Baran v. State

RUCKER, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of review is well settled. We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. We examine only the evidence most favorable to the State along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom and if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conviction, it will not be set aside. Litel v. State (1988), Ind., 527 N.E.2d 1114. Where a case is tried to the bench without the intervention of a jury, the trial judge’s determination of a factual issue will be set aside only if the nonconflicting evidence supports a result contrary to the judge's determination. Taylor v. State (1988), Ind., 530 N.E.2d 1185.

In this case, the judge determined that the result of the Intoxilyzer 5000 was sufficient to sustain Baran's conviction. The nonconflicting evidence does not support a contrary result and thus Baran’s conviction should not be reversed on the grounds relied upon by the majority.

For years law enforcement officers throughout this State have relied upon various mechanical devices to measure a person’s breath for the existence of alcohol. The devices include the Breathalyzer, the Intoximeter 3000, the Intoxilyzer 4011A, the Intoximeter 4011AS, the B.A.C. Verifier, and the Intoxilyzer 5000. See 260 IAC 1.1-4-1 to 4-5. When the device, the operator, the techniques or chemicals used, if any, have been properly certified by the Director of the Department of Toxicology of Indiana University School of Medicine, then the test results are admissible into evidence to prove a person operated a vehicle with at least 0.10% by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood. See Ind. Code § 9-30-6-5(d). Here, the defendant does not challenge the certification of either the operator or the test equipment.

Indiana Code § 9-30-6-5(a)(2) mandates the Director of the Department of Toxicology to adopt “[standards and regulations for the: (A) selection; and (B) certification; of breath test equipment and chemicals.” In my view, the Director of the Department of Toxicology would not adopt standards and regulations for the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the other certifiable breath test machines unless the equipment possessed the capacity to measure the percent of alcohol *1329by weight in a person’s blood. Otherwise certification would be useless and unnecessary.

Simply because the printout sheet from the Intoxilyzer 5000 does not express the numerical value in terms of percentage nor specifically intone the words “by weight of alcohol in blood” certainly cannot mean the machine was selected and certified for some other purpose. Further, unlike the majority, I would not expect a State Trooper or any other certified equipment operator to be able to testify of his own personal knowledge that the Intoxilyzer 5000 recorded alcohol by weight rather than by volume. Generally, such knowledge would be a matter of hearsay obtained only by way of classroom instruction.

The Intoxilyzer 5000 printout showing “.11” was sufficient to support Baran’s conviction for operating a’ vehicle with at least .10% by weight of alcohol in his blood. This view is consistent with Regan v. State (1992), Ind.App., 590 N.E.2d 640. In that case we affirmed the defendant’s conviction for operating a vehicle with .10% of alcohol in his blood even though the evidence showed the Intoxilyzer 5000 registered “.15.” Id. at 645. In like fashion, the defendant’s conviction in this case should not be reversed on the grounds relied upon by the majority.