(dissenting, with whom Nolan and Lynch, JJ., join). The court decides that if the DEQE (hereinafter referred to as the department) incurs any investigative cost relative to a release of oil or hazardous material, the department may place a lien on all of the responsible person’s contaminated and uncontaminated property. The lien, says the court, is to secure the payment of any amount presently due or that may become due in the future. It appears, then, that *774a single telephone call from a department employee to inquire about a possible release will enable the department to place a lien on all the real estate holdings, wherever situated, contaminated or uncontaminated, owned by the party ultimately found to be responsible for the release, and that that lien will remain in place until all assessment, containment, and removal have been completed. The result is that, in a case such as this one, where the property owner has accepted responsibility for assessment, containment, and removal, and the department has agreed to the owner’s proceeding with that effort, the owner’s real estate everywhere is rendered unmarketable and unavailable as a source of money to finance the desired remedial response, in many cases making successful response impossible.
Here, according to the affidavit of the department’s employee, Begley, the remedial response will cost the plaintiffs $500,000 to $800,000, and more if treatment of “the water prior to ground water discharge,” becomes necessary. The plaintiffs call the court’s attention to the fact that the department’s encumbering of all their real estate for the indefinite, and perhaps very distant, future deprives them of a means to pay for the remedial response that they have undertaken, and they persuasively argue that the Legislature could not reasonably have intended such a result. The plaintiffs’ concern, and their argument, are met by the court with the response that “[i]f, in fact, the plaintiffs need to sell the uncontaminated parcels in order to finance the cleanup, the regulations allow them to provide alternative security in the form of a trust fund, stand-by trust fund, letter of credit, escrow deposit, or surety bond.” Ante at 772. That is hardly an adequate response. Nothing in the record demonstrates the availability to the plaintiffs of the means to provide such “alternative security,” particularly in light of their real estate having been encumbered by liens. Furthermore, in construing G. L. c. 21E, nothing can turn on the financial condition of the plaintiffs in this case. By making it difficult in some instances, and impossible in others, for those responsible for destructive releases into the environment to remedy those re*775leases at their own expense, and by otherwise discouraging such activity, as I shall discuss below, the court frustrates the obvious legislative intent that, whenever it is feasible, responsible parties alone, and not the Commonwealth’s taxpayers, should lay out the very considerable sums required to respond adequately to hazardous releases. It is noteworthy, too, that, in accomplishing that unhappy result, the court necessarily ignores or nullifies language in the statute.
The court’s opinion says that “[t]he plaintiffs state that the gravamen of their claim is that the DEQE could not place a lien on their property pursuant to the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act, G. L. c. 2IE, ‘because the DEQE has incurred no costs for the “assessment, containment, and removal” ’ of hazardous materials.” Ante at 764. It is extremely important that the “gravamen” of the plaintiffs’ argument be truly understood. Of course, in a broad sense, the department (DEQE) incurred costs with respect to the assessment, containment, and removal of hazardous materials. The plaintiffs do not contend otherwise. The plaintiffs do claim, however, that the department has not incurred costs for the kind of “assessment, containment, or removal” that constitutes “response action” within the statutory meaning of that term, and that a responsible party is not liable for department costs unless they were incurred in connection with “response action” undertaken by the department. The result, the plaintiffs say, is that the plaintiffs are not liable to the Commonwealth and therefore no liens are authorized by c. 2IE, § 13. The issue raised by the plaintiffs is this: When a property owner accepts responsibility for the assessment, containment, and removal of oil and hazardous materials from his property, and, after preliminary investigation, the department agrees to the owner’s proceeding with that “response action,” as here, does G. L. c. 21E authorize the department to place a lien on the owner’s real estate to secure the owner’s payment of costs incurred by the department in connection with such preliminary investigation and monitoring of the owner’s performance?
*776The plaintiffs’ position, that c. 21E does not authorize a lien in such circumtances, is entirely correct. Unless the department’s costs were incurred pursuant to § 4 or § 8 of c. 2IE, that is, in connection with response action undertaken by the department, the plaintiffs are not liable for them and therefore no lien is authorized. But, the department’s costs were not incurred pursuant to § 4 or § 8. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not liable for the costs incurred by the department and liens are not authorized.
