dissenting:
The parties and the majority discuss the charitable exemption status of Fithian House. The majority suggests that it has not been established that the Department has or has not approved the building as tax exempt. Pursuant to section 108(6) of the Act, it was the duty of the Board of Review to first determine whether property should be exempt from taxation. The parties agree this was done. The Act then requires the clerk of the Board of Review "to make out and forward to the Department, a full and complete statement of all the facts in the case. The Department shall then determine whether such property is or is not legally liable to taxation. It shall notify the board of review of its decision, and the board shall correct the assessment accordingly ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 120, par. 589(6).) As stated, this was not done and Fithian House has not been granted exempt status.
Where the parking lot is located on a separate parcel, section 19.16 of the Act requires that in order for the parking lot to be exempt, the organization or individual seeking the exemption for the parking lot must have a charitable exemption for the property served by the parking lot. The use of the subject parcel as a parking lot is ancillary to the use of the adjacent property. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 120, par. 500.16.) The property owner who seeks tax exempt status must follow the requirements of the Act. The owner cannot plead ignorance of the law, nor can it evade its responsibility by not following the statute in conformity with the Illinois Constitution.
Although the parties contest the charitable nature of the Society, there is no need to address that question as it relates more appropriately to whether the museum property should be exempt from taxation, an issue which is not involved in this case.
Because the Society house building (Fithian House) does not have an approved exemption, the exemption for the parking lot must fall. I reiterate, this case does not concern taxation of the building. I do suggest the Society has a responsibility to pursue tax exempt status for Fithian House, as required by the statute, if that is its desire.
The majority also suggests that the parties agree that the standard of review is de novo. I agree the review of the decision of the trial court is de novo. However, this court does not have the prerogative to reweigh the evidence and the Department’s decision is not to be reversed unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 110 (West 1992); Citizens Utilities Co. v. Department of Revenue (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 32, 47, 488 N.E.2d 984, 990.