dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s judgment that Revetts have an implied easement over Fischers’ property.
The majority disagrees with the trial court’s judgment because some of its findings do not support the conclusion of the judgment. The majority opinion states:
“The trial court was correct in finding that the driveway loop had been used for many years prior to severance; however, we are forced to disagree with its other findings and the legal conclusions based on them because it is apparent that they were based not upon the circumstances at the time of severance, but upon subsequent happenings.”
Majority opinion, page 997 (emphasis added).
The “findings” which the majority refers to are not special findings of fact under Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52(A). Since they are not special findings, they are merely surplusage to the trial court’s general finding that Revetts have an implied easement across Fischers’ property. As surplusage, they can not render the judgment erroneous.
Special findings of fact were not required in this case and the parties did not make a written request for special findings prior to the commencement of trial. Therefore, the “findings” referred to by the majority are reviewed on appeal as special findings of fact only if they were made upon the trial court’s own motion. TR. 52(A). However, the record indicates that the trial court did not make these findings upon its own mo*999tion. Instead, the trial court was merely clarifying its original judgment pursuant to the request of both parties.
The trial court’s original judgment reads as follows:
“This cause having previously been taken under advisement, the Court now enters judgment for the defendants [Re-vetts] and against the plaintiffs [Fisch-ers] at plaintiff’s costs.”
Record, at 189. Both Fischers and Revetts requested the trial court to modify the judgment “for the purpose of specifying and identifying the nature of the legal right vested in the Defendants pursuant to which right this Court entered judgment for the Defendants.” Record, at 190. The trial court complied with both parties’ request by making the following entry:
“Parties file Stipulation requesting the Court to modify its judgment entered January 20, 1981 by specifying the legal right vested in defendants pursuant to which judgment was entered. Accordingly, the judgment is modified to include the following findings:
“1. The use of the disputed area as a driveway existed and was used for many years prior to the severance of the two estates.
“2. The use, while not absolutely necessary for ingress to and egress from the defendants’ property, was of a character looking to permanency.
“3. Discontinuance of the use would obviously involve an actual and substantial rearrangement of defendants’ estate to the end that it would be as comfortably enjoyed as before.
“4. Defendants acquired an implied easement for driveway purposes over plaintiffs’ property.
“5. The use is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of defendants’ property.
‘.‘6. The dimensions of the easement are set out in a survey, copy of which was admitted in evidence in this cause as Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1; copy of said survey is attached to these findings and incorporated in them by reference.”
Record, at 192. Because the statements in the above entry were made at the request of the parties, and because that request was not filed prior to the admission of evidence, the statements are not special findings of fact under TR. 52(A).
Where the trial court does not make special findings of fact, the appeal is from a general judgment. Wilson v. Upchurch (1981), Ind.App., 425 N.E.2d 236, 238; Llewellyn v. Beasley (1981), Ind.App., 415 N.E.2d 789, 792 (reh. denied). On review of a general judgment, this Court must affirm the trial court’s decision if it is sustainable on any legal theory which is supported by the evidence, Wilson, supra, at 238; Van Orman v. State (1981), Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 1301, 1304, even if the trial court gave an erroneous reason for its decision. Husted v. McCloud, (1982), Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 341 at 347; Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Medical Corp. (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 1042 (trans. denied.) Therefore, the trial court’s decision that Revetts have an implied easement must be affirmed if there is sufficient evidence in the record to support that decision, even if the statements made by the trial court in its modified judgment indicate that the decision was based on the wrong reasons.
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s judgment, this Court may not weigh conflicting evidence but may consider only that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom most favorable to the judgment. Van Orman, supra, at 1304. The evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom most favorable to the judgment reveals that the adjacent parcels of land now owned by Revetts and Fischers were once a part'of a farm owned by a man named Van Alstine. Van Alstine sold the east parcel, now owned by Fischers, to Fischers’ predecessor in title, the Horst-*1000mans, and kept the west parcel, which he eventually sold to Revetts.1
After Horstmans had started to build their house on the east parcel, an agent of the county informed them that they were building too close to Van Alstine’s property. Instead of moving their building site, Horstmans asked Van Alstine if they could buy a ten foot wide strip of land from Van Alstine’s west parcel, adjacent to their east parcel. Van Alstine agreed to sell Horst-mans the ten foot wide strip if Van Alstine could continue to use that portion of his turnaround drive which would then be on Horstman’s property. Van Alstine had been using this turnaround driveway for many years. Horstmans agreed, replying that they didn’t want that part of the driveway within the ten foot strip, just the title to the strip so that they could continue to build their home where it had been started. Later, when Van Alstine sold the west parcel to the Revetts, he told them that the part of his driveway turnaround on Horst-mans’ property was included in the sale of the west parcel.
