Collins v. Secretary of the Commonwealth

Nolan, J.

(dissenting, with whom Lynch, J., joins). This law is not about religion, religious practices, religious institutions, powers of the courts, or right of access to the courts. This law is about barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Act, itself, is entitled “An Act making it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.” To assert that public debate surrounding this law will focus on anything other than this primary purpose is disingenuous. Clearly, the Legislature added §§ 1 and 14, not to benefit religious institutions, but to mitigate the risk of the statute being attacked on constitutional grounds. As such, §§ 1 and 14 are only incidentally related to the main thrust of the law, which is to bar discrimination based on sexual orientation. Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 814-815 (1978); Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 537 (1972); Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 354 Mass. 384, 387 (1968); Horton v. Attorney Gen., 269 Mass. 503, 511 (1929). In Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. 555, 558 (1941) this court concluded that a proposed law relating to contraception creating exemptions from criminal prosecution for certain individuals did not re*853late to religion but was rather a public health law. Similarly, c. 516, which bars various types of discriminatory actions on the basis of sexual orientation, is an anti-discrimination law and, as such, is unrelated to any matter excluded from the referendum process under art. 48. The law, therefore, is a proper subject for public debate. Therefore, I dissent.