dissenting.
The majority correctly holds that appellant was convicted in 2000 for Class A misdemeanor driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) and that this conviction is void because the punishment assessed was below the statutory minimum. However, the majority errs in adopting the reasoning of Ex parte Shoe that, while appellant cannot waive his right to challenge this void judgment, he can be estopped from asserting that it is void because he enjoyed the benefits of the sentence. See 137 S.W.3d 100, 102 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. *664granted). Shoe contradicts existing law and should not be followed.
Although the estoppel issue is currently pending before the Court of Criminal Appeals, existing precedent compels the rejection of estoppel principles in challenges to void judgments.
On March 3, 2000, after appellant pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor DWI, a county criminal court-at-law sentenced him to twenty-four days’ confinement, even though the minimum statutory term of confinement for such an offense is thirty days. The majority correctly concludes that, because this sentence fell outside the statutory range of punishment for this offense, it was unauthorized by law and illegal, making the judgment in that case void. See, e.g., Mizell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 804, 806 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (stating that, if punishment assessed is less than the minimum provided by law, the sentence is unauthorized and illegal, making the judgment of conviction void and subject to attack on direct appeal, by habeas corpus, or in any court with jurisdiction over a criminal case). Although the majority recognizes that appellant cannot waive his right to be sentenced within the proper range of punishment, the majority concludes that appellant is estopped from complaining about this void conviction because he enjoyed the benefits of his twenty-four day, plea-bargained sentence. See ante at p. 660. The conclusion reached by the majority (and by the Shoe court) is contrary to at least three decisions from the Court of Criminal Appeals — Williams v. State, Heath v. State, and Fullbright v. State.1 See ante at p. 660; Ex parte Shoe, 137 S.W.3d at 101 (stating that this estop-pel issue was an issue of first impression in Texas); Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d 656, 657-58 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (disapproving of Heath to the extent that it extended legal rules regarding illegal sentences to a probation order but indicating that those legal rules are correct as to illegal sentences); Fullbright v. State, 818 S.W.2d 808, 809-10 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (holding that appellant was not barred from asserting that prior conviction was void, even if he already had accepted the benefits of the lenient sentence thereunder and stating that a defendant may raise a defect that renders a sentence void at any time); Heath v. State, 817 S.W.2d 335, 338-39 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (holding, in four-judge plurality opinion, that appellant, who enjoyed the benefits of his plea bargain for an impermissibly lenient and void sentence, was not estopped from asserting that his sentence was void because principles of estoppel do not apply to illegal sentences, which are void), overruled, in part on other grounds by Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d at 656-57.
In Fullbright, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Fullbright was barred from complaining about his allegedly illegal sentence for a prior offense because he already had accepted the benefits of that lenient sentence. See Fullbright, 818 S.W.2d at 809. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that such complaints may be raised at any time and rejected the intermediate court’s application of estoppel principles to a conviction that is void based on an illegal sentence. See id. at 809-10. The Fullbright court also held that the trial court committed harmful error in denying the Fullbright’s motion to quash an enhancement allegation regarding this void conviction in an indictment regarding a subsequent offense. See id. at 810-11.
*665In Heath, a four-judge plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals also rejected the State’s argument that an appellant was estopped from asserting the illegality of a prior sentence because he already had enjoyed the benefits of that sentence. See Heath, 817 S.W.2d at 888-39. The appellant in Heath had pleaded guilty to the charged offense of aggravated robbery based on a plea bargain agreement. See id. at 336. The trial court found him guilty, followed the plea bargain agreement, assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement, and suspended imposition of the sentence, placing him on probation for ten years. Id. The State later moved to revoke the probated sentence. Id. The trial court held a hearing, revoked Heath’s probation, and sentenced him to eight years’ confinement. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. On original submission, the Heath plurality affirmed the following legal principles: (1) a judgment inflicting punishment not authorized by law is void; (2) Heath did not waive the issue by failing to complain in the trial court because a defect that renders a sentence void may be raised at any time; and (3) when the void sentence is obtained as a result of a plea bargain agreement, and specific performance is not an alternative, the proper remedy is to order the guilty plea withdrawn and to return the parties, including the State, to their original positions. See id. at 336-37. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court with orders to withdraw Heath’s plea and have Heath re-plead to the indictment. See id.