Based on the evidence set forth above, one of two legal relationships was impliedly created between Van Alstine and Horst-mans regarding Van Alstine’s use of that portion of his driveway within the ten foot wide strip he conveyed to Horstmans. Either Van Alstine was impliedly reserving an easement across the strip of land he was conveying to Horstmans, or Horstmans were impliedly granting Van Alstine a revocable license to continue to use his own driveway. I believe it was reasonable for the trial court to infer from the circumstances surrounding the conveyance that Van Alstine was impliedly reserving an easement.
The elements which must be proved to establish an implied easement have been succinctly set forth in Searcy v. LaGrotte (1978), Ind.App., 372 N.E.2d 755:
“The general rule is that when the owner of an estate imposes an obvious and permanent servitude on one part in favor of another part, and at the time ownership is severed the servitude is in use and reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the part benefited, an easement will be implied by law.” (Authorities)2
Searcy, supra, at 757.
Applying the Searcy elements to the facts in the present case, Revetts had to prove that when Van Alstine sold the ten foot strip to Horstmans the portion of the driveway turnaround within that ten foot strip was obvious, permanent, in use, and reasonably necessary for Van Alstine’s fair enjoyment of the west parcel. Fischers essentially contend that Revetts failed to introduce sufficient evidence that the portion of the driveway within the ten foot strip was *1001“permanent” and “reasonably necessary.” I believe Revetts sufficiently established both of these elements.
In the context of implied easements, a servitude is considered permanent if it had continued for so long before the conveyance is made that it would be reasonable to expect it to continue after the conveyance is made. See 2 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Property, § 351, at 292 (1980). In this sense, the word permanent means a use which is not temporary or subject to change but which is continuous and enduring in character. In accordance with this definition, many states have understandingly interchanged the word continuous for the word permanent; continuous being a more accurate description of what must be proved. E.g.s., Haynie v. Brenner (1976), 216 Va. 722, 222 S.E.2d 546, 548; Baylor v. Thiess (1971), 2 Ill.App.3d 582, 277 N.E.2d 154, 154; See, 2 American Law of Property § 8.41 & 8.42 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) (using “continuous” instead of “permanent” and “apparent” instead of “obvious”).
The majority opinion intimates that in Searcy, supra, a drive on a farm which had been in use for over fifty years was not “permanent” within the definition of implied easements because it was “merely a dirt road.” Searcy, supra, at 758. I disagree with Searcy to the extent it so holds:
“The requirement that the quasi-easement must have been ‘permanent,’ or ‘continuous’ means only that the use involved shall not have been occasional, accidental or temporary, but shall have been of such a character as to enable the claimant to rely reasonably upon the continuance of such user.” (Footnote omitted).
3 R. Powell, Powell on Real Property, ¶ 411, at 34-85 (1981); Cf. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Patterson (1885), 103 Ind. 582, 589, 2 N.E. 188, 193 (considering the “probability that the purchaser, as a reasonable man, took the conveyance with the expectation that the existing use would be continued”) [hereinafter cited as John Hancock]
Although Indiana has continued to use the term “permanent”, this state tacitly recognized in John Hancock that permanent essentially meant continuous. As was quoted in John Hancock:
“It may be considered as settled in the United States, that, on the conveyance of one of several parcels of land belonging to the same owner, there is an implied grant or reservation, as the case may be, of all apparent and continuous easements or incidents of property which have been created or used by him during the unity of possession, though they could then have had no legal existence apart from his general ownership.” (Citation omitted), (Emphasis added).
Id., at 587, 2 N.E. 188.
The Indiana Supreme Court further held in John Hancock that “a mere temporary or provisional arrangement . . . can not constitute the degree of necessity or permanency” required to establish an implied easement. Id., 103 Ind. at 588, 2 N.E. at 191. Towards establishing an implied easement “it must be reasonably inferable from the existing disposition and use that it was intended to be continuous, notwithstanding the severance of ownership.” Id.
