveak gave birth out of wedlock to an infant boy on January 24, 1989. The next day, January 25, 1989, the Smiths filed a petition to adopt the infant boy in Lake Circuit Court. Barbara Dzuroveak consented to the adoption. On January 31, 1989, Terry Vaughan, the putative father of the infant, received notice of the adoption proceedings as required by IND.CODE § 81-8-1-6.1 (1988 Ed.).
On February 9, 1989, Vaughan filed a petition to establish paternity in the Lake Superior Court, Juvenile Division. On February 10, 1989, Vaughan filed a motion to contest the adoption in Lake Cireuit Court. On April 7, 1989, the cireuit court granted Barbara Dzuroveak's motion to intervene, which stated that if the motion to contest the adoption was granted and the adoption dismissed, she would seek custody of the infant. On May 9, 1989, the Smiths filed a brief arguing that paternity should be adju*952dicated within the adoption proceeding. On July 18, 1989, the circuit court decided that it had jurisdiction to determine paternity incidental to the pending adoption proceeding. On October 10, 1989, the parties filed in circuit court a stipulation agreeing that Vaughan was the natural father of the infant. On October 11, 1989, the circuit court granted Vaughan's motion to contest the adoption, dismissed the Smiths' adoption petition and awarded custody of the infant to Vaughan. The circuit court stayed execution of the judgment pending appeal.
The Smiths contend that Vaughan had no right to veto the adoption based on IND. CODE § 81-3-1-6(a)(2) (1988 Ed.), which reads in part:
"[A] petition to adopt a child ... may be granted only if written consent to adoption has been executed by:
* * * # # *
(2) the father of such a child whose paternity has been established by a court proceeding other than the adoption proceeding. ..."
There is no evidence in the record presented to this Court showing that Vaughan established paternity in a court proceeding other than the adoption proceeding. Because of this, Vaughan had no right to veto the adoption. If Vaughan can demonstrate that he established paternity in a proceeding other than the adoption proceeding prior to the granting of the adoption petition, he will have the power to veto the adoption. In that case, the circuit court, after hearing evidence as to the best interests of the child and the fitness of a custodial person or persons, should make a custody determination. If Vaughan cannot demonstrate that he established paternity in a proceeding other than the adoption proceeding, the circuit court should decide whether adoption is in the best interests of the child. See: IND.CODE § 31-8-1-6.8(c)(1)(A¥A) (1988 Ed.).
Reversed.
STATON, J., coneurs. BAKER, J., concurs in result with opinion.