An appreciation of whether the department’s costs were incurred pursuánt to § 4 or § 8 requires not only examination of those sections but also a clear understanding of the statutory meaning of the terms “response action” and “assessment.” Section 2 defines “response action” as “assessment, containment, and removal.” “Assessment” is defined as including “investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information gathering activities to identify: (1) the existence, source, nature and extent of a release of oil or hazardous materials; (2) the extent of danger to the public health, safety, welfare and the environment; and (3) those persons liable under section five.” Pursuant to § 2, “assessment” “also include [s], without limitation, studies, services and investigations to plan, manage and direct assessment, containment and removal actions, to determine and recover the costs thereof, and to otherwise accomplish the purpose of [c. 21E].” The definitions are broad indeed. To conclude, however, as the court apparently does, that the term “response action” includes every kind of investigation, test, or study relative to a possible release of oil or other hazardous material, without consideration of how the term is used throughout c. 2IE, is the height of simplism. It is obvious that the Legislature did not intend that all department preliminary investigations and the department’s monitoring of a responsible party’s response actions are themselves response actions, as the court concludes. The statute, read as a whole, clearly assumes that, once a response action has been undertaken by the responsible party, or by the department or its agent, then and only then “assessment” by that party is a *777response action. Section 3A (6), for instance, makes clear that assessment for the purpose of identifying disposal sites must occur before response action status is determined and therefore cannot itself be a response action. Also, § 3A {d) (1) states in relevant part: “As quickly as possible and at most, within one year of the listing of any location to be investigated the department shall complete a preliminary assessment of the location. A preliminary assessment shall include a review of available existing data and an offsite reconnaissance visit to the location to determine whether there is a need to further investigate the location to confirm if it is a disposal site.” Surely, in determining legislative intent, one must go beyond a literal reading of § 2’s definitions, and apply common sense to the statutory language as a whole. The Legislature could not have intended that the kind of investigation, study, or other “assessment" needed to determine whether response action is necessary is itself a response action. The Legislature could not reasonably have intended that the department should engage in response action to determine whether response action is necessary.
Sections 4, 8, and 9 deliver the same message; that is, that the department must engage in preliminary investigation and study in order to determine whether “response action” is called for and, if so, to identify the appropriate action and the party by whom it should be undertaken. For example, § 4 provides that “whenever [the department] has reason to believe” that there has been a release, the department may undertake response action, and under § 8 the department may investigate records, conditions, properties and the like and, on the basis of information gathered, take response action. The court ignores the obvious when it suggests that the preliminary investigations that took place in this case were “response actions” for the costs of which the plaintiffs are liable. The court also ignores the obvious when it concludes that investigation in various forms by the department in order to supervise or monitor the response action undertaken by the plaintiffs is “response action.” Just as department investigations and studies done in order to determine whether re*778sponse actions are necessary cannot themselves be response actions, so, too, investigation and studies to determine whether response actions taken by a responsible party were satisfactory cannot themselves constitute response actions.
In relevant part, c. 2IE, § 4, provides that “whenever [the department] has reason to believe that oil or hazardous material has been released ... [the department] is authorized to take or arrange for such response actions as it reasonably deems necessary. Releases . . . for which the department undertakes response actions, and the extent of such response actions, shall be determined by reference to the Massachusetts contingency plan” (emphasis added). Section 8 provides in material part that, “[f]or the purpose of the administration and enforcement of [c. 2IE] ... the department may enter any site ... to investigate, sample and inspect any records, conditions, equipment, practice or property,” and that “[i]n the event that the department reasonably determines as a result of such investigation, sampling or inspection that there has been a release or that there is a threat of release of oil or hazardous material from or at such site . . . the department and its authorized personnel, agents and contractors may enter such site . . . and undertake such actions pursuant to section four relative to the assessment, containment and removal of oil or hazardous material as it reasonably deems necessary” (emphasis added).
In contrast to §§ 4 and 8, which provide for response action to be undertaken by the department when, on the basis of preliminary investigation, response action is indicated, § 9 provides for response action to be undertaken by the responsible party. The relevant portion of § 9 states: “Whenever it has reason to believe that oil or hazardous material has been released or that there is a threat of release of oil or hazardous material, the department may order any person causing or legally responsible for such release or threat of release to conduct an assessment of such release or threat of release,” and may, if indicated, require such person to take containment and removal action. The final sentence in § 9 states that “[i]ssuance of an order under this section shall not pre-*779elude, and shall not be deemed an election to forego, any action authorized by section four or any action to recover damages, costs, or to seek civil penalties, criminal fines and sanctions, or injunctive relief.” Thus, the department’s decision to order a responsible party to proceed with assessment, containment, and removal, or one or more of those activities, pursuant to § 9, does not operate as a waiver of the department’s right at a later time to discard the § 9 alternative in favor of the alternative provided by § 4, namely assessment, containment, or removal conducted by, or arranged by, the department. However, the court’s contrary suggestion notwithstanding, nothing in § 9 suggests that, while a § 9 order is in place, as it continues to be in this case, the department may incur costs for monitoring or supervising the response action undertaken by a responsible party with the department’s approval and pass those costs along to that party.
