(dissenting). I dissent. I agree with the trial court’s conclusion that, given plaintiff’s decedent’s actions, this killing was wholly unforeseeable.
Plaintiff’s decedent was the only patron at the defendant’s establishment who was injured by the robber, and the only patron who decided to provoke an unknown gun-wielding assailant. A business has a duty to exercise due care to protect its invitees from foreseeable dangers, but it does not have a duty to protect against sudden and unforeseeable injuries caused by assailants. Escobar v Brent General Hospital, 106 Mich App 828; 308 NW2d 691 (1981); McNeal v Henry, 82 Mich App 88; 266 NW2d 469 (1978). A business certainly has no duty to protect an invitee from his own brazen foolhardiness. In this case, it is clear that plaintiff’s decedent’s death was the product of his own foolish actions.
One wonders just what the majority thinks defendant should have done to protect the decedent. If defendant had hired an unarmed guard, the latter would have been in no position to do anything other than what all of defendant’s patrons, with the exception of decedent, did; namely, to comply with the robber’s commands. Had defendant hired an armed guard, the possibility of violence would only have been increased. No doubt had the decedent been killed in a crossfire between the assailant and an armed guard, plaintiff would *282have filed a complaint alleging that the guard was negligent in attempting to stop the robbery. Perhaps defendant should have required the decedent to wear a gag as a condition for allowing him on the premises.
I believe that the majority opinion is simply another example of the modern trend in the judiciary to look for a "deep pocket” when a wrong has been committed. While plaintiffs loss is very real, it is clearly not a loss for which defendant is even remotely responsible, either in law or in fact.
I would affirm.