(dissenting). I dissent. I believe that the 1979 amendment to MCL 750.535; MSA 28.803, which added the words "possesses” and "conceals”, effectively overruled People v Kyllonen, 402 Mich 135; 262 NW2d 2 (1978). Kyllonen dealt with:
"* * * a single narrow and unique question of statutory interpretation: When the Legislature enacted MCL 750.435; MSA 28.803, which proscribes, inter alia, 'aiding] in the concealment of * * * stolen * * * property’, did it intend to provide an alternate statute under which thieves could be convicted; or did it only intend to case a net of criminal liability over persons who assist thieves or others in the concealment of stolen property?” Kyllonen, supra, pp 139-140. (Footnote omitted.)
Based on the statute as worded prior to the 1979 amendment, the Supreme Court strictly construed the statute to exclude thieves who conceal property they have stolen. One year later, however, the Legislature amended the statute, thereby changing the wording relied on by the Supreme Court in Kyllonen and, in my opinion, invalidating the analysis in that case. Further, since criminal statutes are not lightly or frequently amended, we cannot ignore the proximity in time between Kyllonen and the amendment and assume that the Legislature meant nothing by adding the words "possesses” and "conceals”. The commentary cited in the majority opinion, 3 CJI, Ch 26 Commentary, Stolen Property, p 27, also supports this conclusion.
The statute, as presently worded, is no longer *386consistent with the historical development of the crime outlined in Kyllonen. The everyday understanding of the language presently employed in the statute now includes the person who committed the larceny. See Kyllonen, supra, p 145.
I would affirm.