People v. Gawthrop

V. J. Brennan, J.

(dissenting). I respectfully

dissent. Because the state of the law at the time of trial was that an accomplice need not be indorsed as a witness, I am reluctant to find error on the part of the trial court. However, I also recognize that this case was remanded to us with the directive that we reconsider and look at the facts in light of the new Supreme Court case, People v Lytal, 415 Mich 603; 329 NW2d 738 (1982).

I disagree with the majority’s finding of reversible error. On the contrary, I find that the evidence against the defendant was strong. The complainant positively identified the defendant. The female complainant, who was trying to defend her own home, property and, more particularly, her*811self, testified that the defendant had been in her apartment two days prior to the break-in and assault, and she had no trouble identifying him. Further, the facts as related by the witnesses were clear and explicit.

In addition, the number of witnesses who implicated the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes charged has never been considered relevant to prove the elements of the crimes. One witness, who positively identifies the defendant and testifies as to the facts, is sufficient to establish the elements and to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt.

I would affirm.