dissenting. I respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion recognizes, the State Labor Relations Act (SLRA), 21 V.S.A. §§ 1501-1623, provides no authority to appeal to this Court from a Vermont Labor Relations Board (VLRB) decision on unit certification. 162 Vt. at 574, 649 A.2d at 785. To obtain review of the VLRB decision in this case, the Library, therefore, sought a declaratory judgment and extraordinary relief in superior court pursuant to V.R.C.E 75. Where the Legislature has not provided a specific means for review, administrative action is normally reviewable under V.R.C.E 75, unless the legislation declares the administrative decision to be final. Hunt v. Village of Bristol, 159 Vt. 439, 440, 620 A.2d 1266, 1266 (1992). The SLRA does not declare that VLRB decisions are final; therefore, review in superior court under V.R.C.E 75 was the appropriate procedure in this case.
The majority holds, however, that relief sought by the Library under V.R.C.E 75 is not available because the Legislature has established a mode of appeal from all VLRB decisions in the State Employees Labor Relations Act (SELRA), 3 V.S.A. §§ 901-1007.162 Vt. at 577, 649 A.2d at 787. Neither the plain language of the statutes nor the rules of statutory construction relied on by the majority support this result.
The SLRA expressly provides that an aggrieved party may appeal to this Court from a VLRB decision on an unfair labor practices charge. 21 V.S.A. § 1623(c). The statute is silent, however, as to appeals from other decisions under the SLRA, such as the VLRB decision on unit determination and certification in this case. The majority concludes, however, that the appeal provision of SELRA provides authority to appeal to this Court from all VLRB decisions. 162 Vt. at 577, 649 A.2d at 787. SELRA provides: “Any person aggrieved by an order or decision of the board issued under the authority of this chapter may appeal on questions of law to the supreme court.” 3 V.S.A. § 1003(a) (emphasis added). The primary objective in construing a statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. We presume the Legislature intended the plain meaning of the statutory language. Bisson v. Ward, 160 Vt. 343, 348, 628 A.2d 1256, 1260 (1993). The meaning of § 1003(a) is plain on its face; it grants authority to appeal to this Court from decisions issued under *579the SELRA chapter only. It does not authorize review by this Court of decisions issued under any other chapter.
To reach a result contrary to the plain language of the statute, the majority relies on the doctrine of in pari materia and the legislative intent evidenced by the 1976 amendment to SELRA. Where the meaning of a statute is plain on its face, however, no construction is necessary. Paquette v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 83, 86, 499 A.2d 23, 26 (1985). Indeed, the purpose of construing related statutes in pari materia is to determine the legislative intent where the statute at issue is ambiguous. General Elec. Co. v. Southern Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1967). Here, the majority construes the SLRA and SELRA in pari materia to create ambiguity and then resolves it by invoking legislative intent from a 1976 amendment to SELRA codified at 3 V.S.A. § 924(d). Section 924(d) states:
In addition to its responsibilities under this chapter, the board shall carry out the responsibilities given to it under [SLRA] and when doing so shall exercise the powers and follow the procedures set out in that chapter. The board shall also carry out the responsibilities given to it under [the Municipal Employees Labor Relations Act (MERA)] and when so doing shall exercise the powers and follow the procedures set out in that chapter. (Emphasis added.)
This subsection requires the Board to follow the procedures set out in the specific statute under which it is acting. It does not indicate a legislative intent to extend the broad right of appeal provided in SELRA to persons bringing actions under the SLRA; it does not even address the right of appeal. If § 924(d) sheds any light on the issue in this case, it suggests, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, that the procedures under SELRA, MERA and the SLRA should be construed independently. By requiring separate procedures before the Board, the Legislature does not indicate an intent to merge the statutes to obtain the same procedure on appeal.
SELRA and the SLRA have the same purpose, but they serve mutually exclusive groups, and the Legislature has elected to address these two groups in separate statutes. The doctrine of in pari materia is not applicable when the target of two statutes is different. Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 118 (R.I. 1992) (statutes targeting different types of gambling facilities impose independent requirements and are not to be read in pari materia); see also State ex rel. Griffith v. City of Walnut, 193 P.2d 172, 176-77 (Kan. 1948) (no indication that legisla*580ture intended court to read verification requirement in statute on ordinance petition into statute on referendum petition). The majority nullifies the Legislature’s deliberate distinction and makes the existing appeal provisions of both the SLRA and MERA mere surplusage. See Slocum v. Department of Social Welfare, 154 Vt. 474, 481, 580 A.2d 951, 956 (1990) (Court presumes all language in statute is purposeful). I therefore dissent. I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Allen joins in this dissent.