dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority appears to have used a different standard for the termination of parental rights for those parents with mental infirmities than that used for parents without such mental infirmities. Unfortunately, the casebooks are replete with challenges to the termination of a parent's rights, and often there is some failing on the part of the parent which allows the assignment of blame or fault to that parent. See, e.g., Matter of Campbell (1989), Ind.App., 534 N.E.2d 273; Matter of D.L.W. (1985), Ind.App., 485 N.E.2d 139; Alexander v. LaPorte County Welfare Dep't (1984), Ind.App., 465 N.E.2d 223. I acknowledge that the Eglys may be without blame or fault; however, reviewing courts should still employ the settled standard of review.
When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this court should not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the wit*316nesses. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which are most favorable to the judgment. Matter of M.J.G. (1989), Ind.App., 542 N.E.2d 1385. Viewing the evidence in this light, I am of the opinion that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision terminating the Eglys' parental rights.
I agree with the majority that mental retardation in and of itself cannot be a ground for terminating parental rights. See Dull v. Delaware County Dep't of Public Welfare (1988), Ind.App., 521 N.E.2d 972. A child cannot be taken away from parents simply on the basis of the parents' I.Q. scores. Had the Eglys' parental rights been terminated on this basis, I would agree the decision of the trial court should be reversed. That is not what occurred, however. There was evidence the Eglys were incapable of properly caring for their children, and incapable of learning how to care properly for the children.
As acknowledged by the majority, when the Eglys came to the attention of the Welfare Department, in part due to the deplorable conditions of their house, Walter, Jr., nearly four years old, was not yet toilet-trained and had a speech problem in that he repeated everything he heard. The Welfare Department began offering services to the Eglys. A social worker made regular visits to the Eglys' house. The younger child, Matthew, was always in his crib when the social worker came to the house, it did not appear that he had been out of the crib, he had little mobility skills and was unable to crawl at the age of 9-10 months.
There were other problems in addition to those cited by the majority. The Welfare Department arranged for Walter, Jr. to attend the Grant County Developmental Center. The Eglys would not consistently meet the bus that transported Walter, Jr. home from the Center, and he thus would at times be returned to the Center. After the children were removed from the home, the Eglys had visitation with them. The Eglys spent most of the time talking to the social service representative, and did not spend much time with the children. The social worker testified the Eglys were uncomfortable interacting with the children.
Walter, Jr. was toilet-trained within two weeks of his placement in a foster home, Matthew learned to crawl, and both children exhibited remarkable improvement in their vocabulary, educational skills, and interaction with others. All of the service providers eventually concluded the Eglys were not mentally or emotionally capable of raising the children. The Open Door Representative, a social worker who worked with the family for approximately a year and a half, testified the Eglys lacked the mental ability to provide proper parenting, and that additional counseling would not be helpful. The person in charge of the parenting classes attended by the Eg-lys testified the Eglys did not have the capacity to think much beyond what was on their minds at any given moment, that parent counseling was not helpful as the Eglys were incapable of remembering what they had learned in a session, and that they would forget what they had learned within ten to fifteen minutes. She indicated the Eglys lack the ability to care for and nurture their children. A psychologist involved with the family testified Mr. Egly had a problem with motivation rather than capability. The psychologist also stated Mr. Egly did not have a serious concern about the members of his family, and that he instead was economically motivated to get the children back.1 He also testified the children would be at serious risk if they were returned to the Eglys' care.
Viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the judgment, there was clear and convincing evidence that the children were removed from the home for at least six months under a dispositional decree, that the Eglys lack the most basic skills necessary to raise their children, and that they would not or could not develop these skills, There was evidence that the children flourished in foster care, and that the Welfare Department had satisfactory plans for the future care of the children.
*317It is unfortunate that the Eglys' mental retardation probably is the reason for their lack of parenting skills, and their inability to develop such skills. The fact still remains, however, that the children were intellectually, socially, and emotionally impaired because of the care, or lack thereof, they were receiving from the Eiglys. This case is very similar to that of Dull, supra. The majority attempts to distinguish this case from Dull by stating the 8 year old boy in that case was emotionally disturbed because he masturbated excessively, chewed holes in linens, tore up furniture, and ate profusely. In this case, we have a 4 year old boy, not yet toilet-trained, who communicated by repeating everything that was said to him and who was socially, emotionally, and intellectually impaired. Perhaps by the time he is 8 years old he will be even more emotionally disturbed; I see no reason to wait that long.
These difficult judgments lie with the trial court, and our only role is to ensure the appropriate standard was met. We are not to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Although this may be perceived as a close case, there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's determination. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating the Eglys' parental rights.
. Mr. Egly was receiving over $400 per month in social security disability, and Mrs. Egly, Walter, Jr., and Matthew each were receiving $59 per month.