Chapter 2IE, § 5 (a), establishes a responsible party’s liability for costs incurred by the department in specified circumstances. The relevant provisions are as follows: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, (1) the owner . . . of . . . a site from or at which there is or has been a release or threat of release of oil or hazardous material; (2) any person who at the time of storage or disposal of any hazardous material owned or operated any site at or upon which such hazardous material was stored or disposed of and from which there is or has been a release or threat of release of hazardous material . . . shall be liable, without regard to fault, . . . to the commonwealth for all costs of assessment, containment and removal incurred pursuant to section four and section eight relative to such release or threat of release ...” (emphasis added). Section 5 (a) imposes liability only for the costs of response actions undertaken by the department “pursuant to section four and section eight.” Here, no such costs were incurred, because no response action was undertaken by the department. In concluding that the plaintiffs are nonetheless liable for department costs, for which a lien may be imposed, the court simply reads out of § 5 (a) the words “pursuant to section four and section eight.” By nullifying that *780language, contrary to established precedent relative to statutory construction, see Saccone v. State Ethics Comm’n, 395 Mass. 326, 332 (1985), the court effectively, and, of course, inappropriately, amends the statute.
The notice of responsibility issued by the department to Acme II strongly suggests that, at least when that notice was given, the department construed c. 21E as I do. That language, which the court omits in its summary, was as follows: After asserting Eldredge’s acceptance of responsibility on behalf of the partnership, the notice stated that its purpose was to inform Acme II that it is “a responsible party with liability under M. G. L. c. 21E, § 5 (a),” that the department was authorized under §4 to “take actions which it deems necessary to respond to the release should you fail to carry through in your acceptance of responsibility,” that Acme Laundry Company’s liability could be as much as three times the department’s response costs and damages for injury to natural resources, and that, “//// the Department does not hear from you within the times specified [in the notice], or if persons acting in your behalf fail to act within the prescribed times, the Department will commence response actions and expect to recover from you to the extent of liability set forth above” (emphasis added). The department’s understanding of the statute appears to have been that nothing it had done prior to the issuance of the notice of responsibility constituted “assessment” within the meaning of the term “response action,” and, if the plaintiffs, rather than the department, were to undertake response action in compliance with the § 9 order, the plaintiffs would not be liable to the department and there would be no basis for the imposition of a lien. The department’s original understanding was correct.
General Laws c. 2IE, § 3 (a), provides that “[t]he department shall take all action appropriate to secure to the commonwealth the benefits of . . . CERCLA and other pertinent federal laws.” Chapter 21E, § 2, defines “CERCLA” as “Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.” Chapter 2 IE, § 3 (b), states that “[f]or the purpose of implement*781ing [c. 21E], . . . CERCLA, and other pertinent federal laws and regulations, the department is authorized and directed to prepare and from time to time update a Massachusetts Contingency Plan which, as nearly as the department deems appropriate and practicable, shall comport with and complement the National Contingency Plan prepared under the authority of 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (c) and 42 U.S.C. § 9605.” Chapter 2IE, § 3 (c), provides that “[t]he department shall promulgate such regulations as it deems necessary for the implementation, administration and enforcement of this chapter . . . , CERCLA and other pertinent laws.” Clearly, then, in enacting G. L. c. 2IE, the Legislature envisioned a State environmental protection program that would parallel the Federal plan codified in CERCLA. The Appeals Court has characterized CERCLA as “the Federal analogue of G. L. c. 21E.” Sheehy v. Lipton Indus., Inc., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 188, 198 (1987). Thus, CERCLA is a readily available source of help, one that the court rejects, in construing c. 21E.
