specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority on the maintenance issue; however, I respectfully dissent in part. I do not agree that the trial court erred by categorizing John’s sick and vacation days as marital property.
The appropriate standard of review in this case is two-fold: (1) whether, as a matter of law, sick and vacation days can be marital property, which this court reviews de novo; and (2) if so, whether the trial court’s determination that sick and vacation days in the particular case constitute marital property was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Sick and vacation days can, but may not always, be marital property. In this case, John’s sick and vacation days were earned, retained income banked for future use. The majority, by holding that sick and vacation days are not marital property, deprives Jacquie of her interest in property acquired during the marriage. That is, during the marriage, John earned those sick and vacation days by not taking time off and working more hours for the same amount of pay. Now after the dissolution of the marriage, John can use those days earned during the marriage to work fewer days for the same pay or receive cash when he retires or leaves his employment. Jacquie is not compensated for this through maintenance. The maintenance Jacquie receives stays the same regardless of the number of days John works or any compensation John receives when he retires or leaves his employment. She does not receive “additional” compensation for those sick and vacation days earned, but not used, during the marriage. The trial court’s determination that the sick and vacation days constituted marital property was not erroneous and the court’s distribution of that marital property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part.