As acknowledged by the majority, Re-vetts sufficiently established that “the driveway loop had been used for many years prior to severance....”3 Majority opinion, page 997. Van Alstine need only have used that portion of his driveway on the east parcel as regularly as any farmer might use a turnaround near his barn or resident near his home. By showing that Van Alstine’s use of the turnaround loop was not occasional or temporary the Re-vetts established that the servitude was “permanent.”
Revetts also sufficiently established that Van Alstine's use of the driveway turnaround was “reasonably necessary” for his fair enjoyment of the west parcel. Revetts did not need to establish, as the majority suggests, that their use of the turnaround was necessary for their ingress and egress.
In attempting to define what is meant by “reasonably necessary”, Indiana courts have *1002held that while the servitude must be more than merely convenient or beneficial, it need not be strictly necessary. Shandy v. Bell (1934), 207 Ind. 215, 222, 189 N.E. 627, 630; John Hancock, supra, 103 Ind. at 589, 2 N.E. at 192; Searcy, supra, at 758. Another guide in determining the degree of necessity is the permanency, apparent purpose, and adaptability of the servitude. John Hancock, supra, 103 Ind. at 589, 2 N.E. at 192; Searcy, supra, at 758.
As I have previously shown, the turnaround drive is “permanent” as that term is used in the implied easement definition. Next, the apparent purpose of any driveway turnaround is to enable the user to drive forward when exiting the drive, instead of backing out. A driveway turnaround also gives the owner more driveway in which to park vehicles and greater access to different parts of his land and outbuildings, such as Van Alstine’s barn, which may be situated around the turnaround. As to adaptability, without that part of Van Al-stine’s drive on Horstmans’ property the drive has no turnaround. To maintain a turnaround the drive would have to be relocated which, testimony established, would have required extensive re-landscaping.
Besides the above evidence, Van Alstine orally conditioned the sale to Horstmans of the ten foot strip on Van Alstine’s continued use of that portion of his turnaround which would then be on Horstmans’ property. Also, it was Horstmans’ understanding that they were not buying that part of the driveway within the ten foot strip, just the title to the strip so that they could continue to build their home where it had been started. Finally, Van Alstine represented to Revetts that the part of his driveway turnaround on Horstmans’ property was included in the sale of the west parcel.
When determining if the turnaround was reasonably necessary for Van Alstine’s fair enjoyment of the west parcel, it must be remembered that an implied easement is based on the unexpressed intent of the parties as inferred from the circumstances existing at the time ownership is severed. 2 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property, § 351, at 295 (1980).
“The inference drawn represents an attempt to ascribe an intention to parties who had not thought or had not bothered to put the intention into words, or perhaps more often, to parties who actually had formed no intention conscious to themselves. In the latter aspect, the implication approaches in fact, if not in theory, crediting the parties with an intention which they did not have, but which they probably would have had had they actually foreseen what they might have foreseen from information available at the time of the conveyance. In determining implications of this character, the tendency is to isolate and to assign a specific value to such factors as frequently recur. Thus, it may be said that where the factor of necessity exists a particular implication arises. Properly, however, the implication involves a consideration of all the factors present. They are variables rather than absolutes. None can be given a fixed value. Each affects the decision as to the implication arising from all in a different degree in different situations.”
Restatement of Property § 476, comment a at 2978 (1944). This rationale was recognized in John Hancock.
“The application of the rule must depend upon the nature, arrangement and use of the estate, the relation of the parts to each other, and the existing degree of necessity for giving such construction to the grant as will give effect to what may be supposed to have been, considering the manner of the use, the reasonable intendment of the parties.... ”
John Hancock, supra, 103 Ind. at 587, 2 N.E. at 191.
While I concede that the evidence on reasonable necessity was not overabundant, I believe it was sufficient in light of the overall circumstances surrounding the conveyance, including the understanding of the parties regarding their relationship. Because there is sufficient evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom from which the trial court could have found that Re-vetts have an implied easement over Fisch-ers’ property, the general judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
. The diagram below illustrates the property situation discussed in the text:
. Unlike some jurisdictions, Indiana requires “reasonable necessity” for both easements impliedly granted and easements impliedly reserved. Shandy v. Bell (1934), 207 Ind. 215, 222, 189 N.E. 627, 630; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Patterson (1885), 103 Ind. 582, 586, 2 N.E. 188, 192.
. Mr. Revett testified that the driveway had been there since at least 1945.