dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority concludes that the provision of the settlement agreement relating to pensions and benefits is ambiguous. Therefore, the majority states, they are duty bound to interpret ambiguous contracts so as to effectuate the intent of the parties. While I agree with the concept that we must interpret ambiguous contracts to effectuate the intent of the parties, I disagree that such is our charge here. In the present case I would hold that the settlement agreement is not ambiguous, and, therefore, not subject to our interpretation.
Parties are free to craft their own settlement agreement upon dissolution of marriage. Those agreements are contractual in nature and binding. The interpretation or legal effect of a contract is a question of law to be determined by the court. Battershell v. Prestwick Sales, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). As our supreme court stated in First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana v. Key Markets, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600, 604 (Ind.1990):
Language in a contract is given its plain and ordinary meaning, and we will find a contract is ambiguous only when reasonable persons would differ as to the meaning of its terms ... In other words, courts are bound to recognize and enforce contracts where the terms and the intentions of the parties can be readily determined from the language in the instrument. It is not the province of courts to require a party acting pursuant to such a contract to be “reasonable,” “fair,” or show “good faith” 'cooperation. Such an assessment would go beyond the bounds of judicial duty and responsibility. It would be impossible for parties to rely on the written expressions of their duties and responsibilities. Further, it would place the court at the negotiation table with the parties. In *642the instant ease, the court would decide what is “fair” or “reasonable” concerning the advantage or disadvantage of control of the leased property. The proper posture for the court is to find and enforce the contract as it is written and leave the parties where it finds them. It is only where the intentions of the parties cannot be readily ascertained because of ambiguity or inconsistency in the terms of a contract or in relation to extrinsic evidence that a court may have to presume the parties were acting reasonably and in good faith in entering into the contract, (citations omitted).
The majority proposes to graft onto this provision of the settlement agreement a fair division of the assets at issue. However, not all parties to agreements have a fair division in mind when entering into an agreement.
The provision at issue reads as follows: The parties agree that Petitioner retain his Team Share stock and the Respondent will retain the total of her defined benefit plan according to her in connection with her employment at R.R. Don-nelley. That Petitioner’s benefit plan and saving and investment program be put in a domestic relations order to be divided equally between the parties as of the value on May 14, 1997.
The majority opinion relies upon the “divided equally between the parties” language of the provision in order to reach the result arrived at today. However, the parties further stated the division was equal as of the value on May 14, 1997.
Therefore, under the explicit terms of the agreement, if the benefit plan and saving and investment program lost money during the interim between May 14, 1997, and entry of the dissolution of marriage, then John would have to find another source of money from which to pay Myra the amount to which they agreed. In the alternative, if the plan and program made money then Myra forfeited by the terms of the agreement her right to the growth on her share.
If we are to decide this case utilizing the reasoning used by the majority, then all assets should have been re-evaluated, not just the benefit plan and saving and investment program.
I would reverse the trial court’s amended QDRO.