dissenting. The majority opinion fashions a new and novel mechanism for challenging the erroneous dismissal without prejudice of an appeal properly lodged in the circuit court pursuant to Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9. Henceforth, the aggrieved party need not appeal the entry of an erroneous order of dismissal; rather, the reinstatement of the appeal may be accomplished by filing a complaint for declaratory judgment. I must respectfully disagree.
This appeal began when the Little Rock Board of Adjustment (“The Board”) denied the Wrights’ appeal from a decision by the city’s zoning enforcement staff. The Wrights properly appealed the Board’s decision by filing the record of the proceedings before the Board in the circuit court; but, the court erroneously dismissed their appeal &emdash; ‘‘without prejudice” &emdash; for lack of service in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 (i) and (g). Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-56-425 states
In addition to any remedy provided by law, appeals from final action taken by the administrative and quasi-judicial agencies concerned in the administration of this subchapter may be taken to the circuit court of the appropriate county where they shall be tried de novo according to the same procedure which applies to appeals in civil actions from decisions of inferior courts, including the right of trial by jury.
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (Repl. 1998) (emphasis added).1 Notably, the statutory language providing for the action in question specifically provides that appeals from an administrative agency are to be brought according to the same procedure as appeals from decisions of inferior courts. We have consistently held that appeals from decisions of inferior courts are not subject to dismissal without prejudice and that such a dismissal operates as a dismissal of the appeal with prejudice. Watson v. White, 217 Ark. 853, 233 S.W.2d 544 (1950); Fowlkes v. Central Supply Co., 187 Ark. 201, 58 S.W.2d 922 (1933); Wilson v. C&M Used Cars, 46 Ark. App. 281, 878 S.W.2d 427 (1994).2 In other words, the dismissal of a case appealed from an inferior court “simply [does] away with the appeal and [leaves] the municipal court judgment valid and enforceable.” Wilson v. C&M Used Cars, 46 Ark. App. at 286, 878 S.W.2d at 430. Because the plain language of Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 put the Wrights on notice that the inferior court rules applied, they were also put on notice of this court’s case law holding that the circuit court’s dismissal order would operate as a dismissal of the appeal with prejudice. In sum, the bottom line is that, despite the circuit court’s dismissal “without prejudice,” the Wrights should have appealed the erroneous dismissal of their appeal.3
The Wrights argue that, pursuant to our decision in Sosebee v. County Line Sch. Dist., 320 Ark. 412, 897 S.W.2d 556 (1995), a dismissal without prejudice is appropriate in appeals of administrative decisions. At issue in Sosebee was an appeal under the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-1501, et seq. (Repl. 1993), which provided for an appeal to circuit court from a school board’s decision to dismiss a nonprobationary teacher. Id. In resolving the issue of whether Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(a) applied to such appeals, this court noted that Rule 81(a) states:
Applicability in General. These rules shall apply to all civil proceedings cognizable in the circuit, chancery, and probate courts of this State except in those instances where a statute which creates a right, remedy or proceeding specifically provides a different procedure in which event the procedure so specified shall apply.
Ark. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (2005). Our court then stated
The Rules thus apply to a proceeding unless a statute, which creates a right, specifically provides for different procedure. Ms. Sosebee argues the right in question in this case is the right to sue for a breach of contract which is rooted in common law even though her contract was created pursuant to the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act. She also argues the Rules apply because, even if the Act were held to create a right, it does not specifically provide a procedure “different” from the nonsuit without prejudice procedure found in Rule 41(a).
Sosebee v. County Line Sch. Dist., 320 Ark. 412, 897 S.W.2d 556 (1995). We concluded that, in the absence of a different procedure being prescribed in the statute, the action by Ms. Sosebee was subject to the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 41(a).
The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure were similarly applied to an administrative appeal in Weiss v. Johnson, 331 Ark. 409, 961 S.W.2d 28 (1998). In Weiss, the appellee’s driving license was suspended by the Office of Driver Services of the Revenue Division of the Department of Finance & Administration (DF&A). Id. The appellee filed a de novo “petition for review” of the agency’s decision in circuit court, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-104 (Repl. 1997), which allowed a person whose license had been suspended to “file a petition for review within thirty (30) days in the circuit court in the county in which the offense took place.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-104(c) (Repl. 1997). DF&A failed to appear at the hearing, and the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the appellee. DF&A moved to set aside the judgment, alleging that it was not served with the petition, in compliance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 4, but the trial court denied that request, finding that the rule was not applicable. Id.
