Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell(in Jacobson v. Philadelphia) :
Plaintiff filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that he was employed as a children’s agent in the office of the County Commissioners prior to the City-County Consolidation Amendment adopted on November 6, 1951; and that on April 7, 1952 the defendants, the City Commissioners, unlawfully discharged him from his employment and dismissed him from the service of the City of Philadelphia; and prayed that he be restored to his position and be paid his damages. His notice of dismissal read: “This is to notify you that your service as an employe of the County Commissioners office will no longer be required, for cause, as of April 7, 1952.” Defendants subsequently filed an answer which averred that they had reorganized the Children’s Bureau and had reduced the number of employes for reasons of economy, and that plaintiff’s position was one of those eliminated and his work was consolidated with that of another district. The defendants also alleged that he had failed to investigate as required, had filed incomplete, false and inadequate reports and had been insubordinate. The question arises *512whether the answer came too late to validate an invalid discharge.
The majority’s decision, without expressly so stating, overrules or makes meaningless the decision in Cornman v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 312, 111 A. 2d 121. What that decision held is well and accurately stated in the syllabus as follows:
“2. Where such an [County] employe is dismissed and the dismissal notice states that it is ‘for just cause’ but the cause is not specified and he is given no opportunity to answer any charge against him and have a hearing thereon, the dismissal is invalid.
3. Where such an employe has been invalidly dismissed and seeks to be reinstated in an action of mandamus, the setting forth in the answer, for the first time, the reasons for the employees dismissal which constituted the ‘just cause’, does not* give validity to the unlawful dismissal and constitute any defense to the action of mandamus.”
Plaintiff’s motion for judgment admits facts in the answer which are well and clearly pleaded, but not the pleader’s conclusions viz. just cause, or conclusions of law: Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A. 2d 491; Narehood v. Pearson, 374 Pa. 299, 96 A. 2d 895.
I would affirm the lower Court which held that this case is directly ruled by Cornman v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa., supra. In that case Justice Allen M. Stearns, writing the opinion of the Court, said (pages 323, 325) :
“Despite the Herculean effort of defendants to dispossess all County employes contrary to the plain provisions of the Charter and this Court’s decisions, the single controlling question is the legality of their dismissal and particularly the sufficiency of the method employed for the removal of such employes ‘for cause’.
*513In Carrow v. Philadelphia [371 Pa., supra], we decided a former County employe could not be discharged for political reasons but only for ‘just cause’. As above stated, the plaintiff received a written notice which read, ‘[f]or just cause’ the employment was terminated. No facts or reasons constituting ‘just cause? were given* however, nor were the discharged employes given any hearing or indeed any opportunity to learn the derelictions with which they were charged, and to present a defense thereto. This was a violation of fundamental justice and of the rights given them by the Charter.
“When plaintiff filed his complaint in mandamus he alleged such assigned reason was insufficient at law. Defendants answered that the plaintiff was insubordinate, inefficient, untidy and did not cooperate. It is contended by defendants that this is a sufficient statement of ‘just cause’ which raises a question of fact to be determined either by a jury or the Civil Service Commission. The discharge was invalid and the answer setting up new facts comes too late to validate it*
“In the present facts it is obvious that the dismissals constitute an attempt to make possible the retention of the spoils system — such dismissals being for purely political reasons. The device employed is transparently apparent.”
I agree with the majority that plaintiff cannot recover if there was a bona fide abolition of his position. As stated by Chief Justice Steen in Carrow v. Philadelphia, 371 Pa. 255, 89 A. 2d 196 — where this Court held that a County employe could not be discharged for political reasons or without cause — “It remains only to add that nothing herein contained must be un*514derstood. as.preventing the dismissal of employes if the positions they occupy are no longer required, — in other words, if by reason of lack of funds or work the force should be reduced. In that event, however, as stated in the annotation of the Drafting Committee to subsection (o) of section 7-401 of the Charter, lay-offs for any such reason should be determined on the basis of service efficiency and seniority considerations.”
While this was dictum, it was sound law; and it was quickly availed of by city departments. However, that dictum did not mean, as the City contends, that a[n alleged] reorganization or a[n alleged] spreading or division of an employe’s work among other employes constitutes an abolition of the position. This case is, like Common, another transparent subterfuge, a palpable political evasion and an indefensible violation of the Charter; and if Cornman v. Philadelphia is still the law, the answer alleging (a) reorganization for economic reasons and (b) inefficiency, comes too late to validate the invalid discharge.
Italics, ours.
Italics, ours.