MAJORITY OPINION
RICHARD H. EDELMAN, Justice.The State appeals the trial court’s granting of Cory A. Stevens’s motion to sup*566press evidence.1 We affirm.
In 1995, appellee pleaded no contest to a charge of involuntary manslaughter in Brazoria County and was placed on ten years deferred adjudication probation. In 2003, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellee violated the terms of his probation by driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) in Tom Green County. In the Tom Green County DWI prosecution (the “DWI case”), appellee filed a motion to suppress all of the. evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, the trial court granted the motion without making express findings of fact, and the State dismissed that case.
Appellee thereafter filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence from the DWI case in the adjudication proceeding. Based on the transcript of the suppression hearing in the DWI case and the arguments of counsel, but no further evidence, the trial court granted appellee’s motion to suppress.2 It is from this ruling that the State now appeals.
A -trial court’s ruling must be upheld if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case and supported by the record even if the trial court gives the wrong reason for its ruling. Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) cert, denied, 541 U.S. 974, 124 S.Ct. 1883, 158 L.Ed.2d 469 (2004). Thus, although a trial court’s ruling generally may not be reversed on a ground not raised in the trial court, such a ruling can (and should) be upheld if it is correct under any applicable theory, including one never raised by the appellee.3
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a mixed question of law and fact, such as reasonable suspicion or probable cause, we review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts of the case de novo. Estrada, 154 S.W.3d at 607. However, we afford almost total deference to the trial court’s, determinations of historical facts that involve an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. Master-son v. State, 155 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex.Crim.App.2005), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1330, 164 L.Ed.2d 47, 2006 *567WL 386379 (2006). We also afford deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts based exclusively on physical or documentary evidence, as in this case, rather than on the credibility of any live witnesses. See Manzi v. State, 88 S.W.3d 240, 243-44 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). A trial court may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony, even if that testimony is uncontroverted. Mas-terson, 155 S.W.3d at 171.
Where, as here, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact in ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling and assume the trial court made whatever implicit findings of fact were necessary to reach that ruling and supported by the record. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492-93 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). Thus, where a motion to suppress is granted despite evidence supporting the existence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause (whether controverted or uncontroverted), we presume the trial court found that evidence not credible. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856-58 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
The State’s sole issue on appeal challenges the granting of the motion to suppress all evidence from the DWI case based on collateral estoppel because the ruling on the motion to suppress in that case neither decided an ultimate issue nor was it a final judgment. Although the collateral estoppel ruling by the trial court is questionable,4 we must affirm the granting of the motion to suppress if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, even if not raised by appellee in the trial court.5
The Tom Green County court granted appellee’s motion to suppress for a lack of reasonable suspicion in stopping appellee.6 The record from the suppres*568sion hearing in the DWI case contained the Police Officer’s testimony that he stopped appellee after witnessing him commit traffic violations, and thus had reasonable suspicion for the stop. See Tex.Code Grim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999). We must therefore presume that the trial court’s granting of the motion was based on a credibility determination (rather than an erroneous application of the law to those facts). See Boss, 32 S.W.3d at 857-58. Affording the same deference to the suppression ruling by the Brazoria County trial court, that ruling would likewise be correct under a theory of law that is applicable to the case and supported by the record, even if it was not a ground presented to, or relied upon, by the trial court. See Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 336 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Under these circumstances, the State’s issue affords no basis for reversal. Accordingly it is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FOWLER, J., dissenting.
. The State may appeal an order in a criminal case granting a motion to suppress evidence. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5) (Vernon Supp.2005).
. Because it has not been raised by the State, we do not address whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule even applies to a community supervision revocation proceeding. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole y. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363-64, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998)(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001)(finding that states are not permitted to interpret the Fourth Amendment as offering greater protection than determined by the United States Supreme Court); Oles v.State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 105 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)(stating that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly held that Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution does not provide any greater protection than the Fourth Amendment exclusionaiy rule); Hulitv. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)(same).
.Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 336 (Tex.Crim.App.2002)(holding that appellate courts may uphold a trial court's ruling on any legal theory or basis applicable to the case, but may not reverse a trial court's ruling on any theory or basis that might have been applicable to the case, but was not raised); Hailey v. State, 87 S.W.3d 118, 121-22 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (same); State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). It is thus not apparent how decisions such as Allen, holding that an appellate court may not affirm a trial court's granting of a motion to suppress ruling on a ground not raised in the . trial court, conforms with the holdings in Mercado, Martinez and Hailey. See State v. Allen, 53 S.W.3d 731, 733-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
.In addition to other considerations, such as that the suppression ruling in the DWI case was not a final judgment on the merits and that jeopardy had not attached in that case, that ruling did not reflect a finding of any particular fact. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)(holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has necessarily been determined by a valid final judgment). In explaining its ruling in the present case, the Brazoria County trial court stated that:
the Court of Tom Green County made its finding that the stop and arrest of Defendant was without reasonable and/or probable cause, and therefore that all facts regarding the unlawful DWI arrest and detention of defendant, ... were adjudicated in favor of Defendant, and thus, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and in accordance with Guajardo v. State the Motion to Suppress all evidence from Tom Green County should be Granted, (emphasis added).
However, it does not logically follow from the suppression ruling in the DWI case that all facts were found in favor of appellee. The trial court made no express findings of fact in that case. Moreover, even in a suppression hearing where the only evidence presented is the testimony of the police officer (supporting denial of the motion), a trial court might nevertheless grant the motion because it does not know what the facts are (and thus cannot make any affirmative findings of fact), but just isn't convinced that the facts are as the witness has testified. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856. Without a specific fact that the record reflects was necessarily decided in such a ruling, collateral estoppel does not apply. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189; Guajardo v. State, 109 S.W.3d 456, 460-61 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).
. Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404.
. A police officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000); Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). In making reasonable suspicion determinations, courts must look at the totality of circumstances of each *568case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).