dissenting:
I believe that Clay proved a prima facie case of racial discrimination, which, if rebutted by the articulation of a nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, was then established to be pretextual (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817), and the findings and decision of the Illinois Human Rights Commission were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 60, 426 N.E.2d 877.
Clay and McNeil, both black, are the only employees punished for the sordid breach of security at the Vienna Correctional Center. Neither Clay nor McNeil, correctional counselors, were assigned specific security duties. One wonders what the numerous white security officers, whose duties included the prevention of just such an occurrence in the visiting room, were doing while these activities took place. We shall never know, however, as the investigation under Captain Huff never focused on the activities of the security staff in any meaningful manner to determine its culpability by what it did or failed to do. The decision of the Human Rights Commission, affirmed on administrative review by the circuit court of Johnson County, that the investigation and discharge of Clay was pretextual and racially motivated, is amply supported in the evidence and detailed findings of fact.
It is no defense that Clay’s conduct was considered to warrant discharge by the Civil Service Commission if it were merely a racially motivated pretext for discharge. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (1976), 427 U.S. 273, 49 L. Ed. 2d 493, 96 S. Ct. 2574.