At the time that c. 21E was enacted, CERCLA provided that “[wjhenever (A) any hazardous substance is released . . . the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance ... or containment at any time (including its removal from any contaminated natural resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which the [EPA] deems necessary to protect public health or welfare or the environment, unless the [EPA] determines that such removal and remedial action will be done properly by the owner ... of the . . . facility from which the release or threat of release emanates, or by any other responsible party” (emphasis added). CERCLA has been interpreted to “preclude [ ] response actions by the EPA if a responsible party will take proper removal and remedial action. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (a) (1) (A); and 40 C.F.R. § 300.61 (b).” United States v. Dickerson, 660 F. Supp. 227, 233 (M.D. *782Ga. 1987). Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States E.P.A., 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1490 (D.N.J. 1985) (“Section 104 (a) (1) of CERCLA . . . authorizes EPA to take curative action consistent with the [national contingency plan] unless [emphasis in original] [EPA] determines that such removal or remedial action will be done properly by the owner or operator ... of the facility from which the release or threat of release emanates, or by any other responsible party”). The lesson taught by CERCLA and the Federal cases interpreting it is that public policy is best served by encouraging responsible parties, not the department, to undertake response action. In that way, government money is conserved and the number of sites that may be cleaned up is thereby maximized. Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States E.P.A., supra at 1490. It is reasonable to suppose that the Legislature of the Commonwealth, as well as Congress, concluded that government money will go further in advancing environmental cleanup if private individuals are motivated to undertake at their own expense removal and remedial actions with respect to the release of oil or other hazardous material for which they are responsible. Otherwise, the Legislature would not have given the department the option under § 9 of ordering the responsible person to undertake response action instead of the department engaging in such action itself. In this regard, it is significant that the department’s current regulation, 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 40.170 (4) (1988), guided by CERCLA as originally enacted,1 provides as follows: “The Department may refuse to permit a PRP [potentially responsible person] or other person to perform a response action, or to assume responsibility for a response action being per*783formed by the Department, unless the Department is persuaded that:
“(a) the deadlines set forth in 310 [Code Mass. Regs.] § 40.534 will be met;
“(b) a delay in the conduct of the response action will not result which would cause or exacerbate an existing hazard to health, safety, public welfare or the environment;
“(c) the response action will be conducted in accordance with M.G.L. c. 21E and this Contingency Plan; and
“(d) the PRP or other person has a satisfactory record of compliance with statutes and requirements enforced by the Department” (emphasis added).
The court’s construction of c. 21E as authorizing the imposition of a lien on all of the plaintiffs’ real estate impairs, and perhaps destroys, the plaintiffs’ — responsible parties’ — capacity to complete the response action they agreed to undertake. In addition, the result reached by the court, a result not justified by the statutory language and at variance with the Federal cases construing CERCLA, removes the primary motive that a responsible party would otherwise have to undertake response action rather than leave it to the department, namely, cost control. Control would reside with the responsible party only if he could undertake the cleanup under § 9 and not simultaneously be liable for costs incurred by the department over which he would have no control. It is not to be expected that an informed owner of a contaminated site would agree to undertake a cleanup project at his expense when he will also be liable for open-ended duplicate “monitoring” costs incurred and passed on by department employees over whom he has no control. The history of this case, including its present posture, convincingly supports the conclusion that the court’s holding will defeat the legislative objective in enacting c. 2IE, which is to encourage responsible parties to clean up their own mess. Therefore, and also be*784cause the court’s holding is unfaithful to the statutory language, I dissent. I would reverse the summary judgment for the defendants and I would remand this case to the Superior Court for the entry of a judgment declaring the asserted liens to be invalid and of no effect and ordering the defendants to file and record in the registry of deeds for Barnstable County a written release of all liens claimed.2
The court declines “to mold [its] interpretation of c. 21E on a Federal provision which was significantly different from the Massachusetts law at the outset, and which now has been eliminated from Federal law.” Ante at 772. My response is twofold. (1) The relevant Federal provision was not significantly different from the Massachusetts law at the outset. (2) In construing G. L. c. 2IE, the only relevant Federal provision that might suggest legislative intent is the provision that existed when c. 21E was enacted. It is immaterial that sometime after c. 21E was enacted, the Federal provision was amended.
In its footnote 6, the court states, “Thus, of the three Acme Laundry Companies, the first is now dissolved, and the second accepted responsibility for the release but now seeks to avoid the Commonwealth’s statutory means of enforcing that responsibility. The third entity, which now holds the land, may not have accepted responsibility and conducts no business except to hold land. In these circumstances, the DEQE is entitled to view with skepticism the plaintiffs’ professed intention to perform prompt and efficient cleanup operations.” Ante at 767-768. Acme II, the partnership, did indeed accept responsibility for the release, and proceeded with appropriate response actions, but nothing before the court remotely suggests that Acme II “now seeks to avoid the Commonwealth’s statutory means of enforcing that responsibility.” Acme II and Acme III now seek only the removal of liens which were unlawfully imposed on their land, and which impair their ability to complete their undertaking. If, as the court speculates, the department views with skepticism the plaintiffs’ intention to keep their commitment, the statute makes available a variety of remedies, subject to administrative proceedings as provided in § 10, including damages, injunctive relief, the assessment of civil and criminal penalties, and the department’s undertaking of the required response action. In so far as the record in this case discloses, the department has availed itself of none of these remedies, and has instead imposed unlawful liens, with the result that the goal of c. 21E has not been attained.