concurring.
I reluctantly concur that Appellant has raised no issue in this appeal that would require a reversal of the conviction for resisting arrest. In saying that, I add that my agreement in no way condones the disturbing events set forth in the record. I can think of no reason why a sheriffs department would post a law-abiding citizen’s picture in its office, in what appeal’s to be retaliation for the performance of her duties as a physician. The testimony that a police officer followed this same physician for ten miles at one o’clock in the morning in a rural area is also unsettling. That the police officers knew who they had stopped prior to this incident and referred to her as Dr. Miller, despite the fact that there was no designation of her title on her license, is disquieting. Law enforcement officials should certainly be sensitive in this day to the fact that women have been the targets of abductions by persons claiming to be police officers; however, I agree with the prosecutor in this case that this trial and subsequent appeal were simply not the forums to address any inappropriate behavior of law enforcement officials.
Appellant, however, raised two issues that concerned me. Appellant’s second point, that the trial court erred in overrul*856ing her motions for judgment of acquittal on the crime of resisting arrest, has facial appeal because the jury acquitted Appellant on all of the underlying traffic violations. I must conclude that the jury could have rejected the testimony of Officer Moehle, which formed the only evidence as a basis for any of the traffic violations, but, in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient testimony through Officer Sims and, more importantly, Officer Edwards, that Appellant resisted arrest by grabbing the steering wheel and struggling with the officer as he tried to arrest her. That is the jurors’ prerogative. The jury determines the credibility of the witnesses, resolves conflicts in the testimony and weighs the evidence. State v. Pond, 131 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Mo. banc 2004).
The issue of whether the mere grabbing of the steering wheel is sufficient evidence of resisting arrest is more troubling; however, I concur that we are obligated to follow the precedent of State v. Belton, 108 S.W.3d 171, 175 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). I do not concur that Belton did not expand the definition of “physical force” beyond prior cases. As noted in the main opinion, Bel-ton suggests that a defendant uses physical force in resisting an officer’s arrest by exerting strength and power of his bodily muscles to overcome the officer’s attempts to pull him from the car. Id. It is for our supreme court to determine if grabbing the steering wheel is sufficient evidence of “physical force” to sustain a conviction of resisting arrest.
Appellant’s third point involved proffered Instruction No. B. It is clear that the issue of whether Appellant’s alleged failure to physically hand her driver’s license to the officers constituted a resisting of arrest was injected into the case, however, Appellant did not request nor does she appeal the denial of a proper withdrawal instruction. Officer Edwards testified that Officer Sims advised Appellant that she was “resisting” arrest immediately after Officer Sims told her she was under arrest and even prior to any grabbing of the steering wheel by Appellant. Although the jury may have been confused whether Appellant was resisting arrest for failing to produce her driver’s license upon demand of a police officer or for failing to quickly exit the car, proffered Instruction No. B. was properly rejected by the trial court as an incomplete statement of the law. See State v. Kennedy, 894 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Mo.App. S.D.1995) (finding that trial courts do not err by failing to give an incorrect instruction.)
I concur in the result of affirming the judgment.