On rehearing in Heath, the State argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred on original submission by failing to apply the doctrine of estoppel. See id. at 338. The Heath plurality analyzed and disapproved of several prior cases and noted that the Court of Criminal Appeals has long held that illegal sentences are void. See id. at 339. The Heath plurality recognized the following principles: (1) when a plea bargain calls for a sentence not authorized by law, the defendant’s plea must be withdrawn; (2) if the court applied the doctrine of estoppel in situations in which the parties and the trial court unknowingly enter into unauthorized plea bargain agreements, it would be treating those errors as punishment error only, which is incompatible with the concept of negotiated pleas and reflects a theory that the Court of Criminal Appeals has specifically disavowed; and (3) estoppel does not apply to a challenge to an illegal sentence. See id. at 339-40.
In both Fullbright and Heath, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied precedents regarding illegal sentences and rejected the application of estoppel principles to challenges to what it determined were illegal sentences. See Fullbright, 818 S.W.2d at 809-10; Heath, 817 S.W.2d at 338-39. However, in Williams, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Heath plurality erred to the extent it extended legal doctrines regarding sentences to probation orders. See Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d at 657-58. According to the Williams court, the Heath plurality improperly equated an unauthorized order of probation with an illegal sentence. See id. Although the Williams court did not mention Fullbright, Fullbright seems to have erred to the same extent. See id. The Williams court disapproved of Heath on this limited basis only. See id. The Williams court discusses Heath, including its rejection of the applicability of estoppel principles, and then indicates that the Heath court’s statement of legal doctrines relating to sentences was correct but that in Heath the court erroneously extended *666these principles to probation orders.2 See id. After Williams, courts of appeals have recognized the continued validity of the legal doctrines stated in Fullbright and Heath as applied to illegal sentences rather than probation orders. See Rhodes v. State, 175 S.W.3d 348, 352 n. 1 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. filed) (noting that the Court of Criminal Appeals partially abrogated Fullbright but that the remainder of Fullbright is still good law); Scott v. State, 988 S.W.2d 947, 948-49 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (citing Heath as good law in non-probation case regarding illegal sentence); Ortiz v. State, No. 14-00-00646-CR, 2001 WL 1249257, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2001, no pet.) (relying on Heath’s statement of the law as to illegal sentences but noting that Williams overruled Heath in part on other grounds) (not designated for publication).
Appellant’s 2000 conviction does not involve an allegedly unauthorized probation order. Therefore, the part of Fullbright and Heath disapproved in Williams is not an issue in this ease. Under Fullbright, Heath, and Williams, the Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed this court that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to situations like the one presented in this case — appellant’s assertion that his 2000 conviction is void based on an illegal sentence. See Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d at 657-58; Fullbright, 818 S.W.2d at 809-10; Heath, 817 S.W.2d at 338-39. This issue is once again before the Court of Criminal Appeals in the Shoe case. Although the estoppel issue has been submitted in Shoe, to date, the Court of Criminal Appeals has not ruled. This court, as an intermediate court of appeals, is bound by controlling authority from the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Zarychta v. State, 44 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. refd). Because controlling authority from our high court requires this court to reject the State’s es-toppel argument, the majority errs in following the analysis of the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Shoe instead of precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals in Fullbright, Heath, and Williams. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 988 S.W.2d 947, 948-50 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding sentence that was below the statutory minimum was void in a situation in which appellant had benefitted from the lesser sentence).
Even absent controlling precedent, es-toppel should not apply to complaints about a void judgment that can be raised at any time.
