John E. Barnes, III appeals an adverse judgment for $3,250,000 in compensatory and punitive damages raising the following issues for our consideration:
I.Whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss this action pursuant to the parental immunity rule for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II.Whether the trial court erred in barring testimony and discovery relating to other alleged rapes of the plaintiff on the basis of Indiana’s Rape Shield statute in a civil action for damages for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder allegedly incurred as a result of repeated rapes by the plaintiffs father.
III. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the jury to award damages for expenses of psychiatric care already paid by the defendant.
IV. Whether the jury’s award of $3,000,000 in punitive damages was excessive and violative of due process.
Because our reversal on Issue I is dispos-itive of this appeal, we find it unnecessary to address the remaining three issues.
This action was filed on March 12, 1987 by Polly Anna Barnes (Polly) against her father, John E. Barnes III (John). The complaint alleged that on January 2, 3, 4 and 5, when Polly was fifteen years old, she was assaulted and raped by John at the family beach house in Captiva Island, Florida.
John filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, alleging that the action was barred by the parental immunity doctrine. John’s affidavit filed with the motion stated that Polly is his natural daughter, that on the dates of the incidents alleged in Polly’s complaint Polly was living in a home in Florida which was jointly owned by him and Polly’s mother (Margaret), that he and Polly’s mother were married, and that on the dates in question Polly was an unemancipated minor aged fifteen. In support of her opposition to John’s motion to dismiss, Margaret tendered a lengthy affidavit which included the statement that except for four months in 1983 and a two month summer vacation in 1984, Polly and Margaret lived separate from Polly’s brothers and John. The trial court denied the motion.
At the conclusion of a jury trial, Polly obtained a judgment for $250,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages. John appeals.
When matters outside the pleadings are considered by the trial court in ruling upon a motion to dismiss, we will treat that motion as a motion for summary judgment. Van Keppel v. County of Jasper (1990), Ind.App., 556 N.E.2d 333, 335. In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court. Kopec v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend (1990), Ind.App., 557 N.E.2d 1367, 1368, transfer pending. Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits and testimony, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Witham v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 484, 485. All facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue must be resolved against the movant. Witham, supra.
*1044John argues that Polly’s action against him is barred by the parental immunity rule. The parental immunity rule is a vestige of the common law and was first explicitly recognized in Indiana in Smith v. Smith (1924), 81 Ind.App. 566, 142 N.E. 128. In Smith, the plaintiff brought a tort action against his father based upon acts of personal violence and the failure of the father to provide an education for the plaintiff when he was a child. The Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the action, noting the rationale underlying the bar to actions by a child against his or her parent:
It is well established that a minor child cannot sue his parent for a tort. The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. An unkind and cruel parent may and should be punished at the time of the offense, if an offender at all, by forfeiting custody and suffering criminal penalties, if need be; but for the minor child who continues, it may be for long years, at home and unemancipated, to bring a suit, when arrived at majority, free from parental control and under counter influences, against his own parent, either for services accruing during infancy or to recover damages for some stale injury, real or imagined, referable to that period, appears quite contrary to good policy. And this rule has been applied, not only in cases of excessive punishment, or other assault and battery, but to the most extreme case possible, that of the ravishment of a minor daughter by her father.
Id. 142 N.E. at 128-129, quoting 20 R.C.L. 631 (emphasis added).
The parental immunity rule has been repeatedly reaffirmed by our courts. See Buffalo v. Buffalo (1982), Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 711; Vaughan v. Vaughan (1974), 161 Ind.App. 497, 316 N.E.2d 455; Hunter v. State (1977), 172 Ind.App. 397, 360 N.E.2d 588, transfer denied, cert. denied 434 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 306, 54 L.Ed.2d 193.
Polly argues, however, that in recent years the rule has been “significantly eroded by exceptions,” and therefore the trial court correctly held the rule to be inapplicable here. Polly points to the guest statute, I.C. 9-3-3-1, and Buffalo, supra as evidence of the “erosion” of the rule. She asserts that her case is similar to Buffalo, wherein this court recognized that the parental immunity rule does not apply to bar an unemancipated child’s action where the child brings suit against a non-custodial parent where the parents’ marriage has been dissolved. The Buffalo court found the rationale underlying the rule to be inapplicable to such a situation:
The reasons underlying the parental immunity rule ... cannot reasonably be said to apply to father. He is a non-custodial parent. The peace and tranquility of this marriage had been broken irretrievably before Chad was injured. There is no longer any reason for the enforcement of the immunity rule for the father’s benefit.
