dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority that this case presents a legal condition totally distinguishable from the precedent established by Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 231. In that case, the Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that the defendants owed Quinn a duty of reasonable care where the defendant “pressured” Quinn by requiring him to consume alcoholic beverages past the point of intoxication before allowing him membership in their fraternity. (155 Ill. App. 3d at 237.) The court found that although Quinn’s participation was voluntary,
“membership *** was a ‘much valued status.’ It can be assumed that great social pressure was applied to plaintiff to comply with the fraternity’s membership ‘qualifications,’ perhaps to the extent of blinding plaintiff to any dangers he might face.” 155 Ill. App. 3d at 237.
The majority finds Quinn distinguishable since the plaintiff did not “specifically allege that she would lose her apartment if she failed to follow the rule regarding snow removal.” (207 Ill. App. 3d at 919.) They state that “[a]t best, plaintiff’s allegations indicate that she complied with the snow removal rule because she was concerned that her failure to follow the rule might cause her to lose her apartment.” 207 Ill. App. 3d at 919.
The record is clear that the requirement that tenants shovel snow was contained in a rule propounded by the landlord. The only authority that a landlord has for creating rules for tenants is that authority created by the landlord-tenant relationship. It was therefore reasonable for Mrs. Williams to believe that if she violated the snow-shoveling rule she would be in violation of her lease and thus jeopardize her tenancy. This apprehension was fostered by the fact that the landlord did not request elderly tenants to participate in snow removal. Rather, he created a rule which, by virtue of being a rule, implied that conformance was mandatory.
The plaintiff alleged in her third amended complaint that because she is poor, she resides in a federally subsidized apartment building “for the elderly.” Further, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants required that she and the other elderly tenants remove the snow from their vehicles before the parking lot was plowed. She complied only after the floor captain demanded that she participate in the snow removal and only because she “was very desirous of maintaining a protected place to live as well as her federally rent subsidized apartment.”
As the court held in Quinn, I would hold that a legal duty was created when the landlord compelled its tenants to perform the physical act of snow removal. That duty would include an evaluation of the risks presented by the working environment when considered in light of the physical condition, including age and infirmity, of the worker-tenants. In view of that duty, I would find that the plaintiff’s third amended complaint states a cause of action in negligence. A jury could find that the defendants should surely know that their elderly tenants could easily slip and fall on the snow-and ice-covered parking lot, if they were required to go out and shovel.
The plaintiff could have reasonably believed that she would be evicted for failure to comply with the defendants’ rules. Such a fear of eviction coerced the tenant to follow blindly the rules, even though she could be injured; the tenant could not effectively refuse to shovel her parking spot since the threat of eviction loomed over her head. Since I find that a duty was created by the actions of the landlord, the plaintiff has a right to have a jury determine if that duty was breached and if it was foreseeable that an elderly tenant under these conditions would slip, fall, and break a hip. See Quinn, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 237.
The Quinn court found two independent factors created the duty. First, the court considered the requirement that the plaintiff drink intoxicants; second, it considered the defendant fraternity’s violation of an antihazing statute to support the duty. I see no reason why the equivalent of the second factor should be necessary in this case. I would hold that the plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleges that the defendants owe her a duty of reasonable care. I therefore must respectfully dissent.