concurring.
I concur in the majority's opinion. I write this separate opinion only to suggest alternatives for the trial court's consideration.
The trial court’s thoughtful judgment distributing the marital property must be reversed because the trial court erred in allocating the structured settlement fund. The undisputed value of the guaranteed annuity is $402,175.1 Raymond’s receipt of the remaining guaranteed monthly payments is contingent upon his survival; therefore, his receipt of his portion of the total value would be defeated if he did not survive until his assumed life expectancy. This contingency violates the prohibition against any part of the distribution of the marital estate being conditioned upon a subsequent change in circumstances, including death.
However, I want to make it clear that, in my opinion, the trial court has several alternatives upon remand. For example, it can distribute a proportional share to each party, as it has, if it includes all the remaining monthly payments, i.e., Raymond and his designated beneficiary receive sixty percent (60%) of each monthly benefit; Shirley and her designated beneficiary receive forty percent (40%) of each monthly benefit. Alternatively, the trial court could award either party a sum certain representing some portion of the present value of the remaining guaranteed monthly payments payable in such manner as the court determines. Undoubtedly there are other acceptable alternatives. The only thing the trial court cannot do is to provide that the interest awarded to either party is divested by that party’s death.2
I emphasize the purpose of the remand is to allow the trial court only to reconsider the distribution of the marital property. I also want to emphasize this court’s determination that the trial court’s judgment contains sufficient findings to support an unequal division of property in favor of Shirley.
. There is evidence apportioning the total present value of the guaranteed annuity, $402,-175, between Raymond’s expected receipts, based upon his life expectancy, and Shirley’s survivorship benefit. Assuming a mortality multiple of 100% means standard mortality, the value of the payments for Raymond's life expectancy is $358,724 and the value of the surviv-orship portion is $43,451.
. Hence, there is no issue concerning the trial court’s failure to place a present value on the right to receive the monthly payments during Raymond’s life expectancy and on the right to receive those benefits as a named beneficiary.