Even without the above-discussed controlling precedent, the better rule is to bar the application of estoppel in these situations because Texas law holds judgments containing illegal sentences to be void judgments that may be challenged at any time. Judgments assessing punishment outside the statutory range of punishment are not void for lack of jurisdiction. See Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221, 225 & n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (stating that judgments imposing unauthorized sentences do not create a lack of jurisdiction). Nonetheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that such unauthorized judgments impose illegal sentences and are nullities from the beginning. See Mizell, 119 S.W.3d at 806 & n. 7 (stating that sentence outside the range of punishment is illegal, rendering the judgment void and subject to direct or collateral attack); Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 225 & n. 4 (stating that these judgments impose illegal sen*667tences and are a nullity from the beginning); Fullbright, 818 S.W.2d at 809 (holding that defect that renders sentence void may be raised at any time); Heath, 817 S.W.2d at 389 (stating that illegal sentences are void); Gonzales v. State, 527 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (finding punishment for offense of assault without the double penalty provisions below the statutory minimum and therefore void). Accordingly, parties may attack these judgments at any time, including on direct appeal, by habeas corpus, or by collateral attack. See Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 225 & n. 4 (stating that judgments that impose unauthorized sentences are a nullity from the beginning and subject to direct or collateral attack at any time); Dillard v. State, 77 Tex.Crim. 1,177 S.W. 99, 107 ( 1915) (stating that assessment of punishment at less than the statutory minimum can be raised at any time because Texas courts have no right to assess punishment not authorized by Texas law) (op. on rehearing); see also McClinton v. State, 121 S.W.3d 768, 771-72 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (stating, in concurring opinion by Judge Cochran, that “both trial and appellate courts may always take cognizance of an illegal or unauthorized sentence”). Because a void judgment is a legal nullity and has no binding force or effect, see Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 225, equitable principles like estoppel cannot breathe life into it.
Furthermore, because a judgment that imposes an unauthorized sentence is void, it cannot dispose of the case. The case remains pending and the parties, even though the trial court’s plenary power appears to have expired, may file a motion to re-open the case to remedy the illegal sentence. See Mizell, 119 S.W.3d at 806 & n. 7; Villarreal v. State, 590 S.W.2d 938, 938-39 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that trial court had authority, five months after sentencing, to grant the State’s motion to reopen punishment and assess a different and proper punishment because initial judgment contained unauthorized punishment that rendered judgment void); Cooper v. State, 527 S.W.2d 898, 898-99 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (holding that trial court did not err in resentencing appellant after he already had been confined in jail under his original sentence because original sentence was less than statutory minimum, rendering the judgment void); Banks v. State, 29 S.W.3d 642, 645 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. refd) (holding that trial court did not err in resentencing appellant three days after his original sentencing because his original sentence was not authorized by law and therefore void). Appellant has an absolute and nonwaivable right to be sentenced within the proper range of punishment established by the legislature. See Speth, 6 S.W.3d 530, 532-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). As the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained:
[T]he case law ... involving void sentences has viewed legislatively defined sentencing schemes that are explicit about the applicable range or category of punishment as absolute, systemic features of the system, such that their application cannot be waived. That is, a defendant’s “right” to be sentenced to a term within the defined “universe of punishments applicable to the offense” is absolute and nonwaivable.
Speth, 6 S.W.3d at 533 n. 5.
As shown above, Texas law treats appellant’s right to be sentenced within the proper range of punishment established by the legislature with a high degree of solicitude. The majority concedes that appellant cannot waive this right. Even if there were no controlling authorities specifically on the estoppel issue, given the extraordinary protections and remedies Texas law provides for this right, estoppel principles should not be applied to it.