This court disagreed. Specifically, we noted that, according to Ark. R. Civ.P. 81(a), the rules of civil procedure “shall apply to all civil proceedings cognizable in the circuit courts of this state except in those instances where a statute which creates a right, remedy or proceeding specifically provides a different procedure in which event the procedure so specified shall apply.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (2005). Thus, the statute in question in Weiss was a “special proceeding” because the right to administrative review was statutorily created. However, as the statute in question did not specifically provide for a different procedure, the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure applied.
The instant case can be readily distinguished from the circumstances at issue in Sosebee and Weiss. In Sosebee, the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act did not prescribe a specific procedure for appealing the school board’s decision. That statute stated:
The exclusive remedy for any nonprobationary teacher aggrieved by the decision made by the board shall be an appeal therefrom to the circuit court of the county in which the school district is located, within seventy-five (75) days of the date of written notice of the action of the board. Additional testimony and evidence may be introduced on appeal to show facts and circumstances showing that the termination or nonrenewal was lawful or unlawful.
Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-1510(d) (Repl. 1993). Similarly, in Weiss, the statute in question provided for a remedy in the form of filing a petition for review, but did not designate specific procedures by which such remedy was to be executed. Weiss v. Johnson, supra. In this case, however, there is a specific procedure set forth for appealing the Board’s decision — Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425. Moreover, the majority mistakenly overrules Weiss v. Johnson, supra, because as explained above, the Weiss case involved an appeal that was perfected by the filing of a “petition for review,” and not by the filing of a record pursuant to the inferior court rules.
In essence, in this case, where the procedure for the appeal is the same procedure as that used in an appeal of an inferior court’s decision to circuit court, which is not subject to dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a), so too the dismissal without prejudice in this case actually operated as a dismissal with prejudice and the savings statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-126, cannot apply. In the instant case, the circuit court held that the savings statute did not apply because the Wrights failed to complete timely service. While the court erred in its reasoning, the court’s judgment should be affirmed as reaching the right result for the wrong reason. Fryar v. Touchstone Physical Therapy, Inc., 365 Ark. 295, 229 S.W.3d 7 (2006); Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark. 434, 139 S.W.3d 500 (2003). The original appellate proceeding was effectively dismissed with prejudice on April 27, 2003, and the Wrights failed to timely appeal that dismissal order. Consequently, in dismissing the instant case with prejudice, the circuit court reached the right result for the wrong reason.
For the above-stated reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Glaze, J., joins this dissent.By a per curiam order dated December 9,2004, the Inferior Court Rules have been renamed the “District Court Rules.” See In Re: Adoption of Administrative Order Number 18 and Amendment of District Court Rules (Formerly Known as Inferior Court Rules), 360 Ark. Appx. 601 (2004).
Though Watson and Fowlkes were decided before the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, those cases were cited with approval in Sosebee v. County Line Sch. Dist., 320 Ark. 412, 897 S.W.2d 556 (1995), with the court noting that the statutory right of a claimant to dismiss an action without prejudice is now found in Rule 41. Likewise, the Sosebee court agreed with the decision by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Wilson v. C&M Used Cars, 46 Ark.App. 281, 878 S.W.2d 427 (1994). In that case, the court of appeals held that Rule 41 “which applies to original actions in circuit court, does not apply to an appeal from municipal court, so as to vest circuit court with the authority to dismiss the cause of action without prejudice.” Wilson v. C&M Used Cars, 46 Ark. App. at 286, 878 S.W.2d at 429.
The majority’s reliance on our decision in King v. Carney, 341 Ark. 955, 20 S.W.3d 341 (2000), is misplaced. While the plaintiffin King v. Carney, supra, had the right to rely on the court’s valid order until such a time as the order was reconsidered, the Wrights could not reasonably rely on an order that the circuit court never had the authority to enter.