441 N.E.2d at 713.
Polly argues that Margaret and John’s de facto separation broke the peace and tranquility of the family, as demonstrated by their subsequent divorce. See Barnes v. Barnes (1990), Ind.App., 549 N.E.2d 61, transfer denied. Thus, she contends that the exception in Buffalo should be extended to this case.
This case does not fall within the exception delineated in Buffalo. At the time of the alleged tortious acts, John and Margaret were married; John and Margaret had joint custody of Polly by virtue of their marriage; and they were together with Polly as a family in Florida.
Polly next invites us to abolish the parental immunity rule, noting its “erosion” and arguing that it no longer serves the needs of society. We do not find the fact that the General Assembly chose to make an exception to the rule in the case of wanton or willful misconduct in the operation of a motor vehicle persuasive in determining *1045whether to abolish parental immunity.1 We presume that the legislature did not intend to change the common law beyond what it declares expressly or by unmistakable implication. Northern Indiana Public Service v. Citizen’s Action Coalition (1989), Ind., 548 N.E.2d 153, 159. Thus, we do not find that the guest statute evinces a legislative disapproval of parental immunity. Nor do we find the limited exception delineated in Buffalo to be a harbinger of the demise of the-parental immunity doctrine.
On the contrary, the Smith court clearly contemplated suits based on allegations such as those in this case — i.e. “the ravishment of a minor daughter by her father;” Smith, supra, 142 N.E. at 129 — when it considered whether to follow the parental immunity rule. Although cases such as this are disturbing, the wronged party is not without a remedy. We agree with the Smith court that the proper remedy is to cause the offender to forfeit custody and be incarcerated under the criminal processes rather than to allow the victim to seek monetary compensation. The offender is thus removed from society, at least for a time, and the chances of a repeat offense are considerably decreased. Moreover, as the father of the victim, the child abuser or child molester still retains at least a partial responsibility to pay for the psychological and medical treatment of the child which was necessitated by his deviant conduct. Such was the case here, where John paid over $160,000 for Polly’s psychiatric care and institutionalization.
We realize that if we were to abolish parental immunity, it would be possible for the offender to be tried both civilly and criminally, thereby requiring him to pay his debt to both society and the individual victim. However, we are also concerned with the impact which the recognition of a child’s cause of action in tort against her parent would have on the family as a.unit. To this end, we join the Smith court in our reluctance to disturb the fragile balance which maintains this important institution, and echo the sentiments which ring as true today as they did in 1924:
From our knowledge of the social life of today, and the tendencies of the unrestrained youth of this generation, there appears to be much reason for the continuance of parental control during the child’s minority, and that such control should not be embarrassed by conferring upon the child a right to civil redress against the parent under the circumstances stated in the question we are now considering. In our opinion, much reason exists for maintaining the sound public policy, which, as stated, underlies the rule which denies such redress. Extreme cases may arise, where it may seem harsh to deny the right, but we are governed by recognized rules, which must be uniformly applied. On the whole it seems far better to rely on the criminal law and the equity powers of the court to protect the child, where parental affection fails, even if they afford no redress for past wrongs, than to abandon the rule under consideration.
Smith, supra, 142 N.E. at 129.
Although this is certainly a case where denial of civil redress might seem harsh, we deem a wholesale abolition of the parental immunity rule to be unwise, and we cannot find that the interest of consistency is served by adjudicating suits between parent and child on a case-by-case basis.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal.
GARRARD, J., concurs. CONOVER, J., dissents and files separate opinion.. Our guest statute, IC 9-3-3-1, provides in relevant part:
(b) the owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle is not liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or the death of:
(1) his parent ...
(3) his child or stepchild ...
resulting from the operation of the motor vehicle which the parent, ... child or stepchild ... was being transported without payment therefor in or upon the motor vehicle, unless the injuries or death are caused by the wanton or willful misconduct of the operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of the motor vehicle.