*668Furthermore, the Shoe court’s reasons for applying estoppel in this context are not convincing.3 See Ex parte Shoe, 137 S.W.3d at 101-02. The Shoe court does not discuss the Court of Criminal Appeals’s decisions in Williams, Heath, and Fullbright. See Ex parte Shoe, 137 S.W.3d at 101-02. Instead, the Shoe court cites a case from the Court of Criminal Appeals regarding estoppel and invited error; however, that case did not involve or mention void judgments or illegal sentences. See Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 530-32 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding that invited error and estoppel barred appellant from complaining about charge error that he requested); Ex parte Shoe, 137 S.W.3d at 101-02 (citing Prystash). The Shoe court’s reliance on California’s application of waiver doctrines to unauthorized sentences is not persuasive because, unlike Texas, California courts have held that such sentences render the judgment voidable, rather than void. See In re Marriage of Goddard, 33 Cal.4th 49, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 55, 90 P.3d 1209 (2004) (stating that, under California law, if a court acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its judgment is voidable rather than void); People v. Hester, 22 Cal.4th 290, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 641, 644-45, 992 P.2d 569 (2000) (stating that criminal defendants are estopped from complaining of unauthorized sentences to which they agreed because such unauthorized sentences do not deprive the court of fundamental jurisdiction but only constitute an act in excess of jurisdiction). The Shoe court also cites a statement from the Supreme Court of Indiana that is an obiter dictum that does not cite another Indiana case on point. See Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Ind.1987). Additionally, the Shoe court fails to recognize contrary authorities from other states. See, e.g., State v. Ohnmacht, 342 N.W.2d 838, 842-45 (Iowa 1983) (holding that sentence outside of statutory range of punishment renders judgment void and subject to challenge at any time, without application of estoppel principles). For these reasons, this court should not follow the Shoe opinion, even if it were not contrary to controlling precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals.4
*669Two prior convictions for DWI are elements of the offense of felony DWI that must be proven to obtain a conviction. See Bollen v. State, 117 S.W.3d 798, 801-02 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). Appellant stipulated that he was driving while intoxicated at the time of the instant offense; he objected only on the ground that the 2000 conviction was void and could not be used as a basis for convicting him of felony DWI. On appeal, appellant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for felony DWI. Because the 2000 conviction is void, the State did not prove two prior convictions. However, in this bench trial, the parties’ stipulations are sufficient to support a conviction on the lesser-included offense of Class A misdemeanor DWI. Therefore, rather than affirming, this court should sustain appellant’s second issue, reverse the felony DWI conviction, reform the judgment to reflect a conviction for Class A misdemeanor DWI, and remand to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. See Tex.R.App. P. 43.2(c) (stating that the court of appeals may reverse the trial court’s judgment in whole or in part and render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered); Herrin v. State, 125 S.W.3d 436, 443-45 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating that, in reviewing a judgment based on a jury trial, an appellate court may reform the judgment to reflect conviction of a lesser-included offense and remand for a new punishment hearing if the evidence is legally insufficient to prove the greater offense, sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser offense, and if a jury instruction on the lesser offense was given or requested and denied); Shute v. State, 877 S.W.2d 314, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (stating that, in bench trial, there is no need to submit a lesser-included-offense charge to the trial court because the court is authorized to find the defendant guilty of any proven lesser-included offense and stating that finding defendant guilty of a greater offense necessarily includes a finding that the evidence is sufficient to prove the lesser offense); Watson v. State, 923 S.W.2d 829, 832-33 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. refd) (holding that, in reviewing a judgment based on a bench trial, to grant reformation reflecting conviction of a lesser-included offense, the appellate court need only conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove the greater offense and sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser offense). Because the court does not do so, I respectfully dissent.
. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded in Mizell that it did not need to address this estoppel issue, which is not the same as stating that the court has never addressed that issue in the past. See Mizell, 119 S.W.3d at 806 n. 8.
. In response, Presiding Judge Keller issued an opinion concurring in the judgment and asserting that estoppel principles should apply. See Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d at 658-60 (Keller, P.J., concurring in the judgment).
. Although this court cited Shoe in a recent case, that case did involve the estoppel issue present in the instant case and in Shoe, and this court did not adopt the Shoe court’s es-*669toppel analysis. See Meineke v. State, 171 S.W.3d 551, 558 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. filed) (citing Shoe to support the proposition that appellant could not corn-plain of enhancements and sentence to which he agreed, in case that did not involve sentences outside the statutory range of punishment).