dissenting.
The majority opinion concludes that the mandatory extended term provisions of the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c and N.J. S.A. 2C:44-3d, apply to a defendant “whose first Graves Act offense is the subject of his second Graves Act conviction.” Ante at 360. The dissenter in the Appellate Division would restrict the Graves Act extended-term sentences only to those defendants whose pending Graves Act offense was preceded by a conviction for a prior Graves Act offense. 214 N.J.Super. 430, 436-37 (1986) (Dreier, J., dissenting). I agree.with the majority that the Graves Act extended-term provisions should apply to a defendant convicted of his or her second Graves Act offense, whether or not the conviction for the first Graves Act offense occurred before or after the commission of the second offense. Ante at 361. However, although the literal language of the Graves Act supports the majority’s holding, I cannot agree that the Act’s mandatory extended-term provisions apply to a defendant’s first Graves Act offense that happens to be the subject of his second Graves Act conviction.
I am generally in accord with the majority opinion’s analysis of the relevant decisional law, ante at 363-365, and concur in its conclusion that neither State v. Bey, 96 N.J. 625 (1984), nor State v. Anderson, 186 N.J.Super. 174 (1982), aff’d o.b., 93 N.J. 14 (1983), is dispositive. Ante at 366. I would focus instead on the effect of the majority’s holding. Simply stated, it is that a defendant who commits two Graves Act offenses is to be sentenced to a mandatory extended term, and the length of that term will be affected substantially by the sequence in which the convictions for the offenses are entered.
It is self-evident that under the majority’s holding the impact of the order of convictions on a defendant’s sentence can be enormous. The length of the mandatory Graves Act extended term is fixed by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7a, which prescribes a range of extended-term sentences that is equivalent to the sentencing range for offenses one degree higher than the offense for *369which the extended term is to be imposed. The Graves Act also requires imposition of a mandatory minimum term in conjunction with the extended term, to be fixed between one-third and one-half the sentence imposed or five years, whichever is greater; if the extended-term sentence is life imprisonment, the mandatory minimum term is twenty-five years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7c.
The impact of the chronology of convictions can be illustrated by a hypothetical defendant who commits a first-degree Graves Act offense and subsequently commits a third-degree Graves Act offense. Assume that the offenses are tried in the order committed, that the second conviction is entered after the first conviction becomes final, see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4b, and that maximum sentences are imposed for both crimes and are to run consecutively. The maximum term for the first-degree offense would be twenty years, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(l), with ten years parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c. The maximum extended term for the third-degree offense would be ten years, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7a(4), with five years parole ineligibility. Defendant’s sentence would thus expose him to thirty years imprisonment with a fifteen-year period of parole ineligibility.
However, if the vagaries of the trial calendar resulted in the order of convictions being reversed, the impact on defendant’s sentence would be severe. The maximum non-extended term for a third-degree crime is five years, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(3), subject to three years parole ineligibility, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c. The maximum extended term for a first-degree offense is life imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7a(2), with twenty-five years parole ineligibility. Again assuming the imposition of maximum and consecutive sentences, the reversal of the order of convictions would cause the hypothetical defendant to be sentenced to life plus five years imprisonment, and twenty-eight years parole ineligibility. The increase in that defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence would be fifteen years, attributable solely to the order of conviction.
*370I acknowledge and agree with the majority’s observation that “[t]he history of the [Graves Act] makes it clear that its focus is deterrence and only deterrence; rehabilitation plays no part in this legislation.” Ante at 366 (quoting State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 67-68 (1983)). Nevertheless, the Graves Act’s legislative history is inconclusive on the issue before us. The Senate Law, Public Safety & Defense Committee Statement to S. 3057, L.1981, c. 31, after describing the mandatory sentences to be imposed on first-time offenders, observes that “[s]eeond or subsequent offenses would subject the person to mandatory sentencing under the extended-term provisions of the Criminal Code * * I read that language to be supportive of the legislature’s intent to impose a mandatory extended term in connection with a Graves Act offense committed subsequent to a defendant’s first Graves Act offense.
Moreover, the sentencing mechanism approved by the majority is incompatible with the overriding concern of the Code of Criminal Justice to avoid sentencing disparity and to promote “a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing.” State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 379 (1984), certif. denied, 105 N.J. 518 (1986). Our Code adopted a sentencing philosophy that focuses primarily on the offense rather than the offender. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 355 (1984). As Justice O’Hern explained in State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987), the Code’s philosophy for extended-term sentencing is to focus on the offender “in the context of the offense committed,” id. at 91, apparently by accepting thé premise that the repeat offender is more blameworthy. Id. at 87.
It obviously distorts the offense-oriented sentencing approach of the Code to consider a first-time Graves Act offender to be more blameworthy, with reference to his first offense, because he subsequently commits another Graves Act offense. As illustrated above, the majority holding would foster sentencing disparity in respect of multiple Graves Act offenders, allowing the chronology of a Graves Act conviction to influence unduly the length of extended terms and period of parole ineligibility. *371I perceive no affront to the legislative purpose in confining the mandatory extended-term provisions of the Graves Act to those Graves Act offenses committed after a defendant’s first Graves Act offense.
HANDLER, J., joins in this opinion.
For affirmance—Chief Justices WILENTZ, and CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI—5.
For reversal—Justices HANDLER and STEIN—2.